



全球南方的知识觉醒

“全球南方与东南亚”论坛专刊

Intellectual Awakening of the Global South
Special Issue of Global South and Southeast Asia Forum

文化纵横

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知识的去殖民化与全球南方的自主发展
建构后新自由主义时代的南部理论
南方问题及其超越
普世价值「真空」期与全球南方国家的作用
殖民遗产与印尼的欠发达：一个全球南方的挑战

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修远基金会

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2025年6月10日至12日，“全球南方与东南亚”论坛在印度尼西亚雅加达举办。论坛由北京修远经济与社会研究基金会、中国传媒大学人类命运共同体研究院、上海春秋发展战略研究院、印度尼西亚大学社会与政治科学学院联合主办，全球南方网络（GSN）承办，旨在推动全球南方国家知识界之间的深入对话，探讨全球格局重塑背景下的区域合作路径与发展模式创新。与会的38位专家学者来自中国和东南亚的10个国家，涵盖政治学、社会学、经济学、发展研究、国际关系、中国研究、文化研究等多个学科，皆为各自地区与研究领域卓有影响的学者，也是推动全球南方新发展议程和知识去殖民化的重要思想力量。

此次论坛是民间力量参与构建国际话语平台，传播“人类命运共同体”理念，促进21世纪全球南方新团结协作的一次成功尝试。本期增刊是对论坛成果的整体展现，许多文章是基于论坛上的发言与讨论形成的。本期专刊特以修远基金会理事长、《文化纵横》杂志社社长杨平先生在论坛上的开幕致辞代为编辑手记。

“全球南方”是俄乌冲突之后兴起的概念，由于贴合国际政治现实，并代表了今日世界的现实与未来，所以这几年广为流行。什么是全球南方？在亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲的广大范围内，至少有150多个国家可称为全球南方国家，它们彼此之间差异很大，难以归类，因此难以定义。

尽管如此，但全球南方在如下方面明显不同于西方国家，它们是现代化道路的后来者，是西方现代化的学习模仿者，是现代世界体系的追随者，也是殖民帝国主义历史的受害者，更是不公正不合理国际秩序的受损者。二战之后，世界殖民地体系瓦解，大量的亚非拉国家获得独立。独立建国的南方国家欲建立新的世界规则和世界秩序，于是有了“万隆精神”，有了“不结盟运动”，有了“和平共处五项原则”，等等，世界因全球南方而改变。

但在现代化发展道路上，南方国家并不顺利。二战后70多年，多数南方国家仍然面对发展与建设任务的艰巨挑战。发展，仍然是全球南方的主要议程。

发展议程，长期以来一直深受西方国家影响，从发展知识、技术路线、制度建设、经济模式……南方国家莫不深受西方现代化理论与模式的影响。然而70多年的实践结果却告诉人们，西方模式并不普遍适用，西方发展理论导致的结果多是失败。在西方发展援助的几十年时间中，虽然发展援助也带来了庞大的资源，但南方国家并未摆脱贫困与落后的现状。现有西方发展援助的理念、价值和政治经济模式，

存在着大量问题，需要认真总结和反省。

历史和现实告诉人们，现代化的道路并非一条，多元与多样现代性是可能的。许多南方国家，根据自身的历史文化和现实国情，正在走出适合本国实际的现代化道路，并为南方国家提供着非西方现代化的新选择。

今天，全球南方国家的主题仍然是发展，发展命题远比“民主 vs 威权”“市场 vs 国家”等价值观争论要重要得多，需要南方国家集中全部精力一心一意谋发展。为此，探索新发展模式，研究新发展理论，应该是全球南方知识界的重要任务。

今天，已经到了南方国家知识觉醒的时代。在现代化发展道路上，南方国家要确立自己的知识自觉，建构自身的知识主体性，从对西方知识的模仿和依附的状态中摆脱出来。

“全球南方网络”（GSN）就是这样一个以全球南方知识分子为主体的跨国界民间行动，它的宗旨，是要与全球南方的知识界建立普遍的合作，通过不断的思想行动，建构南方世界适合本国、本地区、本民族的发展模式与知识话语体系，并用以指导和解释南方国家的发展事业。

东南亚地区是中国的近邻，是全球南方具有重要影响力的一极，也是曾经具有广泛影响力的“东亚模式”的重要实践主体。因此，推动东南亚知识界与中国知识界的合作，推动东南亚知识界与全球南方知识界的合作，是中国与东南亚知识界的责任。

北京修远经济与社会研究基金会是一家非营利的民间组织，以文化价值观建设为自己的宗旨和内容定位，成立近 18 年时间，支持中国思想界最有影响力的杂志《文化纵横》，并组织相关的学术研究和国际活动。目前，《文化纵横》杂志已有 320 万读者，相关研究也产生了广泛的社会影响力。修远基金会是中国民间 NGO 中具有代表性的机构。

各位教授，各位嘉宾：

世界正处于变乱交织时代，美国和西方社会的动荡，正将人类引向不可控的未来。因此，全球南方应更加自觉，参与到重建这个世界、维护人类和平、推动人类发展的伟大事业中去。

这就是“全球南方与东南亚”会议的初衷，愿与各位分享。■

修远基金会理事长 杨平

2025 年 6 月 10 日

Intellectual Awakening of the Global South:

Opening Speech at the Global South and Southeast Asia Forum

The term “Global South” gained prominence after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, because it resonates with contemporary geopolitical realities and represents the future of our world. What is the Global South? Across the vast regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, there are at least 150 countries that can be considered part of the Global South. Their huge diversity makes “Global South” a term difficult to define.

Yet, the Global South differs distinctly from the West in the following aspects: they are latecomers to modernization, learners and imitators of Western modernization models, peripheral followers in the modern world system, victims of colonial imperialism, and, moreover, bearers of an unjust and unreasonable international order. Following WWII, the collapse of the colonial system led to the independence of numerous Asian, African, and Latin American nations. The endeavor of these newly established sovereign states to establish new global rules and order gave rise to the Bandung Spirit, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and more. The world was transformed by the Global South.

However, the path to modernization has been far from smooth. Over seven decades after WWII, most Southern countries still face formidable challenges in development. Development remains the central agenda of the Global South.

The development agenda has long been influenced by the West. From development knowledge and technological approaches to institutional frameworks and economic models, southern countries have been profoundly shaped by Western modernization paradigms. Yet seven decades of practice have shown that the Western model is not universally applicable, and Western development theories have largely yielded failed outcomes. Despite decades of Western development assistance bringing substantial resources, Global South nations have yet to escape poverty and underdevelopment. The concepts, values, and political-economic models of the prevailing Western aid paradigms contain fundamental flaws, and require thorough review and critical reflection.

History and reality have shown that there is no single path to modernization, and that plural and diverse modernities are possible. Many Southern countries are forging modernization paths grounded in their own historical-cultural contexts and contemporary realities, offering non-Western approaches for fellow Southern nations.

Today, development remains the priority issue for the Global South - a priority far surpassing ideological debates like “democracy vs. authoritarianism” or “market vs. state”. Southern countries must concentrate on development as the central task. Hence, exploring new development models and theorizing alternative

frameworks constitutes an urgent intellectual mission for Global South scholars.

Today, we have entered an era of intellectual awakening for the Global South. In pursuing modernization, Southern nations must establish intellectual autonomy and construct their own knowledge systems to break free from imitative dependence on Western paradigms.


The Global South Network (GSN) embodies this transnational intellectual movement. Led by intellectuals from the Global South, it seeks to foster broad collaboration across the Global South. Through continuous intellectual engagement, GSN aims to develop localized development models and discursive frameworks that are tailored to specific national, regional, and cultural contexts, and ultimately provide guidance and explanation to the development endeavors of Southern countries.

As China's neighbor, Southeast Asia represents a pivotal force within the Global South and gave rise to the widely influential "East Asian Model". Therefore, promoting intellectual collaboration between Southeast Asian and Chinese academia, as well as between Southeast Asian and the broader Global South academia, constitutes a shared responsibility for our intellectual communities.

Longway Foundation is a nonprofit civil organization dedicated to the construction of cultural values. For over 18 years, it has supported Beijing Cultural Review — China's most influential intellectual journal — while organizing academic research and international initiatives. With 3.2 million readers, Beijing Cultural Review today has gained significant influence, making Longway Foundation one of China's most representative NGOs.

Distinguished Professors and Guests:

The world is standing at a crossroads of turbulence and transformation. The upheavals in the United States and Western societies are steering humanity toward an increasingly uncertain future. At this critical juncture, the Global South must act with heightened consciousness — to actively engage in the monumental task of rebuilding our world, safeguarding human peace, and promoting human development.

This is the vision of the Global South and Southeast Asia Forum. I am honored to share it with you. 

Yang Ping,
Chairman, Longway Foundation
June 10, 2025

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[编者按]

2025年6月10日至12日，由北京修远经济与社会研究基金会、中国传媒大学人类命运共同体研究院、印度尼西亚大学社会与政治科学学院联合主办的“全球南方与东南亚”论坛在印度尼西亚雅加达举办。会议旨在推动全球南方国家知识界之间的深入对话，探讨全球格局重塑背景下的区域合作路径与发展模式创新。与会的38位专家学者来自中国和东南亚的10个国家，皆为各自地区卓有影响的学者，也是推动全球南方新发展议程的重要思想力量。

当前，全球知识格局处于深刻变动期，西方主流理论及其话语体系面临挑战，东南亚学者普遍展现出摆脱西方知识体系、争取话语自主与发展主导权的强烈意愿。本次论坛即是推动南方国家交流与合作、建设反对霸权的全球南方知识网络的一次努力。

知识的去殖民化与全球南方的自主发展^{*}

——“全球南方与东南亚”会议综述

修远基金会

[关键词] 知识去殖民化 自主发展 全球南方

从万隆会议到全球南方

“全球南方”是数百年殖民主义掠夺在地球版图上投下的阴影。以人均GDP衡量，包括中国在内的全球南方国家普遍呈现出与全球北方国家相对贫困的状况，这一差距的根源可追溯至殖民主义。全球南方国家都有被殖民或被殖民国家统治和掠夺的经历。以印度尼西亚为例，荷兰殖民统治期间的巨额财富掠夺，导致该国在1950年独立之初工业基础薄弱、教育水平低下、文盲率居高不下，并背负了殖民者遗留的沉重外债。这种因殖民掠夺而陷入极端贫困的境遇，在独立初期的中国、印度及众多东南亚国家中具有普遍性。

第二次世界大战以来，西方殖民体系虽然在形式上趋于瓦解，但其内在的等级秩序与权力结构依然存续，并与新兴独立国家建立更平等国际秩序的努力形成持续的紧张关系。印度尼西亚前总统苏加诺在1955年万隆会议的开幕致辞中便已预见到：殖民主义在形式上结束后，将以新的形态持续存在。而在殖民主义诸多剥夺形式中，最深层的是对想象力的剥夺。20世纪80年代，撒切尔夫夫人曾有一个著名的表达“TINA”——“别无选择”（There is no alternative）。在新自由主义浪潮下，市场化、私有化、去监管化等信条成为不容置疑的金科玉律，被全球几乎所有国家所接受。这种以市场为导向、高度个人主义的

意识形态，被塑造为人类共同未来的唯一驱动力。当时由西方主导的世界体系，掌握了工业化与全球扩张的技术及方法，而大部分南方国家则缺乏相应的能力。这种物质与认知上的双重不平等，导致全球南方国家在面对强势的外部力量时，逐渐丧失了以自身方式塑造世界未来的信心。此种状态可被界定为本体论失能（Ontological Incapacity）。即在本体论层面失去了对世界的未来进行自主想象的能力。弗朗西斯·福山于1989年提出的“历史终结论”亦是此种思潮的延续，其观点认为人类制度的探索已臻终点，美国模式即为最终答案。

上述关于“别无选择”“历史终结”的叙事，反映了20世纪80年代以来政治和知识界的理论天真。对于南方国家而言，以“华盛顿共识”作为总结的新自由主义议程，通过推动贸易与外国投资自由化，重构了新的依附关系，逆转了这些国家在独立后为摆脱殖民遗绪所做的努力。此后，殖民主义又呈现出两种新的表现形式。其一，金融资本的崛起模糊或掩盖了直接投

资和金融投资之间的差异。其二，与技术有关的新统治形式的出现，使知识产权成为国际竞争的核心要素之一，深刻改变了国家间技术竞争、产业发展的规则与格局，也奠定了此后中美之间技术竞争的框架。

无论是华盛顿共识还是后来的新统治形式，西方主导的现代性方案留给南方国家的是一系列问题，如对原材料的出口和结构性依赖、外国资本渗透、气候脆弱性、环境退化、债务负担和外部冲击。面对这些挑战，全球南方国家迫切需要建构自身的发展框架，而非依赖长期以来沿袭的全球化模式。

万隆会议70年后的今天，全球南方代表85%的世界人口，贡献了近40%的全球GDP，预计到2030年将拥有世界四大经济体中的三个，即中国、印度和印度尼西亚。万隆会议所代表的历史时刻，不应沦于怀旧情绪，而应被转化为推动世界变革的现实动力。万隆精神的复兴，正体现了全球南方国家追求更美好未来的共同愿景与政治实践。



万隆会议所代表的历史时刻，不应沦于怀旧情绪，而应被转化为推动世界变革的现实动力

建立主体性的南方知识

全球南方不仅是一个地理范畴，而且是一个知识和政治的场域。在全球知识生产体系中，作为前殖民宗主国的全球北方长期占据中心地位，将自身定位为知识的生产者，而将南方视为被研究的对象与数据的提供者。这种源于殖民主义的知识权力结构，导致了人文社会科学领域普遍存在一种认识论上的“欧洲中心主义”，将欧洲的特定期历史经验与视角伪装成普世真理。例如，11到13世纪之间，欧洲人和穆斯林之间就巴勒斯坦归属问题发生了一系列战争，无论在印尼语、阿拉伯语或波斯语中——也就是说，在几乎所有语言里，欧洲人屡次前往巴勒斯坦并与当地穆斯林开战这件事都被称作“十字军东征”。这一命名源自欧洲人将其视为基督教对抗伊斯兰教的战争。然而，对于当时的伊斯兰世界而言，这并非纯粹的宗教冲突。当时伊斯兰教控制下的巴勒斯坦和平生活着不少阿拉伯基督徒，而且当欧洲基督徒前往巴勒斯坦时，他们也

会抢劫和杀害东正教徒。直到欧洲殖民势力快速扩张的19世纪，随着欧洲教育在全球范围的传播，穆斯林才开始在阿拉伯语、波斯语或马来语中使用“十字军东征”一词。词语的使用，实际上反映了他们对于当时世界的理解方式。

同样，对麦哲伦首次环球航行的纪念，在欧洲中心叙事中被塑造为一项全人类的伟大成就与地理大发现的里程碑。然而，从全球南方的视角审视，欧洲人的地理“发现”实则标志着长达数百年血腥殖民统治的开端，是一场文明的灾难而非庆典。“发现新大陆”这类表述，抹杀了美洲原住民早已存在的事实，而非洲人甚至很可能在哥伦布之前就知道美洲的存在甚至登陆美洲。

在人文社会科学界，虚假普世主义的危害不止于叙事扭曲，更在于其对全球南方本土声音的压制。它通过否定非西方文明的复杂性与能动性，为殖民征服提供了合理化依据。例如，将美洲原住民社会描绘为没有国家治理能力、缺乏复杂政治思想与宗教的“前文明”状态，这种智识上的贬低与抹除，



从全球南方的视角审视，欧洲人地理“发现”是一场文明的灾难而非庆典

为殖民者的占领与统治铺平了道路。这一逻辑与 19 世纪犹太复国主义兴起时对巴勒斯坦的说法如出一辙。其“一片无主之地，留给无地之人”（A land without a people for a people without a land）的口号，正是通过虚构一个“没有文明”的巴勒斯坦，来论证其殖民项目的正当性。

这种客体化逻辑同样存在于文化领域。许多文化政策将文化视为审美装饰或旅游宣传的工具，却忽视了其背后深层的知识体系。联合国教科文组织等机构的文化遗产保护项目，也倾向于将文化固化为特定历史节点的静态产物，而非一种持续演进的鲜活实践。全球南方国家需要重拾文化主体性，认识到文化不仅是经济或政治变革的背景，更是社会想象与表达变革的核心结构。它关乎如何将全球南方塑造为一个具有共同愿景的共同体。从 20 世纪的亚非作家会议和亚非电影节，到当今数字媒介时代跨国界的文化交流，文化始终是构想另类世界观与超越国界团结的力量。因此，若要自主定义未来，全球南方必须将文化视为构想团结与认同感的核心动力，而非停留在过去的“化石”或经济发展的点缀层面。

超越“发展主义”

对发展主义的传统叙事，通常将其定位为西方沿其发展道路形成的一种理论范式。然而，其真正的实践源头可追溯至更早的全球南方。早在杜鲁门“第四点计划”将“发展”议程化之前半个世纪，即 19 世纪末至 20 世纪初，全球南方内部的三个关键板块——拉丁美洲、晚清中国及奥斯曼帝国——已独立开启了各自的工业化进程。这些早期实践共享一个核心特征：强调国家在经济转型中的能动作用，无论是通过

官办企业还是政府主导的工业化政策。

因此，发展主义本是全球南方实践的结晶。二战以后，布雷顿森林体系的建立与发展援助的系统化，标志着西方开始在认识论层面收编并重构发展主义。发展经济学（如罗斯托的起飞理论）与社会学（如帕森斯的社会进化论）共同赋予发展主义以西方色彩，从而确立了西方在发展知识体系中的霸权地位。此后，由于知识生产机制与能力的结构性匮乏，全球南方在发展理论领域进入了一个漫长的“认识论静默期”。

尽管如此，南方的自主发展实践从未中断，各国始终按照自身的政治、社会、经济、文化特点去探索自己的发展道路，却不断受到外部力量的影响。南方国家对于自身发展道路的认识和理论化进程也没有中断，然而，这种实践与理论化的努力长期被西方中心主义的强大话语权和知识生产能力所遮蔽。西方知识界倾向于运用自身的理论框架（如“发展型国家”概念）来收编和阐释南方的经验，而对于发展主义的批判性论述，如埃斯科瓦尔的“遭遇发展”论，也未能摆脱西方主导的发展议程与知识范式的钳制。南方在全球知识场域中丧失了自我表述和对话的能力。“摸着石头过河”“发展是硬道理”等实践经验，难以被置于主导性理论范式中进行有效言说。

直至 20 世纪 90 年代，随着全球南方经济力量的显著崛起，其进行理论赋权与自我阐释的自信才得以重建。新发展主义正是在此背景下应运而生的理论自觉。如果说传统发展主义的诞生与全球南方的初步形成同步，那么新发展主义的兴起则与全球南方的整体性崛起同步。它精准地把握了 20 世纪 90 年代以来世界政治经济格局的变化，将全球南方的关注点从新自由主义话语下的民主、人权等议题重新转向国

家能力、国家—社会关系，以及国际贸易与金融等根本性的发展问题。在此进程中，中国作为发展主义的最早实践者与发展主义的关键贡献者，为重构一个更具包容性与多元性的全球发展知识体系，提供了核心的理论与实践参照。

新发展主义并非单一的理论体系，而是源自对新自由主义及传统发展主义实践反思的一系列思想与政策主张的集合。本体论上，它解构了西方现代化的线性目的论，肯定了多元发展路径的合法性；认识论上，它超越“唯增长论”，强调以人为本、环境友好及社会文化的内在价值。因此，新发展主义必然兼顾经济发展、社会改造和创造人人平等的社会结构，同时也要反对不平等的国际体系。其核心在于将“国家能力建设”置于先决地位，主张通过强化国家在经济中的能动作用，将工业化普遍规律与本国具体国情相结合，以确保在汇率控制、资本监管、产业政策等领域的经济主权，最终探索出一条具有普遍意义的、通往可持续繁荣的自主现代化道路。

新自由主义之后

今天，东南亚各国正在出现一种后新自由主义的发展模式，它将现代化与当地实际相结合、将国家与市场相结合，并将包容性和可持续性置于转型的核心。

在发展战略上，国家和市场的关系就像一对历史的钟摆，在国家主导和市场至上之间摇摆不定。20世纪60~70年代，全球南方的主要发展模式是由国家主导的。受到欧洲战后国家规划成功的启发，加上新独立国家对自力更生的渴望，东南亚国家普遍实行以进口替代、工业化、关税保护和国有企业扩张为中心的发展战略，这意味着国家制订经济蓝图、国家主导基础

设施建设和对关键部门的集中控制。例如，菲律宾建立了大型国有企业，在高关税壁垒的保护下促进本地制造业的发展。泰国同样实施了五年计划，并在银行、运输和工业领域促进了企业发展。

然而，到了20世纪70年代末，由于债务增加、效率低下和生产率停滞不前，国家主导工业化的时代开始动摇。20世纪80年代初的债务危机迎来了一个急转弯，市场原教旨主义席卷了全球南方，包括东南亚。在多边机构的支持或压力下，各国采用了基于华盛顿共识的结构调整方案，强调自由化、去管制和私有化，国家被认为是低效的，市场则是神圣不可侵犯的。例如，菲律宾积极地将公用事业私有化，并开放资本流动。

此后出现了一系列警钟：1997年亚洲金融危机、2008年国际金融危机，以及最近的新冠疫情危机。这些危机说明，国家不能仅仅是经济的监管者。于是，激进的财政政策回归，过去被视为禁忌的产业政策重新出台，贸易和投资战略变得更有选择性和战略性。可以说，国家—市场的钟摆已经摆回，国家正在发挥更加平衡的作用。这种重新平衡并非凭空出现。它大量借鉴了东亚的经验，尤其是日本、韩国、中国大陆和中国台湾地区的发展模式。这些国家和地区的经验表明，市场是发展的必要条件，但不是充分条件。重要的是国家如何利用市场，以及如何建立学习、适应和引领的制度。

东亚模式以战略性的国家干预为基础。政府协调产业升级，支持关键部门，保护新兴产业（初创企业），并在人力资本和研发方面进行大规模投资。他们对贸易自由化进行了排序，并确保技术转移到国家商业合作中。中国以前所未有的规模采用了这种模式，将国家资本主义与全球一体化

基础设施、特殊经济区、国有龙头企业和专家主导的制造业结合起来。东南亚也从东亚学到了经验。在模仿与创新之间的东盟混合发展模式，东南亚并没有全盘采用东亚模式。相反，东南亚国家制定了混合战略，将自由的经济原则与因地制宜的产业政策、区域一体化和社会投资结合起来。例如，新加坡经济发展局前瞻性地布局未来产业，并通过淡马锡控股确保国家战略意图的实现。泰国则以“泰国 4.0”战略和东部经济走廊为抓手，系统性地推动高科技工业化。越南巧妙地将外国直接投资与培育本土供应链相结合，而印度尼西亚利用出口禁令等手段倒逼国内加工业升级，提升产品附加值。菲律宾亦在更新其发展蓝图，强调重建国内产业能力，而非简单吸引外资。这些举措共同彰显了国家在塑造区域经济未来中的核心作用。

这些例子反映了新时代的务实思维：没有教条，只有行得通的东西。当下，产业政策又遇上了新的地缘政治环境。特朗普重返美国政治舞台后对全球化的强烈抵制，

都标志着从基于规则的多边主义向地缘现实主义的转变。如今，西方产业政策披上了国家安全和战略再耦合的外衣，而东盟国家将产业政策与贸易和投资战略相结合的做法正在全球范围内得到效仿。与新自由主义的分离不同，东盟对待贸易与发展的做法更具整体性。

东南亚的发展经验表明：第一，拒绝新自由主义教条并不意味着拒绝市场。反而，它意味着战略性地利用市场、有序推进改革、投资国家能力建设与促进竞争以抑制寡头垄断。第二，这些经验突出了国家能力的核心地位，不仅在监管方面，更是在愿景设定、政策连贯性和制度学习方面。第三，发展不是一个固定公式，而是一个过程，需要战略与当地实际情况相契合，向他人学习并不断调整。第四，发展需要进一步强调包容性和可持续性，不仅在成果上，而且在设计上。未来，突出经济自主与知识主体性，充分发挥地方能动性，重视社会正义、数字技术创新与生态的可持续性，将是南方世界发展的新意涵。



东盟国家将产业政策与贸易和投资战略相结合的做法正在全球范围内得到效仿

不确定世界中的南南合作

当前，全球地缘政治与经济秩序正经历深刻重构。二战后建立的部分全球治理体系面临挑战，为区域性力量，特别是中国与东南亚国家，开辟了拓宽和深化合作的战略空间。在这一复杂且充满不确定性的背景下，东南亚国家普遍寻求通过伙伴关系多元化来分散风险、拓展市场并探索新的增长机遇。作为该区域最具活力的多边平台，东盟（ASEAN）不仅是其成员国利益的协调者，也日益成为塑造未来世界新秩序的重要力量。

东盟作为世界第四大经济体，其在全球舞台上的核心竞争力源于其独特的创立与运作逻辑：以地缘经济学为内核，并以此为工具来有效管理复杂的地缘政治现实。这一原则根植于其 1967 年的成立背景。当时，印度尼西亚与马来西亚之间的对抗使创始成员国深刻认识到，必须超越政治分歧，通过经济合作构建共同利益，以“不干涉内政”为基础，维护区域稳定与繁荣。

在其 2023 年发布的《东盟共同体愿景 2045》中，东盟重申了其地缘经济思维，将加强全球价值链、数字经济与绿色经济作为未来发展的核心支柱。即便是面对成员国间的领土争端等敏感地缘政治问题，东盟依然倾向于运用地缘经济的合作框架来缓和管理矛盾。东盟的成功在于，它证明了在一个政治制度（包括四个君主制与两个社会主义国家）、宗教文化（包括世界三大宗教）极度多元的区域，国家间无需趋同，而是可以通过有效的合作机制来管理差异、共创繁荣。

对于中国而言，东盟提供了一个连接各利益相关方的宝贵外交平台。在诸多区域对话机制中，东盟的中心地位与中国的

合作伙伴角色形成互补，为区域合作提供了平衡且高效的平台。这种被称为“全球东盟”（Global ASEAN）的模式，使得东盟能够超越地理邻近性，与金砖国家等区域外机制建立对话渠道，进一步提升其全球影响力。在此框架下，中国与东盟的合作日益深化，尤其是在“一带一路”倡议的推动下。2013 年，“21 世纪海上丝绸之路”构想正是在中国领导人访问东盟期间提出的。近十年来，东南亚已成为共建“一带一路”成果最为集中的地区之一。其中，柬埔寨的经验尤为突出，它提供了一个边缘经济体如何通过发挥战略能动性 with 坚持主权自主，成功利用外部合作实现国家现代化的样本。

传统发展理论中的“中心—边缘”结构，常导致边缘经济体在与中心国家的互动中陷入依赖。然而，柬埔寨在与“一带一路”的对接中，通过精巧的制度设计与战略规划，成功构建了一种相互依存而非单向依赖的合作关系。柬埔寨政府将“一带一路”倡议与本国的“五角战略”紧密结合，优先发展基础设施、人力资本、可持续增长与机构能力建设。通过战略性地采用 BOT（建设—经营—转让）模式和优惠融资，柬埔寨在利用中国资本与技术的同时，确保了项目最终的资产所有权，有效规避了潜在的债务风险，并保证了“一带一路”项目服务于本国的长期发展要务。2017~2022 年，“一带一路”倡议相关项目有力推动了柬埔寨 GDP 实现年均 6% 至 7% 的增长；农产品对华出口增长 30%，其中大米出口的 70% 销往中国市场。柬埔寨的案例充分证明，通过成熟的谈判与战略对接，发展伙伴关系可以实现真正的双边互惠，这一模式与新自由主义市场驱动的典范截然不同。柬埔寨与“一带一路”倡议的战略合作说明，南方国家有能力驾

驭全球经济结构，挑战新自由主义。这对全球南方国家的现代化具有重要借鉴意义。

在当前开放的多边贸易秩序受到挑战、国际规则面临侵蚀的背景下，中小国家虽无法主导宏观战略环境，但仍可通过积极主动的合作，在三个关键领域开拓发展空间：

第一，深化区域内部合作，维护开放经济与多边主义。中国—东盟自由贸易区

(CAFTA) 3.0 版的谈判升级即是典范。新版自贸协定不仅涵盖传统贸易领域，更将数字经济、绿色经济和供应链互联互通等新兴议题纳入其中，为区域经济一体化注入了新的动力。

第二，与其他关键区域伙伴合作，开拓新市场以分散风险。例如，《太平洋联盟—新加坡自由贸易协定》的生效，为拉美与东南亚两大区域的经济联动提供了制度保障，有助于成员国在货物贸易、服务投资、电子商务等领域实现互利共赢。

第三，与主要伙伴共同探索新兴前沿领域的合作。中国与新加坡在贸易数字化领域的合作堪称标杆。两国开展的首次跨境无纸化贸易及中国、新加坡和中东的互操作性贸易数字化试点，不仅提升了企业效率、降低了交易成本，更为构建更广泛的区域数字贸易框架奠定了基础。中国在推动数字经济方面有很多前沿创新和贡献。与此同时，中国与柬埔寨的合作则彰显了基础设施建设在推动经济转型和减贫方面的关键作用。在“一带一路”倡议和澜湄合作等框架下，以 2022 年建成的金边—西港高速公路为代表的重大项目，显著改善了柬埔寨的互联互通水平，降低了

物流成本，并带动沿线经济发展。此外，针对农村的农业技术支持和职业培训也直接惠及基层社区，提升了农业生产力和粮食安全。这些务实举措成为柬埔寨发展的关键驱动力，有力推动该国多维贫困率从 2014 年的 36.7% 大幅降至 2022 年的 16.6%，凸显了以发展为导向的伙伴关系所带来的显著成效。

当然，任何深度合作都伴随着潜在挑战，如债务可持续性、环境与社会影响等。对于许多试图在快速变化的世界中驾驭复杂伙伴关系的南方国家来说，这些挑战是普遍存在的，重要的是如何应对，如何改善治理、监管监督和公众沟通。这时，东盟的区域性协商可以有助于统一标准、调解风险并建立参与框架。虽然双边合作可以带来显著的好处，但必须辅以多边协调。东盟在这方面的作用非常关键。通过将东盟的中国自由贸易区等区域倡议或互联互通总体规划与“一带一路”倡议、大湄公河次区域经济合作等中国平台对接，可以从零散的合作通道过渡到体系化的合作。

展望未来，中国与东盟的合作经验为更广泛的全球南方合作提炼出若干核心价值准则：首先是尊重发展主权，确保每个国家对其发展进程的完全掌控；其次是坚持包容性，致力于减少区域不平等，创造本土就业机会；最后是确保可持续性，这不仅关乎环境，更涉及金融与制度层面。在一个支离破碎、充满不确定性的世界里，建立在相互尊重、共同利益和主权平等基础上的南南合作，为实现全球南方的共同繁荣与可持续发展带来了曙光。■

* 本文由“全球南方与东南亚”论坛讨论内容整理而成，由《文化纵横》编辑王儒西执笔。感谢黄惠英、孔涛、李小龙、刘宏、潘玥、秦北辰、王敏、徐晋涛、许利平、殷之光、云昌耀、周咏梅、查道炯、Awang Azman Awang Pawi、Fernando T. Aldaba、Fachru Nofrian、Helio A.X. Mauquei、Hilmar Farid、Hoang Thi Ha、Jomo Kwame Sundaram、Kin Phea、Lucio Blanco Pitlo III、Lye Liang Fook、Max Lane、Narong Petprasert、Neak Chandarith、Rommel Banlaoi、Semiarto Aji Purwanto、Shandre M Thangavelu、Shofwan Choiruzzad、Syed Farid Alatas、Tran Thanh Hai、Vannarith Cheang、Vivi Alatas 等学者与专家的贡献。

Knowledge Decolonization and the Autonomous Development of the Global South*:

Summary of the Global South and Southeast Asia Forum

Longway Foundation

Keywords: knowledge decolonization, autonomous development, Global South

From the Bandung Conference to the Global South

The “Global South” is the shadow cast upon the world map by centuries of colonial plunder. Measured by GDP per capita, countries of the Global South, including China, generally exhibit a state of relative poverty compared to the Global North, a disparity rooted in colonialism. Countries of the Global South have all experienced colonization, domination, and exploitation by colonial powers. Take Indonesia, for example. The immense wealth plundered during Dutch colonial rule left the country with a weak industrial base, low education levels, high illiteracy rates, and a heavy burden of foreign debt inherited from the colonizers when it gained independence in 1950. This condition of extreme poverty resulting from colonial plunder was common among newly independent nations like China, India, and many Southeast Asian countries.

Since the end of World War II, although the Western colonial system has largely disintegrated in form, its internal hierarchical order and power structures have persisted, creating ongoing tension with the efforts of newly independent nations to establish a more equitable international order. In his opening address at the 1955 Bandung Conference, former Indonesian President Sukarno foresaw that colonialism, after its formal end, would continue to exist in new forms. Among the many forms of deprivation under colonialism, the most profound is the deprivation of imagination. In the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher famously coined the expression “TINA” — “There is no alternative.” Amid the wave of neoliberalism, doctrines such as marketization, privatization, and deregulation became unquestionable dogmas, accepted by almost all countries worldwide. This market-oriented, highly individualistic ideology was portrayed as the sole driving force for the common future of humanity. The Western-dominated world system of that time possessed the technology and methods for industrialization and global expansion, while most of the world lacked corresponding capabilities. This dual inequality, both material and cognitive, caused countries of the Global South, when faced with powerful external forces, to gradually lose confidence in shaping the world’s future in their own way. This state can be defined as Ontological Incapacity—that is, the loss of the ability to independently imagine the future of the world at an ontological level. Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History” thesis, proposed in 1989, was a continuation of this line of thought, arguing that humanity’s exploration of institutional forms had reached its end,

with the American model being the final answer.

The aforementioned narratives of “there is no alternative” and the “end of history” reflect a theoretical naïveté within political and intellectual circles since the 1980s. For the countries of the Global South, the neoliberal agenda, epitomized as the “Washington Consensus”, reconstructed new dependency relationships by promoting the liberalization of trade and foreign investment, thereby reversing the efforts these nations had made to escape their colonial legacy after independence. Subsequently, colonialism has taken two new forms. First, the rise of financial capital blurred or concealed the distinction between direct investment and financial investment. Second, the emergence of new forms of technological domination related to technology made intellectual property one of the core elements of international competition, profoundly changing the rules and landscape of technological competition and industrial development among nations, and establishing the framework for the subsequent technological competition between China and the United States.

Whether in the form of the Washington Consensus or later forms of domination, the Western-led modernization project has brought a series of problems to the Global South countries, such as structural dependency on raw material exports, foreign capital penetration, climate vulnerability, environmental degradation, debt burdens, and external shocks. Faced with these challenges, the countries of the Global South urgently need to develop their own development frameworks rather than relying on the long-established model of globalization.

Today, 70 years after the Bandung Conference, the Global South accounts for 85% of the



In the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher famously coined the expression “TINA” — “There is no alternative”.

world's population, contributes nearly 40% of global GDP, and is projected to include three of the world's four largest economies by 2030: China, India, and Indonesia. The historical moment represented by the Bandung Conference should not be reduced to nostalgia but should be transformed into a catalyst for driving global change. The revival of the Bandung Spirit embodies the shared vision and political practice of the Global South in its pursuit of a better future.

Establishing the Subjectivity of Southern Knowledge

The Global South is not merely a geographical category but also a knowledge and political domain. In the global knowledge production system, the Global North, as the former colonial metropole, has long occupied a central position, casting itself as the producer of knowledge while relegating the South to the role of research subject and data provider. This knowledge-power structure, rooted in colonialism, has led to a pervasive epistemological "Eurocentrism" in the humanities and social sciences, which disguises Europe's specific historical experiences and perspectives as universal truths. For example, the series of wars fought between Europeans and Muslims over Palestine from the 11th to the 13th centuries are referred to as the "Crusades" in Indonesian, Arabic, Persian—that is, in almost all languages. This naming originates from the European framing of the conflict as a war of Christianity against Islam. However, for the Muslim world at the time, this was not a purely religious conflict. Under Islamic rule, Palestine was home to many Arab Christians living peacefully, and when European Christians arrived in Palestine, they also robbed and killed Orthodox Christians. It was not until the 19th century, with the rapid expansion of European colonial influence and the global spread of European education, that Muslims began to use the term "Crusades" in Arabic, Persian, or Malay. The use of this terminology, in fact, reflects how their understanding of the world was reshaped through colonial epistemic dominance.

Similarly, the commemoration of Magellan's first circumnavigation of the globe is portrayed in the Eurocentric narrative as a great achievement for all humanity and a milestone in the Age of Discovery. However, viewed from the perspective of the Global South, this event and the subsequent "discoveries" by Columbus, da Gama, and others actually marked the beginning of centuries of bloody colonial rule, constituting a civilizational catastrophe rather than a celebration. Expressions like "discovering the New World" erase the fact that Indigenous peoples of the Americas had long been existing there, and historical evidence suggests that Africans may have even known about or even reached the Americas before Columbus.

In the humanities and social sciences, the harm of false universalism extends beyond narrative distortion to the suppression of local voices from the Global South. By denying the complexity and agency of non-Western civilizations, it provides legitimacy for colonial conquest. For instance, portraying Indigenous American societies as being in a "pre-civilized" state, lacking state governance, sophisticated political thought, or organized religion, served as an intellectual degradation and erasure that paved the way for the colonizers' occupation and rule. This logic closely mirrors the claims made about Palestine during the rise of Zionism in the 19th century. Its slogan, "A land without a people for a people without a land," justified its colonial project by fabricating the notion of a Palestine "without civilization."

This logic of objectification also exists in the cultural sphere. Many cultural policies treat

culture as an aesthetic ornamentation or a tool for tourism promotion, while ignoring the deep knowledge systems behind it. The cultural heritage preservation projects of organizations like UNESCO also tend to treat culture as a static artifact of a specific historical moment, rather than a living, evolving practice. Countries of the Global South need to reclaim cultural subjectivity, recognizing that culture is not merely a backdrop for economic or political change, but the core structure through which social imagination and transformation are expressed. It is essential to shaping the Global South into a community with a shared vision. From the Afro-Asian Writers' Conferences and Afro-Asian Film Festivals of the 20th century to transnational cultural exchanges in today's digital era, culture has always been a force for imagining alternative worldviews and fostering solidarity beyond national borders. Therefore, to autonomously define its future, the Global South must regard culture as the central dynamic for envisioning solidarity and identity, not as a "fossil" of the past or a superficial adjunct to economic development.

Beyond "Developmentalism"

The traditional narrative of developmentalism typically positions it as a theoretical paradigm that emerged from the West along its own developmental trajectory. However, its true practical origins can be traced back to the earlier practice in the Global South. Half a century before Truman's "Point Four Program" institutionalized "development" as a formal agenda—that is, from the late 19th to the early 20th century—three key regions within the Global South (Latin America, late Qing China, and the Ottoman Empire) had already independently initiated their own processes of industrialization. These early practices shared a core feature: the emphasis on the proactive role of the state in economic transformation, whether through state-owned enterprises or state-led industrialization policies.

Thus, developmentalism was originally a product of diverse practices across the Global South. After World War II, the establishment of the Bretton Woods system and the systematization of development aid marked the West's epistemological appropriation and reconfiguration of developmentalism. Development economics (e.g., Rostow's take-off theory) and sociology (e.g., Parsons' theory of social evolution) collectively lent developmentalism a Western veneer, thereby consolidating Western hegemony within the knowledge system of development. Subsequently, due to a structural deficit in knowledge production mechanisms and capacities, the Global South entered a prolonged period of "epistemic silence" in the field of development theory.

Nevertheless, the practical pursuit of autonomous development in the Global South has never ceased. Countries have consistently explored their own development paths in accordance with their unique political, social, economic, and cultural characteristics—albeit under continuous influence from external forces. The process of understanding and theorizing their own development trajectories has also persisted, yet these efforts have long been overshadowed by the dominant discourse and knowledge production capacity of Western-centric perspectives. Western academia tends to appropriate and interpret the experiences of the Global South through its own theoretical frameworks, such as the concept of the "developmental state." Even critical discourses on developmentalism, such as Escobar's "encountering development," remain constrained by Western-dominated development agendas and knowledge paradigms. As a result, the Global South has been largely deprived

of the ability for self-representation and dialogue within global knowledge production. Practical experiences, such as “crossing the river by feeling the stones” and “development is the absolute principle,” have struggled to be articulated effectively within dominant theoretical frameworks.

It was not until the 1990s, with the significant economic rise of the Global South, that the region regained confidence in theoretical empowerment and self-interpretation. “New developmentalism” emerged precisely as a form of theoretical self-consciousness under these circumstances. If the emergence of traditional developmentalism coincided with the initial formation of the Global South, the rise of new developmentalism is aligned with its comprehensive ascendancy. It accurately captures the transformations in the global political and economic landscape since the 1990s, redirecting the focus of the Global South from issues such as democracy and human rights under neoliberal discourse back to fundamental development concerns, including state capacity, state–society relations, and international trade and finance. In this process, China, as one of the earliest practitioners of developmentalism and a key contributor to new developmentalism, has provided a central theoretical and practical reference for reconstructing a more inclusive and pluralistic global knowledge system on development.

New developmentalism is not a monolithic theoretical system, but rather a set of ideas and policy proposals stemming from critical reflections on the practices of neoliberalism and traditional developmentalism. Ontologically, it deconstructs the linear teleology of Western modernization and affirms the legitimacy of diverse development paths. Epistemologically, it moves beyond “growth-only-ism,” emphasizing people-centered development, environmental sustainability, and the intrinsic value of socio-cultural dimensions. Thus, new developmentalism necessarily aims to integrate economic development, social transformation, and the establishment of an equitable social structure, while also opposing unequal international systems. At its core, it prioritizes “state capacity building,” advocating for an enhanced role of the state in the economy to combine the universal principles of industrialization with specific national conditions. This approach safeguards economic sovereignty in areas such as exchange rate control, capital regulation, and industrial policy making, ultimately paving a self-determined path toward modernization with universal relevance and sustainable prosperity.

After Neoliberalism

Today, Southeast Asian nations are witnessing the emergence of a post-neoliberal development path—one that integrates modernization with local conditions, combines state and market forces, and places social inclusion and sustainability at the core of economic transformation.

In development strategy, the relationship between the state and the market resembles a historical pendulum, swinging between state dominance and market supremacy. During the 1960s and 1970s, the predominant development model in the Global South was state-led. Inspired by the success of postwar state planning in Europe and driven by the desire for self-reliance among newly independent nations, Southeast Asian countries widely adopted strategies centered on import substitution, industrialization, tariff protection, and

the expansion of state-owned enterprises. This entailed state-directed economic blueprints, state-led infrastructure development, and centralized control over key sectors. For instance, the Philippines established large state-owned enterprises to promote domestic manufacturing behind high tariff barriers. Thailand similarly implemented five-year plans and fostered enterprise development in banking, transportation, and industry.

By the late 1970s, however, the state-led model began to falter due to mounting debt, inefficiency, and stagnant productivity. The debt crisis of the early 1980s marked a sharp turn, as market fundamentalism swept across the Global South, including Southeast Asia. Under the influence or pressure of multilateral institutions, countries of the Global South adopted structural adjustment programs based on the Washington Consensus, emphasizing liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. The state was viewed as inefficient, while the market was regarded as sacrosanct. The Philippines, for example, aggressively privatized public utilities and liberalized capital flows.

A series of wake-up calls followed—the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, and more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. These crises revealed that the state cannot serve merely as an economic regulator. In response, expansionary fiscal policies have made a comeback, industrial policies once deemed taboo have been revived, and trade and investment strategies have become more selective and strategic. It can be argued that the state–market pendulum has swung back, with the state now assuming a more balanced role. This rebalancing did not occur in a vacuum. It draws heavily on East Asian experiences, particularly the development models of Japan, the Republic of Korea, China’s Taiwan region, and mainland China. These cases demonstrate that the market is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development. What matters is how the state makes use of the market and builds institutions capable of learning, adapting, and leading.

The East Asian model is founded on strategic state intervention. Governments coordinate industrial upgrading, support key sectors, protect infant industries, and make substantial investments in human capital and R&D. They sequenced trade liberalization and facilitated technology transfer through national business cooperation. China adopted this model on an unprecedented scale, merging state capitalism with global integration through infrastructure development, special economic zones, state-owned leading enterprises, and expertise-driven manufacturing. Southeast Asia, too, has drawn lessons from East Asia. In a hybrid ASEAN development model that blends imitation and innovation, the region did not adopt the East Asian approach wholesale. Instead, countries crafted mixed strategies incorporating liberal economic principles with context-sensitive industrial policies, regional integration, and social investment. For example, Singapore’s Economic Development Board strategically plans future industries and implements national strategic objectives through Temasek Holdings. Thailand is systematically advancing high-tech industrialization via its “Thailand 4.0” strategy and the Eastern Economic Corridor initiative. Vietnam skillfully combines foreign direct investment with the cultivation of domestic supply chains, while Indonesia uses tools such as export bans to spur upgrading in domestic processing and enhance value addition. The Philippines, too, is updating its development plan to emphasize rebuilding domestic industrial capabilities rather than merely attracting foreign investment. Together, these efforts underscore the central role of the state in shaping the region’s economic future.

These examples reflect a new era of pragmatic thinking—one that rejects dogma and focuses

on what works. In the current context, industrial policy is intersecting with a new geopolitical environment. The return of Trump to the U.S. political scene and his strong opposition to globalization signify a shift from rules-based multilateralism toward geopolitical realism. Today, Western industrial policy is couched in terms of national security and strategic realignment, while the ASEAN approach—integrating industrial policy with trade and investment strategies—is gaining emulation worldwide. Unlike the neoliberal tendency toward fragmentation, ASEAN's approach to trade and development is more holistic.

The development experience in Southeast Asia offers several insights: First, rejecting neoliberal dogma does not mean rejecting the market. Rather, it entails using the market strategically, pursuing reforms in a phased manner, investing in state capacity, and promoting competition to curb monopolies and oligopolies. Second, these experiences highlight the central importance of state capacity—not only in regulation but also in vision setting, policy coherence, and institutional learning. Third, development is not a fixed formula but a dynamic process that requires aligning strategy with local conditions, learning from others, and continuously adapting. Fourth, development must further emphasize inclusiveness and sustainability—not only in outcomes but also in design. Looking ahead, highlighting economic autonomy and intellectual agency, fully leveraging local initiative, and prioritizing social justice, digital innovation, and ecological sustainability will constitute the new dimensions of development in the Global South.

South-South Cooperation in an Uncertain World

The global geopolitical and economic order is currently undergoing profound restructuring. Elements of the post-World War II global governance system face mounting challenges, creating strategic space for regional actors—particularly China and Southeast Asian nations—to broaden and deepen their cooperation. Against this complex and uncertain backdrop, countries in Southeast Asia are widely seeking to diversify their partnerships to mitigate risks, expand markets, and explore new growth opportunities. As the region's most dynamic multilateral platform, ASEAN serves not only as a coordinator of its member states' interests but also as an increasingly influential force in shaping the future world order.

As the world's fourth-largest economy, ASEAN's core competitiveness on the global stage stems from its unique founding and operational logic: it adopts geoeconomics as a core principle and a practical tool to navigate complex geopolitical realities. This approach is rooted in its establishment in 1967. At that time, the "Confrontation" between Indonesia and Malaysia led the founding members to a crucial realization: they must transcend political differences and build common interests through economic cooperation, upholding regional stability and prosperity based on the principle of "non-interference in internal affairs."

In ASEAN Community Vision 2045, released in 2023, ASEAN reaffirmed its geoeconomic approach, identifying strengthened global value chains, the digital economy, and the green economy as core pillars for future development. Even when confronting sensitive geopolitical issues such as territorial disputes among member states, ASEAN prefers to employ geoeconomic frameworks to de-escalate and manage conflicts. ASEAN's success demonstrates that in a region marked by extreme diversity in political systems—including four monarchies and two socialist states—and religious cultures, countries need not

pursue institutional convergence. Instead, they can manage differences and achieve shared prosperity through effective cooperation mechanisms.

For China, ASEAN offers a valuable platform for engaging with multiple stakeholders. Within various regional dialogue mechanisms, ASEAN's centrality complements China's role as a partner, providing a balanced and efficient framework for regional cooperation. This model, often termed "Global ASEAN," allows the bloc to transcend geographical confines and establish dialogue channels with extra-regional mechanisms such as BRICS, further expanding its global influence. Within this framework, China-ASEAN cooperation has continued to deepen, notably under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The concept of the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" was first proposed during Chinese leaders' visit to ASEAN in 2013. Over the past decade, Southeast Asia has become one of the regions with the most concentrated achievements in BRI cooperation. Cambodia's experience is particularly noteworthy, offering a model for how a peripheral economy can leverage external cooperation to achieve national modernization through strategic agency and sovereign autonomy.

Traditional development theory's "core-periphery" structure often leads peripheral economies into dependency in their interactions with core countries. However, through its engagement with the BRI, Cambodia has constructed a relationship of interdependence rather than one-way dependency by means of sophisticated institutional design and strategic planning. The Cambodian government closely aligned the BRI with its national "Pentagonal Strategy," prioritizing infrastructure, human capital, sustainable growth, and institutional capacity building. By strategically adopting the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model and preferential financing, Cambodia utilized Chinese capital and technology while retaining ultimate asset ownership—effectively mitigating debt risks and ensuring that BRI projects serve long-term national development priorities. From 2017 to 2022, BRI-related projects contributed significantly to Cambodia's average annual GDP growth of 6~7%; agricultural exports to China increased by 30%, with 70% of its rice exports destined for the Chinese market. Cambodia's experience demonstrates that through mature negotiation and strategic alignment, development partnerships can achieve genuine mutual benefit—a clear contrast to the neoliberal market-driven paradigm. Cambodia's strategic engagement with the BRI illustrates how Global South countries can navigate global economic structures and challenge neoliberal orthodoxy, offering important lessons for other nations in the region.

In the current context, where open multilateral trading orders are under strain and international rules are being eroded, small and medium-sized countries may not dominate the macro-strategic environment, but they can still carve out development space through proactive cooperation in three key areas:


First, deepen intra-regional cooperation to uphold an open economy and multilateralism. The upgraded China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 3.0 negotiations are a prime example. The new version of the agreement covers not only traditional trade areas but also incorporates emerging issues such as the digital economy, green economy, and supply chain connectivity, injecting new momentum into regional economic integration.

Second, cooperate with other key regional partners to open new markets and diversify risks. For instance, the entry into force of the Pacific Alliance-Singapore Free Trade Agreement provides an institutional guarantee for economic connectivity between Latin America and

Southeast Asia, helping member states achieve mutual benefits in goods trade, services investment, e-commerce, and other areas.

Third, explore cooperation in emerging frontier fields with major partners. The collaboration between China and Singapore in trade digitalization serves as a benchmark. Their first cross-border paperless trade initiative, along with a digital trade pilot involving China, Singapore, and the Middle East, has not only enhanced corporate efficiency and reduced transaction costs but also laid the foundation for a broader regional digital trade framework. China has contributed numerous cutting-edge innovations to advance the digital economy. At the same time, China's cooperation with Cambodia highlights the key role of infrastructure in driving economic transformation and poverty reduction. Under the BRI and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation framework, major projects such as the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, completed in 2022, have significantly improved Cambodia's connectivity, reduced logistics costs, and stimulated economic development along the route. In addition, agricultural technical support and vocational training in rural areas have directly benefited local communities, enhancing agricultural productivity and food security. These practical measures have become key drivers of Cambodia's development, contributing significantly to the reduction of its multidimensional poverty rate from 36.7% in 2014 to 16.6% in 2022, demonstrating the tangible outcomes of development-oriented partnerships.

Of course, any deep cooperation entails potential challenges, such as debt sustainability and environmental and social impacts. These are common issues for many Global South countries navigating complex partnerships in a rapidly changing world. What matters is how they are addressed—through improved governance, regulatory oversight, and public communication. In this context, ASEAN's regional consultation mechanisms can help harmonize standards, mitigate risks, and establish engagement frameworks. While bilateral cooperation can yield substantial benefits, it must be reinforced by multilateral coordination. ASEAN's role in this process is essential. By aligning regional initiatives such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity with Chinese platforms including the BRI and the Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation, cooperation can evolve from fragmented projects into a systematic framework.

Looking ahead, the experience of China-ASEAN cooperation has distilled several core principles for broader Global South collaboration: first, respect for developmental sovereignty, ensuring that each country retains full control over its development process; second, commitment to inclusivity, aimed at reducing regional inequality and generating local employment; and finally, ensuring sustainability, which pertains not only to the environment but also to financial and institutional resilience. In a fragmented and uncertain world, South-South cooperation built on mutual respect, shared interests, and sovereign equality offers a promising pathway toward common prosperity and sustainable development for the Global South. 

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基金会宗旨

——探索中国近代以来不断凸显的文化连续性危机，从根本上解决普遍的文化焦虑，建立中国社会的文化自主权、价值系统和话语体系。

——探索社会结构变迁中产生的新兴社会阶层的文化诉求及新政治诉求，在社会建设中夯实文化建设的基礎。

研究领域

——道统重建：确立中国人的文化主体性意识，研究基于中国文化又适应现代世界的新的普遍性价值。

——政统重建：创新发展执政党意识形态，再解释国家政治制度及法律形态，建构一个具有历史合理性、现代正当性又具备未来代表性的政制传统。

——民间伦理重建：继承中华传统、面向未来公民社会建设，为千千万万普通民众提供安身立命的价值皈依。

——社会结构变迁与新兴社会阶层研究：追踪社会力量和社会结构的变迁，探寻社会建设和社会治理的新方向。

[摘要]

曾一度主导全球南方发展叙事的新自由主义已走向衰落，而新的主流理论尚有待建构。新自由主义的失败显示，实现赶超的前提是政府能够积极协调国内与国际利益冲突，进而持续推进制造业的规模扩张与技术升级。在后新自由主义时代，满足上述前提对南方国家而言有可能更为困难，其原因则是数字技术、跨国企业、大国竞争带来的障碍。可以确定的是，全球南方若想在后新自由主义时代继续推进经济追赶，则必须要避免对来自北方的经济理论的盲目依赖与全盘接受，转而基于全球南方实践、发挥全球南方智慧、寻找经济现代化的南部理论。作为全球南方群体中经济追赶步伐最快的一员，中国经验可以作为重要的起点与参考。

建构后新自由主义时代的南部理论*

[中国] 秦北辰 景军

关键词：经济现代化 全球南方 南部理论

经济理论不仅可以解释人类经济活动，也可以通过影响大众预期与政策制定而形塑经济活动。来自全球北方的新自由主义经济理论曾一度主导全球范围的发展叙事，在很大程度上拖延了南方国家追赶北方国家的经济现代化进程。近年来，新自由主义的理论基础（市场原教旨主义）与政策倡议（华盛顿共识）都已失去吸引力与公信力，南方国家也已开始积极探索由本国政府主导的追赶道路。但是，系统总结新自由主义带来的教训、理性认识后新自由主义时代的挑战、积极寻找替代新自由主义的理论，仍是全球南方国家得以继续推进经济追赶的关键。值得注意的是，避免对全球北方经济理论的盲目依赖、发掘从全球南方发展实践出发的南部理论是其中关键。^[1]

大势：新自由主义的兴起与衰落

尽管对新自由主义这一思潮的具体定义不无争议，其核心共识“更多市场（更少政府）带来繁荣”是无异议的。^[2]其理论基础是具备市场原教旨主义色彩的经济理论，即货物、资本、劳动力的自由流动可以带来更高的效率与更大规模的福利。在国内层面，这意味着只要尽量减少政府对市场运作的任何形式的干预，即可自动提升经济增长率；在国际层面，这意味着全球化（国家间经济一体化程度的提高）是南方国家与发达国家的共赢之策。其政策建议则是华盛顿共识，即政府应该将自己扮演的角色局限于一般意义上的基础设施、教育提供、产权保护，并致力于降低政府在国内经济规管与国际贸易及投资中的干

预行为。具体而言，在国内经济政策上应进行去规管（即减少政府在各领域的扭曲，使市场机制和价格信号真正发挥作用），在对外经济政策上则应施行自由化（即降低贸易与投资壁垒，取消关税的、非关税的阻碍国际贸易自由进行的政策）。

自 20 世纪 80 年代以来，美国部分商业集团与曾长期被边缘化的新自由主义学派的结合，开始将新自由主义推向发展叙事的主流。首先，1982 年部分南方国家发生债务危机，世界银行和国际货币基金组织在进行援助贷款时推出了结构调整计划（SAP），强行要求受援国满足与财政紧缩、贸易自由化、经济去规管与国企私有化相关的系列前提条件。此后，类似的结构调整计划广泛在亚洲与非洲推行，这些应对债务危机的计划事实上成为在南方国家“削减政府角色的一场运动”。^[3]此外，美国主导了众多多边或双边投资或知识产

权协定的签署，不对称地保护了来自美国（等发达国家）跨国企业（相对于南方国家）的权益。同时，“更多市场（更少政府）带来繁荣”一度成为具备正当性的思想共识。一些国际组织的报告声称产业政策并未发挥正向的作用，在讨论因政府主导工业化而取得成功的东亚经济体时，成功诀窍被简单总结为市场化或贸易自由化等。《纽约时报》在 2002 年甚至断言，“开放经济且最小化政府角色的国家，会不可避免地出现更快的经济增长与收入水平的提高”^[4]。

但是，新自由主义并未带来其所宣称的繁荣。就全球南方而言，在被迫或主动采用华盛顿共识式政策建议的拉丁美洲与东欧国家，都出现了显著的经济动荡、降低的经济增速、激增的失业与社会不平等。更重要的是，在新自由主义秩序下的全球南方经济赶超绩效并不突出。图 1 的纵横



美国主导的应对债务危机的计划事实上成为在南方国家“削减政府角色的一场运动”

规划等领域的积极管理作用。智利总统加夫列尔·博里奇 (Gabriel Boric) 甚至宣称“智利是新自由主义的诞生地，也将成为它的坟墓”。^[7]

教训：政府主导工业化仍是必要路径

新自由主义的失败，彰显出对全球南方国家而言政府主导工业化是实现经济赶超的必由之路。事实上，国内与国际两个层面都存在难以（如新自由主义所宣称的一样）依靠市场机制自发解决的障碍，因此政府的积极作为对南方国家的制造业发展（进而对经济赶超）仍有着必要的作用。具体而言，新自由主义可以带来三个相互联系的教训：

第一，制造业具备难以替代的重要作用。在很大程度上，新自由主义影响下并不乐观的赶超图景来源于全球南方制造业的停滞。在历史上，全球经济的南北分野就是由工业化进程的差异造成的，绝大多数经济赶超的基础也都是工业化。而在新自由主义秩序下，经济赶超绩效不佳的非洲与拉丁美洲也同时是过早去工业化最为严重的地区。在这两个区域的众多国家，劳动力因而淤积于附加值较低、非正式工作比例较高的低端服务业，而资本则被投入资源、金融与地产等领域的寻租或投机活动。相关国家在世界大宗商品价格较低且廉价资本较为充裕时可以享受较快的增长，但是在发达国家总需求不足或主要央行升息时则会迅速陷入危机。正是这样高波动的增长使得这些国家难以实现对发达国家收入水平的持续接近。^[8]相反，在过去四十年间最具赶超希望的中国，则存在着规模持续扩张与技术不断升级的制造业部门。当然，一些声音认为数字技术背景下服务业可以替代制造业扮演经济赶超的驱动者

角色，世纪之交以来印度、菲律宾、卢旺达、肯尼亚等地服务业的快速发展似乎也佐证了这一观点。尽管如此，高附加值服务业（例如研发设计、生产管理、电子仓储等）仍与制造业活动直接相关，难以脱离制造业而独立实现规模扩张。历史上也还未出现单纯由服务业驱动的经济赶超。^[9]

第二，政府需动员资源投入制造业发展。新自由主义秩序限制了政府支持产业发展的意愿与能力，很大程度上带来了全球南方工业化的停滞。众多国家在经济金融危机后被迫进行了华盛顿共识式的改革，重要国有企业被私有化、跨境资本流动与汇率管制被取消、关税被大幅降低、进出口配额及强制技术转让等被禁止。上述措施使得政府缺乏必要的政策工具与财政资源支持本土制造业的发展，同时加剧了（脱离管制的）私营部门对政府庇护主义式的利益输送要求。例如，印度的加权制造业产品税率由1992年的42%骤降至2005年的12.7%，且自由化的经济改革催生出了矿业、电信、能源等领域利润丰厚的寡头企业（这些企业也在施压政府不断进行利益输送），这使得该国政府既无资源，也无意愿持续支持如汽车、制药等重要制造业部门的持续发展。^[10]然而，在历史上几乎所有成功的经济赶超背后，政府都曾动员各类资源并引导其流入制造业。缺乏政府积极作为的南方国家，纷纷出现制造业投资不足（例如对私营企业而言不确定性过高）与围绕制造业的利益冲突（例如金融与矿产等部门精英阻碍制造业发展）。

第三，依附国际投资者无法实现持续的技术升级。新自由主义秩序中的全球分工生产格局则是以碎片化生产为基础的，南方国家因而极易被锁定在低附加值的生产活动上。参与跨国分工的南方国家通常

高度依赖进口的中间产品和机器，无法通过从事低附加值的生产活动获得升级所必要的资本与技术。例如，南美洲的出口加工区本土零件利用率仅在3%~9%之间（多米尼加为0.0001%）。^[11]造成这一局面的原因则是国际投资者的低升级意愿：其激励在于在区域乃至世界范围内配置投资以降低成本，并无意愿帮助特定的南方国家持续提升技术水平。如果来自南方国家的企业威胁到了其高附加值的生产活动（例如研发设计、资本品制造、供应链管理、产品营销等），跨国企业还会动用各类手段限制其升级的可能，例如限制对该企业的资本品与零部件供给、大幅提高对该企业的价格、通过国际投资者争端解决机制进行起诉等。事实上，历史上成功的经济赶超也都是以本土企业为基础的，本土企业核心生产活动在本国境内，自然有激励通过升级到更高附加值的生产活动而赚取更高利润。例如，在韩国与中国台湾地区（以及有机会实现赶超的中国大陆），都曾在电子等产业出现本土企业由较低附加值的活动参与跨国生产、同时逐渐沿着产业链提升本土生产活动附加值的过程。同时，仍没有单纯依附外来投资者实现经济赶超的案例。^[12]因此，政府应通过产业政策积极地为本土企业提供制造业升级的资源和机会。

挑战：全球南方经济追赶的艰难时代

当前，全球南方的政策制定者已清晰认识到新自由主义理论与实践的局限，转而推动政府主导的工业化。但是，在后新自由主义时代实现这一目标并不容易。南方国家至少会面临三方面相互联系的障碍：数字技术、寡头企业、大国竞争。三者间的相互作用给南方国家政府提出了极高的

资源投入要求，使得各国独自推进经济赶超的难度显著增加。

首先是数字技术将加大全球南方产业发展的难度。第一，数字技术将持续降低制造业所吸收的劳动力规模。制造业生产中的数字技术存在明显的劳动力节约倾向，例如欧美国家在快速工业化时该制造业就业占比接近40%，而当前（工业化绩效较为突出的）越南也仅为18%。^[13]这一趋势将产生一系列的连锁反应。就国内而言，历史上的工业化往往能创造大量稳定的就业机会，从而培育了支持制造业扩张的社会群体。而数字技术进步使得这个受益群体的规模逐渐缩小，并相应加大了政府获得各社会群体支持的难度。^[14]就国际而言，南方国家的廉价劳动力对国际投资的吸引力可能会明显减弱，这有可能带来南方国家间的激烈竞争，进一步压低南方国家所能获得的产品附加值。第二，数字技术进步将持续提高产业升级所需的政府投资。第四次工业革命的生产率提升机制来源于众多场域的互联，单独场域的数字孤岛（无论其技术前沿程度如何）难以使得南方国家真正享受新数字技术所带来的红利。换言之，在没有架设互联网或没有普及传感器的经济中讨论物联网、人工智能与大数据分析是没有意义的。然而，普遍意义上的传感器普及、网络联通、数字技能培训，都需要南方国家政府的积极作为。故而，数字技术进步的加速使得全球南方广泛推进基本互联互通的任务愈加紧迫。

此外是寡头企业将明显限制南方国家的利润空间。在新自由主义秩序下，以美国为首的发达国家政府热衷于与南方国家签署双边与多边的自由贸易协定，但这类协定事实上确立了跨国企业的寡头甚至垄断地位。目前来自美国等发达国家的寡头

企业收益规模已经与很多南方国家的 GDP 相当，这些企业通过产品设计、制造标准、流程管理、市场物流等渠道实现了对全球价值链的主导，并得以挤压南方国家的利润空间。苹果公司即是该趋势的代表：不从事任何制造活动的苹果赚取了其最终产品价值中的 58%，而劳动密集型生产活动的份额则仅为 1.8%。^[15] 在后新自由主义时代，跨国企业的不对称利润极有可能继续增加。数字时代制造业生产活动的一个突出特征即是无形资产密集度的提高。^[16] 而相对于有形资产，跨国企业对无形资产有着更为强力的垄断。当前，世界范围内不同国家间专利保有量的基尼系数已近 0.85（远超任何国家的收入不平等程度），绝大多数数据存储中心与几乎全部有影响力的商标也都位于美国等发达国家。跨国企业得以依靠对无形资产的垄断赚取超额利润，例如 2021 年发达国家的专利使用费收益为 4055 亿美元，而南方国家的收益仅为 200 亿美元，前者为后者的 20 倍以上。在这一跨国企业寡头垄断的背景下，南方国家政府很难有机会推进制造业的发展。

最后则是地缘政治会显著增加经济追赶的不确定性。第一，大国竞争使世界经济有进一步“模块化”的风险，即依意识形态、技术标准、支付体系、储备货币、贸易系统而分割为不同的模块。这种分割意味着南方国家可能需要购买价格更高的中间产品与资本品，同时也更难获得支撑国内生产规模的下游市场，这些不利后果都需要政府更多的资源支持才有可能弥补（例如补贴机器进口与产品出口）。第二，出现经济金融动荡的可能性急剧升高。例如，俄乌冲突及随之而来的制裁使得全球小麦价格在 2022 年春天突然上涨了 37%，并随之引发了北非与南亚部分国家的粮价上涨乃至食品危机。^[17] 又如，世界范围内

与贸易有关的行政禁令由 2019 年的少于 1000 项骤增至 2022 年的近 3000 项。^[18] 类似的突发事件都需要政府具备足够的资金储备才得以应对（进而避免本国宏观经济的崩溃），这样的不确定性事实上降低了南方国家政府可以投入制造业发展的资源体量（因为要预留更多资源以应对更常发生的突发事件）。第三，当然也有观点认为，大国竞争中“脱钩”“去风险”的考虑反而能给部分南方国家带来产业转移的机会。但是，迄今为止的产业转移仍集中在劳动密集型生产活动，且南方国家对美贸易的增长也已经引发了特朗普政府的敌意行为，换言之，产业转移能够带来的益处可能也相对有限。^[19]

前景：寻找经济现代化的南部理论

正如土耳其裔经济学家丹尼·罗德里克所说，“我们当今在离开所谓新自由主义的转型过程中，但什么将替代它尚很难确定”^[20]。新自由主义“更多市场（更少政府）带来繁荣”的简单叙事早已失去了在南方国家的吸引力与公信力，但是新的主流理论尚未成熟。可以确定的是，全球南方若想在后新自由主义时代继续推进经济追赶，则必须要避免对来自北方的经济理论的盲目依赖与全盘接受，转而基于全球南方实践、发挥全球南方智慧、寻找经济现代化的南部理论。^[21] 当然，作为全球南方群体中经济追赶步伐最快的一员，中国经验可以作为重要的起点与参考。具体而言，这样的探索至少应包括以下三个方面的努力：

第一，应提倡发展理论的去意识形态化。社会科学在美国的传播与发展一直深度嵌入该国个人主义、自由主义与普世主义的社会价值观之中。^[22] 新自由主义秩序

的支持者与受益者也成功地将其理论基础与这类社会价值观捆绑在一起：反对“自由”贸易、“自由”投资、“自由”市场者，一定是特殊寻租利益集团的代言人或异教徒式的“离经叛道者”。但是，正如卡尔·波兰尼（Karl Polanyi）所说，“自由放任是计划出来的”^[23]：相关理论中的“自由”仅代表着投资者与企业主不受限制的贸易、投资或交易行为，且在一定程度上意味着对南方国家劳动者及更多民众自由的限制。例如，确保资本自由流动实际上需要通过限制企业雇员等众多其他主体的自由来实现，^[24]大幅度降低贸易与投资壁垒实际上限制了南方国家制定符合自身国情的经济政策的自由。^[25]因此，不应将经济赶超的理论研究与美国特有的意识形态因素捆绑在一起，而应客观地正视与经济赶超有关的历史经验，特别是东亚经济体与中国的政府主导工业化经验。

第二，将关注点放在生产与就业问题上。西方主流经济学自20世纪70年代起就越来越关注交换中的效率，以消费者的效用最大化为微观基础构建其理论框架，相对忽略生产活动之间（除所需投入生产要素配比以外的）差别。^[26]这一关注点对反思彼时（70年代）低效率的进口替代战略有积极的意义，但是也逐渐被新自由主义的支持者与受益者利用作为忽视生产与就业问题的工具。例如，在南方国家内部，快速的私有化或严苛的财政纪律有可能在短时间内造成大规模的失业（同时却有利于发达国家的债权人），但是相关的政策倡议得以在“效率”的名义下被顺利推行。又如，在国际贸易之中，专注初级产品出口及劳动密集型生产的南方国家可能丧失既有的产业基础并难以实现制造业技术升

级（同时这种局面却有利于总部位于发达国家的跨国企业），但是对比较优势理论的机械解读也使得类似的政策倡议具备了“提高贸易效率”的正当性。相比之下，中国在改革发展进程中始终关注制造业规模扩张与技术升级，也始终将就业问题放在政策制定的核心位置。如能基于中国经验开发出关注生产与就业的新理论框架，则无疑更加有利于确立南方国家支持本国制造业行为的正当性。

第三，正视政府作用并进行系统探讨。西方主流经济学的研究范式将市场视作与社会完全独立的领域，认为市场有其自身的运行规律，不应受到政府与其他社会团体的干涉。而“非市场”因素的干预，则是市场效率受到限制，以至于不能发挥“看不见的手”作用的首要原因。在此框架下，政府通常被认为是发展的阻力，而提供“小政府”式的制度环境则是（无论何时何地都可以促进发展的改革方向。^[27]然而，在市场制度还未建立起来的南方国家抑制政府的作为，容易出现寡头企业垄断、产业基础流失、非法活动盛行等一系列问题。例如，在改革开放初期，中国并未追求主流理论中的“小政府”，而是利用既有制度优势、发挥各级政府官员的积极性从事招商活动。^[28]这种制度安排不被上述主流观点所允许，却取得了远优于进行“小政府”式改革的东欧国家的绩效。事实上，主流范式中的完美市场可能根本就不存在，市场活动一定是嵌入在社会活动中的，无法脱离后者而独立运作。更有意义的问题并非是“要不要政府”，而是“要怎样的政府”。因此，放弃对政府角色的偏见、转而系统讨论经济发展中的政府作用是有益的理论变革方向。■

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Constructing Southern Theories in the Post-Neoliberal Era*

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Economic theories not only explain human economic activities but also shape them by influencing public expectations and policymaking. Neoliberal economic theories from the Global North once dominated global development narratives, significantly delaying the economic modernization and catch-up efforts of Southern countries. In recent years, the theoretical foundations of neoliberalism (market fundamentalism) and its policy prescriptions (the Washington Consensus) have lost appeal and credibility, prompting Southern nations to actively explore state-led development paths. However, systematically summarizing neoliberalism's failures, rationally addressing post-neoliberal challenges, and seeking alternative theories remain crucial for the Global South's continued economic catch-up. Notably, avoiding blind reliance on Northern economic theories and developing "Southern theories" rooted in the Global South's own practices are key to this endeavor.^[1]

The Trend: The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism

While there is ongoing debate about the precise definition of neoliberalism as an intellectual movement, its core consensus remains uncontested: "more market (less government) brings prosperity."^[2] Its theoretical foundation lies in economics theories with market-fundamentalist traits, asserting that the free flow of goods, capital, and labor yields greater efficiency and larger-scale welfare. Domestically, this implies that minimizing all forms of government intervention in market operations automatically elevates economic growth rates; internationally, it posits that globalization (increased economic integration among nations) is a win-win strategy for both Global South countries and developed nations. Its policy prescription is the Washington Consensus, which confines the government's role to providing basic infrastructure, education, and property rights protection, while reducing state intervention in domestic economic regulation and international trade/investment. Concretely, domestic economic policies should prioritize deregulation (reducing government distortions across sectors to let market mechanisms and price signals function effectively), while external economic policies should focus on liberalization (lowering trade/investment barriers and eliminating tariff/non-tariff obstacles to free international commerce).

Since the 1980s, an alliance between certain U.S. business groups and the then-marginalized neoliberal school began propelling neoliberalism into the mainstream of development narratives.

First, when debt crises struck several Global South countries in 1982, the World Bank

and IMF introduced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) as loan conditions, mandating recipient nations to implement fiscal austerity, trade liberalization, economic deregulation, and state-owned enterprise privatization. Subsequently, similar SAPs were widely imposed across Asia and Africa, effectively becoming “a campaign to shrink the state” in the Global South.^[3] Additionally, the U.S. spearheaded numerous multilateral/bilateral investment and intellectual property agreements that asymmetrically safeguarded the interests of American (and other developed-world) multinational corporations vis-à-vis Global South nations. Concurrently, the notion that “more market (less government) brings prosperity” gained ideological legitimacy as a consensus view. Reports from international organizations dismissed industrial policy as ineffective, reducing the success of state-led industrialization in East Asia to simplistic explanations like marketization or trade liberalization. In 2002, the New York Times even declared, “Countries that open their economies and minimize government roles will inevitably achieve faster economic growth and rising income levels.”^[4]

However, neoliberalism has failed to deliver the prosperity it promised. For the Global South, both Latin American and Eastern European countries—whether coerced or voluntary in adopting Washington Consensus-style policy prescriptions—have experienced pronounced economic volatility, decelerated growth, surging unemployment, and worsening social inequality. More critically, the economic catch-up performance of the Global South under the neoliberal order remains unremarkable. Figure 1 plots the conditions when neoliberal ideology firmly dominated (1990, horizontal axis) versus its evident decline (2021, vertical axis), with the two horizontal lines marking the threshold levels for middle-income and high-income status in the respective years. The data reveals that only a handful of economies successfully transitioned to high-income status^[5], while the vast majority of Global South nations remain trapped in middle- or low-income brackets.^[6] As for the Global North, since the late 20th century, core neoliberal states like the U.S. and U.K. have aggressively pursued domestic privatization and labor market deregulation. The resulting deterioration in income and wealth inequality has fueled social discontent and political instability. In recent years, the Global North has witnessed a revival of industrial policy—evidenced by the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and “mirror tariffs,” alongside the EU’s strategic interventions in electric vehicles and semiconductors. In sum, the experiences of both Northern and Southern states have substantially eroded the theoretical foundations and policy appeal of neoliberalism.

Under these circumstances, the neoliberal order has faced increasing skepticism in both theoretical research and policy practice, and there is no doubt that this ideological trend is now in decline. In terms of theoretical research, since the global financial crisis, mainstream economists have begun using the concept of market failure to justify industrial policies that support the development of specific industries. Representative scholars include Joseph Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik. These arguments have garnered widespread attention and discussion within mainstream economics—a scenario that would have been unimaginable in the 1990s. In terms of policy practice, countries in the Global South have actively begun exploring state-led, domestically tailored paths for economic catch-up. Many leaders in the South have explicitly rejected Washington Consensus-style policy arrangements and publicly advocated for an active governmental role in areas such as income distribution, foreign investment, and industrial planning. Chilean President Gabriel Boric even declared, “Chile is the birthplace of neoliberalism—and it will also be its grave.”^[7]

countries is insufficient or major central banks raise interest rates. It is this highly volatile growth that prevents these countries from achieving sustained convergence with the income levels of developed nations.^[8] In contrast, China, the most promising case of economic catch-up over the past four decades, is characterized by a manufacturing sector that has continuously expanded in scale and upgraded technologically. Admittedly, some argue that in the age of digital technology, the service sector can replace manufacturing as the driver of economic catch-up, a view seemingly corroborated by the rapid growth of services in places like India, the Philippines, Rwanda, and Kenya since the turn of the century. Nevertheless, high-value-added services (e.g., research and development, production management, and e-warehousing) remain intrinsically linked to manufacturing, making it difficult for them to achieve large-scale expansion in isolation. Moreover, there are no historical precedents of successful economic catch-up driven solely by the service sector.^[9]

2. State mobilization of resources into manufacturing: The neoliberal order has limited the government's willingness and ability to support industrial development, which has to a large extent brought about the stagnation of industrialization in the Global South. In the wake of economic and financial crises, many nations were pushed into "Washington Consensus" reforms: vital state-owned enterprises were privatized, controls on cross-border capital and exchange rates were lifted, tariffs were slashed, and policy tools like import quotas or mandatory technology transfers were outlawed. For example, India's weighted tariff rate on manufacturing products dropped sharply from 42% in 1992 to 12.7% in 2005, and liberalizing economic reforms gave rise to lucrative oligarchic enterprises in sectors such as mining, telecommunications, and energy (these enterprises also pressured the government for continuous rent-seeking), which left the country's government with neither the resources nor the will to continuously support the sustained development of important manufacturing sectors like automotive and pharmaceuticals.^[10] However, behind almost all successful economic catch-ups in history, the state has mobilized various types of resources and guided them into the manufacturing sector. Southern countries lacking proactive state action have widely experienced insufficient investment in manufacturing (for example, due to excessively high uncertainty for private enterprises) and conflicts of interest surrounding manufacturing (for example, elites from the financial and mineral sectors obstructing manufacturing development).

3. Dependence on foreign investors hinders upgrading: The global production structure of the division of labor within the neoliberal order is based on fragmented production, and Southern countries are therefore easily locked into low-value-added production activities. Southern countries participating in the international division of labor typically rely heavily on imported intermediate products and machinery, and are unable to obtain the necessary capital and technology for upgrading by engaging in low-value-added production activities. For example, the local parts utilization rate in South America's export processing zones is only between 3%-9% (in the Dominican Republic, it is 0.0001%).^[11] The reason for this situation is the low willingness of international investors to upgrade: their incentive is to allocate investment regionally or even globally to reduce costs, and they have no intention of helping specific Southern countries continuously raise their technological level. If a firm from a Southern country threatens their high-value-added production activities (such as R&D, capital goods manufacturing, supply chain management, product marketing, etc.), multinational corporations will also use various means to limit its potential for upgrading, such as restricting

the supply of capital goods and components to the firm, sharply increasing prices for the firm, or suing through the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. In fact, successful economic catch-ups in history have all been based on domestic enterprises; with their core production activities located within their own country, domestic enterprises naturally have the incentive to earn higher profits by upgrading to higher-value-added production activities. For example, in South Korea and Taiwan, China (as well as mainland China, which has the potential to catch up), local companies in industries such as electronics have participated in transnational production through lower value-added activities while gradually moving up the industrial chain to increase the value-added of local production. At the same time, there is no case of achieving economic catch-up solely by relying on foreign investors.^[12] Therefore, governments should actively provide domestic enterprises with resources and opportunities for manufacturing upgrades through industrial policies.

Challenges: A Difficult Era of Economic Catch-up for the Global South

Currently, policymakers in the Global South have clearly recognized the limitations of neoliberal theory and practice, and have turned to promoting state-led industrialization. However, achieving this goal in the post-neoliberal era is not easy. Southern countries face at least three interconnected obstacles: digital technology, oligarchic enterprises, and great power competition. The interaction between these three factors places extremely high demands on the governments in the Global South for resource investment, making the difficulty for each country to independently advance its economic catch-up significantly greater.

First, digital technology will continuously reduce the scale of labor absorbed by the manufacturing sector. Digital technology in manufacturing production has a clear labor-saving tendency; for example, during their period of rapid industrialization, the employment share of the manufacturing sector in European and American countries was close to 40%, whereas currently in Vietnam (a country with relatively outstanding industrialization performance), it is only 18%.^[13] This trend will produce a series of chain reactions. Domestically, historical industrialization often created a large number of stable employment opportunities, thereby cultivating social groups that supported manufacturing expansion. However, the advancement of digital technology is gradually reducing the size of this beneficiary group, and correspondingly increasing the difficulty for the state to obtain support from various social groups.^[14] Internationally, the appeal of cheap labor in Southern countries to international investment may be significantly weakened, which could lead to intense competition among Southern countries and further suppress the product value-added that Southern countries can obtain. Second, the advancement of digital technology will continuously increase the government investment required for industrial upgrading. The productivity enhancement mechanism of the Fourth Industrial Revolution comes from the interconnection of numerous domains; digital islands in isolated domains (regardless of their level of technological advancement) make it difficult for Southern countries to truly enjoy the dividends brought by new digital technologies. In other words, discussing the Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, and big data analytics in an economy that has not set up the internet or popularized sensors is meaningless. However, the popularization of sensors, network connectivity, and digital skills training in a general sense all require proactive action

from the governments of Southern countries. Therefore, the acceleration of digital technology advancement makes the task of broadly promoting basic interconnectivity in the Global South increasingly urgent.

Furthermore, oligarchic enterprises will significantly limit the profit margins of Southern countries. Under the neoliberal order, the governments of developed countries, led by the United States, were keen to sign bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements with Southern countries, but these types of agreements in fact established the oligopolistic or even monopolistic status of multinational corporations. Currently, the revenue scale of oligarchic enterprises from developed countries like the United States is already comparable to the GDP of many Southern countries; these enterprises have achieved dominance over global value chains through channels such as product design, manufacturing standards, process management, and market logistics, and are thus able to squeeze the profit margins of Southern countries. Apple Inc. is representative of this trend: Apple, which does not engage in any manufacturing activities, earns 58% of its final product's value, while the share of labor-intensive production activities is only 1.8%.^[15] In the post-neoliberal era, the asymmetrical profits of multinational corporations are very likely to continue to increase. A prominent feature of manufacturing production activities in the digital age is the increase in the density of intangible assets.^[16] And compared to tangible assets, multinational corporations have an even stronger monopoly over intangible assets. Currently, the Gini coefficient of patent holdings among different countries worldwide is close to 0.85 (far exceeding the level of income inequality in any country), and the vast majority of data storage centers and almost all influential trademarks are also located in developed countries like the United States. Multinational corporations are able to earn excess profits by relying on their monopoly over



Under the neoliberal order, the governments of developed countries in fact established the oligopolistic or even monopolistic status of multinational corporations.

intangible assets; for example, in 2021, the patent royalty income of developed countries was 405.5 billion USD, while the income of Southern countries was only 20 billion USD, with the former being more than 20 times the latter. Against this backdrop of multinational corporate oligopoly, it is very difficult for the governments of Southern countries to have the opportunity to advance the development of manufacturing.

Finally, geopolitics will significantly increase the uncertainty of economic catch-up. First, great power competition creates the risk of further “modularization” of the world economy, that is, being divided into different modules according to ideology, technical standards, payment systems, reserve currencies, and trade systems. This division means that Southern countries may need to purchase higher-priced intermediate and capital goods, and at the same time find it more difficult to access downstream markets to support their domestic production scale; these adverse consequences require more government resource support to be potentially compensated for (for example, by subsidizing machinery imports and product exports). Second, the probability of economic and financial turmoil occurring has sharply increased. For example, the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ensuing sanctions caused global wheat prices to suddenly rise by 37% in the spring of 2022, and subsequently triggered food price hikes and even food crises in some countries in North Africa and South Asia.^[17] As another example, trade-related administrative bans worldwide surged from fewer than 1,000 in 2019 to nearly 3,000 in 2022.^[18] Similar sudden events all require the government to have sufficient financial reserves to cope (and thus avoid the collapse of the domestic macroeconomy); such uncertainty in fact reduces the volume of resources that governments of Southern countries can invest in manufacturing development (because more resources must be set aside to respond to more frequently occurring sudden events). Third, there are of course also views that considerations of “decoupling” and “de-risking” in great power competition could, on the contrary, bring opportunities for industrial transfer to some Southern countries. However, up to now, industrial transfers are still concentrated in labor-intensive production activities, and the growth of Southern countries’ trade with the U.S. has already triggered hostile actions from the Trump administration; in other words, the benefits that industrial transfer can bring may also be relatively limited.^[19]

Prospects: Toward a Southern Theory of Economic Modernization

As economist Dani Rodrik notes, “We are transitioning out of neoliberalism, but what replaces it remains unclear.”^[20] The simple neoliberal narrative—that “more market (less government) brings prosperity”—has long since lost its appeal and credibility in the Global South, yet a new mainstream theory has yet to mature. Consequently, for the Global South to continue its pursuit of economic catch-up in the post-neoliberal era, it must avoid uncritical reliance on and wholesale adoption of economic theories from the North. The imperative is instead to formulate a Southern theory of economic modernization, one grounded in the practices and wisdom of the Global South itself.^[21] To be sure, as the member of the Global South with the most rapid record of economic catch-up, the Chinese experience can serve as a crucial starting point and a vital point of reference. Specifically, such an inquiry should entail at least three dimensions of effort:

First, it is imperative to advocate for the de-ideologization of development theory. The dissemination and evolution of social sciences in the United States have always been

deeply intertwined with the country's societal values of individualism, liberalism, and universalism.^[22] Proponents and beneficiaries of the neoliberal order have successfully conflated its theoretical foundations with these societal values. Consequently, those who oppose "free" trade, "free" investment, or "free" markets are typically cast as either spokespersons for special rent-seeking interests or as heretics deviating from established orthodoxy. However, as Karl Polanyi famously argued, "Laissez-faire was planned."^[23] The "freedom" in such theories refers only to the unrestricted activities of investors and business owners in trade, investment, and transactions; to a significant degree, it entails a restriction on the freedoms of laborers and the broader populace in Southern nations. For instance, ensuring the free mobility of capital is, in practice, achieved by curtailing the freedoms of numerous other actors, such as a firm's own employees.^[24] Likewise, drastically lowering trade and investment barriers effectively constrains the freedom of Southern countries to formulate economic policies suited to their own national contexts.^[25] Therefore, theoretical research on economic catch-up must be decoupled from ideological elements specific to the United States. Instead, it should be grounded in an objective examination of the relevant historical experiences, particularly the state-led industrialization of the East Asian economies and China.

Second, the focus should be shifted to issues of production and employment. Since the 1970s, mainstream Western economics has increasingly centered on efficiency in exchange, constructing its theoretical frameworks on the micro-foundations of consumer utility maximization. In doing so, it has relatively neglected the intrinsic differences among production activities, beyond their requisite input ratios of production factors.^[26] While this focus was valuable for rethinking the inefficient import-substitution strategies of that era, it was also gradually instrumentalized by the proponents and beneficiaries of neoliberalism as a means to disregard issues of production and employment. For example, within Southern countries, rapid privatization or stringent fiscal discipline could cause large-scale unemployment in the short term (while simultaneously benefiting creditors in developed nations), yet such policy initiatives were successfully implemented in the name of "efficiency." Similarly, in international trade, a focus on primary commodity exports and labor-intensive production could lead Southern countries to lose their existing industrial base and struggle with technological upgrading in manufacturing (a situation that benefits multinational corporations headquartered in developed countries). A mechanistic interpretation of the theory of comparative advantage, however, lent these policies the legitimacy of "enhancing trade efficiency." In contrast, China, throughout its process of reform and development, has consistently focused on expanding the scale and technological sophistication of its manufacturing sector, and has always placed employment at the core of its policymaking. If a new theoretical framework centered on production and employment can be developed based on the Chinese experience, it would undoubtedly be more conducive to establishing the legitimacy of actions taken by Southern countries to support their domestic manufacturing sectors.

Third, the role of government must be re-evaluated and subjected to systematic inquiry. The research paradigm of mainstream Western economics conceives of the market as a sphere entirely separate from society, governed by its own inherent laws and unsusceptible to interference from government or other social groups. Within this framework, intervention by "non-market" factors is posited as the primary reason why market efficiency is constrained

and the “invisible hand” fails to function. Consequently, government is typically perceived as an impediment to development, and creating a “limited government” institutional environment is presented as a universally beneficial direction for reform.^[27] However, in Southern countries where market institutions are not yet consolidated, constraining government action is prone to generating a series of problems, such as the rise of oligarchic monopolies, the erosion of the industrial base, and the prevalence of illicit activities. For example, during the initial phase of its Reform and Opening-Up, China did not pursue the “limited government” model prescribed by mainstream theory. Instead, it leveraged its existing institutional advantages, mobilizing the proactiveness of government officials at all levels to engage in investment promotion activities.^[28] While such an institutional arrangement would be proscribed by the aforementioned mainstream perspective, it achieved performance far superior to that of the Eastern European countries which undertook “limited government” reforms. In reality, the perfect market of the mainstream paradigm may not exist at all; market activities are necessarily embedded in social relations and cannot operate independently of them. The more meaningful question, therefore, is not “whether government,” but “what kind of government.” Accordingly, abandoning preconceived notions about the role of the state and, instead, engaging in a systematic discussion of its function in economic development represents a productive direction for theoretical reorientation.^[29]

注释 References:

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[1] 南部理论通常对生成于西方国家的“北部理论”持从修正或质疑到批判或否定的立场，详见景军：《什么是南部理论？》，载《社会学评论》2023年第4期。Southern theories generally adopt a stance ranging from revision or questioning to critique or negation towards “northern theories” generated in Western countries. See Jing Jun, “What is Southern Theory?” *Sociological Review*, No. 4, 2023, pp. 28~52.

[2] Rajesh Venugopal, “Neoliberalism as Concept,” *Economy and Society*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2015, pp. 165~187.

[3] Atul Kohli, *Imperialism and the Developing World: How Britain and the United States Shaped the Global Periphery*, Oxford University Press, 2019.

[4] L. Uchitelle, “Challenging the Dogmas of Free Trade,” *New York Times*, February 9, 2002.

[5] 事实上，这些国家（地区）的赶超都与新自由主义的全球发展秩序关系不大：韩国和中国台湾地区因政府主导工业化而迅速增长；波兰及捷克在90年代末已非常接近高收入门槛，因欧盟一体化与溢出效应而实现增长；沙特阿拉伯与阿曼因油气资源而赚取寡头利润。In fact, the catch-up growth of these countries (regions) has little to do with the neoliberal global development order: among them are South Korea and Taiwan, China, which achieved rapid growth through government-led industrialization and were already very close to the high-income threshold by the late 1990s; Poland and the Czech Republic, which grew due to EU integration and spillover effects; and Saudi Arabia and Oman, which reaped oligopoly profits from oil and gas resources.

[6] 其中，仅有不足十分之一的中等收入国家仍具备赶超可能（即人均收入稳定处于门槛水平的三分之二以上），但这一群体除中国外都有陷入“中等收入陷阱”的倾向。Among them, less than one-tenth of middle-income countries still have the potential for catch-up growth (i.e., maintaining per capita income steadily above two-thirds of the threshold level). However, apart from China, this group is prone to falling into the “middle-income trap”.

[7] “Chile’s New President Promises to Bury Neoliberalism,” *The Economist*, December 20, 2021.

[8] Shekhar Aiyar, Romain Duval, Damien Puy, Yiqun Wu and Longmei Zhang, “Growth Slowdowns and the Middle-Income Trap,” *Japan and the World Economy*, Vol. 48, 2018, pp. 22~37.

[9] 对一些有关“服务型经济”的讨论存在着误读。例如，根据联合国工业发展组织（UNIDO）的数据，世界上人均制造业产值最高的国家是（通常被视作“服务型经济”的）瑞士和新加坡，两国仍在机械制造、电子工业、精密装备或工业化学等制造业领域占据世界领先地位。There are misinterpretations in some discussions about the “service economy”. For example, according to data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the countries with the highest per capita manufacturing output in the world are Switzerland and Singapore

(often regarded as “service economies”), both of which still maintain world-leading positions in manufacturing sectors such as machinery, electronics, precision equipment, or industrial chemicals.

[10] Adnan Naseemullah, *Development After Statism*, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

[11] Jostein Hauge, “Should the African Lion Learn from the Asian Tigers? A Comparative-Historical Study of FDI-Oriented Industrial Policy in Ethiopia, South Korea and Taiwan,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 11, 2019, pp. 2071~2091.

[12] Adnan Naseemullah, “The International Political Economy of the Middle-income Trap,” *The Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 58, No. 10, 2022, pp. 2154~2171.

[13] 秦北辰、胡舒蕾：《新自由主义与全球南方国家的过早去工业化》，载《文化纵横》2023年第2期。[Qin Beichen and Hu Shulei, “Neoliberalism and Premature Deindustrialization in Global South Countries,” *Beijing Cultural Review*, No. 2, 2023, pp. 28~37.]

[14] Dani Rodrik, “Prospects for Global Economic Convergence Under New Technologies, in David Autor, Kaushik Basu, Zia Qureshi and Dani Rodrik eds., *An Inclusive Future? Technology, New Dynamics, and Policy Challenges*, Brookings, 2022.

[15] Donald Clelland, “The Core of the Apple: Degrees of Monopoly and Dark Value in Global Commodity Chains,” *Journal of World-Systems Research*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2014, pp. 82~111.

[16] 无形资产是指不具备物理存在的各类知识性资产，包括可提高产品附加值的知识（例如专利、版权、实践技巧等），数字化信息中所蕴含的知识（例如数据与计算机程序），以及商业行为中内嵌的知识（例如供应链管理与品牌营销等）。Intangible assets refer to non-physical knowledge-based resources that encompass: (1) value-adding intellectual properties (e.g. patents, copyrights, trade secrets), (2) knowledge embedded in digital information systems (e.g. datasets, software algorithms), and (3) operational knowledge institutionalized in business practices (e.g. supply chain protocols, brand equity management).

[17] ABDPost, “Wheat, Corn Prices Surge Deepening Consumer Pain,” Al Jazeera, March, 2022.

[18] Kristalina Georgieva, “The Price of Fragmentation: Why the Global Economy Isn’t Ready for the Shocks Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October, 2023.

[19] 秦北辰、王勇：《中美脱钩背景下的中国—东南亚产业转移》，载《边界与海洋研究》2025年第3期。[Qin Beichen and Wang Yong, “China-Southeast Asia Industrial Transfer in the Context of U.S.-China Decoupling,” *Journal of Boundary and Ocean Studies*, no. 3 (2025): 3~26.]

[20] Dani Rodrik, “The New Productivism Paradigm,” *Project Syndicate*, Vol. 5, No. 7, 2022, pp. 1~3.

[21] 有关发掘与讨论南部理论的更为系统的实践，可以参见景军、高良敏主编：《南部理论：人文社科思想的他者建树》，中国社会科学出版社2024年版。For more systematic practices regarding the exploration and discussion of Southern Theory, see Jing Jun and Gao Liangmin eds., *Southern Theory: The Other's Contribution to Humanities and Social Sciences Thought*, China Social Sciences Press, 2024.

[22] Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

[23] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Farrar & Rinehart, 1944, p. 147.

[24] 这是因为，资本所有者自由在国家或地区间转移其资本，需要以解雇在某地的企业雇员不承担额外高昂成本为前提才能实现。This is because the freedom of capital owners to transfer their capital between countries or regions can only be achieved on the premise that dismissing employees in a particular location does not incur prohibitively high additional costs.

[25] 这种矛盾的一个突出例子，是以“资源自由流动”为号召的欧洲一体化进程，甚至剥夺了共同市场成员国自行决定长棍面包长度的自由。A prominent example of this contradiction is the European integration process, which, under the banner of “free flow of resources,” even deprived member states of the common market of the freedom to decide the length of their baguettes. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, *The euro: How A Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe*, WW Norton & Company, 2016.

[26] Alice Amsden, “Bringing Production Back In—Understanding Government’s Economic Role in Late Industrialization,” *World Development*, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1997, pp. 469~480.

[27] 事实上，在较为激进的“华盛顿共识”改革失败后，以世界银行为代表的国际组织转而认为落后的制度环境（或曰“坏治理”）是南方国家不能从这些改革中获益的关键。In fact, after the failure of the more radical “Washington Consensus” reforms, international organizations represented by the World Bank came to believe that a backward institutional environment (or “bad governance”) was key to the inability of Southern countries to benefit from these reforms. See M. Doornbos, “Good Governance: The Rise and Decline of a Policy Metaphor?” *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 6, 2001, pp. 93~108.

[28] Yuen Yuen Ang, *How China Escaped the Poverty Trap*, Cornell University Press, 2018.

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[摘要]

借鉴葛兰西百年前对“一体但不平衡的发展”的经典洞察，本文旨在剖析当今世界不平等的结构性根源。资本主义现代化与新自由主义全球化共同构筑了现行国际体系，使全球南方国家普遍陷入“没有发展的增长”这一结构性困境。全球南方欲实现真正发展，其根本出路在于摆脱外部依附，致力于构建“自主发展能力”。这一能力的核心，在于国家掌握生产与再生产的主导权，将参与全球化所获价值有效地转化为内生的、可持续的发展动力，最终实现超越单纯经济增长的、深刻的社会政治文化转型。中国式现代化为后发国家的自主探索提供了重要的理论参照与实践可能，但中国无法独善其身。全球南方只有通过集体团结，从根本上撼动既有国际秩序，才能实现自我和世界的双重解放。

南方问题及其超越

[中国] 殷之光

关键词：全球南方 自主发展 葛兰西

葛兰西视角下的南方问题

20世纪20年代，意大利的不平衡发展已经引起都灵共产主义者的警觉。以农业生产为主的南方沦为北方资产阶级“待剥削的殖民地”^[1]。尽管同属一个国家，“工业北方”与“农业南方”之间的发展差距使国家陷入了持久的对立状态。资产阶级知识分子将南方描绘成社会落后、文化懒惰的象征^[2]，几乎视其为阻碍意大利整体社会发展的枷锁。而在南方内部，社会也已经极度分裂，作为一个整体的南方人“无法对他们的诉求与需要给出一个统一的表达”^[3]。

葛兰西富有洞见地指出了“一体但不平衡发展”（combined and uneven development）的问题。南方和北方都无法在没有对方的情况下真正发展。然而，两

者也都无法作为一个统一的实体达成共识。对葛兰西而言，解决这一问题的关键在于构建“大众形成”的机制——在有机知识分子的支持下，南方无产阶级与农民阶级可以有机地结成联盟。^[4]

安东尼奥·葛兰西在100多年前敏锐观察到的现象，几乎可以直接用来描述当今世界。如今，这种发展不平衡及其伴随的社会政治问题已不仅限于意大利。在新自由主义全球化的背景下，这已成为一个全球性问题。不平衡的发展与政治霸权构成了资本主义现代化全球进程中固有的、难以解决的结构性问题。只要不同社群之间的生产与消费保持相对孤立，这种差距就不会构成重大问题。正如意大利的“南方问题”是在构建统一意大利共同体的历史进程中产生的那样，“全球南方”问题正是通过全球资本主义市场的形成，作为一个世界

历史现象而出现的。此外，这种不平等是一个整体性现象，涵盖了政治经济和社会文化多个层面的不平衡。因此，要克服这种不平等状态，需要进行全面的社会变革。以这种社会变革为导向的发展，必须超越单纯的经济和市场考量；它要求对国家和社会进行多层次、整体的赋权。

发展理论的解构与新自由主义崛起

一体但不平衡的发展产生了全球南方问题。解决这一问题的关键在于全球南方长期以来争取独立和自力更生发展模式的努力。对资本主义北方而言，现代化进程是一个同质化的、自上而下的过程。现代化也像是权力与文化从主导核心向依附性半边缘及边缘地带扩散的结果。这种现代化通常仅与资本主义经济发展模式及其生产方式扩张引发的全面社会转型相关联。

随着欧洲资本主义的兴起及其在全球范围内无休止的殖民扩张，人类真正开始融合成马克思所说的“世界市场”。这个全球市场的核心体现了两大基本特征：其一，它意味着生产活动的全球整合；其二，

它标志着商品在世界范围内的常态化流动。虽然西方经济学试图通过需求、交换和分工等概念来概括这种流动，但这种概括往往掩盖了“世界市场”的一个关键特性——单向性。

20世纪50年代之前，一个明显的趋势清晰可辨：劳动力和原材料、初级农产品从殖民地与半殖民地向外输出，用以维持殖民宗主国的经济增长。随着世界步入工业时代，特别是19世纪第二次工业革命后，西方资本主义国家间的竞争日趋激烈。这一时期，工业制成品与金融资本向殖民地、半殖民地的输出不断加剧。

然而，这种资本外流并未促进殖民地与半殖民地成熟消费市场的形成——这些市场本可与西方工业化国家真正抗衡。相反，这种商品与资本的对外流动实质上为西方金融资本的全球流动开辟了更广阔的渠道。在殖民地与半殖民地初生的工业发展中，逐渐形成了买办资产阶级。这个深度依附于帝国主义世界市场体系的精英阶层，虽在本土积累财富，却讽刺性地选择在原宗主国进行消费。

冷战的前三十年间，世界市场流通体



随着欧洲资本主义的兴起及其在全球范围内无休止的殖民扩张，人类真正开始融合成马克思所说的“世界市场”

系曾呈现多元化的可能。苏联积极推动社会主义国家间的区域内整合以及与第三世界国家的跨国流通，其中易货贸易与国际主义援助是促成此类流通的主要方式。然而，苏联的式微导致这一雄心勃勃的世界市场多元化尝试以失败告终。当时，第三世界国家短暂的发展窗口期被突然关闭，使得大多数第三世界国家更容易受到外部资本和市场的影响，对后者的依赖性也更强。苏联推行的经济模式具有集体主义发展道路、计划经济体制和强调社会公平的价值取向等特征。尽管苏联最终解体，但其存在证明了西方模式并非人类发展的唯一选择。

与苏联主导的国际流通模式的衰落相呼应的，是20世纪80年代新自由主义全球化模式的迅速崛起。虽然自20世纪80年代以来，随着新自由主义全球化的兴起，国际分工格局确实发生了变化——制造业从北美和欧洲的发达国家流向发展中国家，但这种转变并未真正撼动美国在世界市场中的结构性霸权地位。基于美元霸权，美国对全球资本和消费市场的垄断性控制，推动了其服务贸易在全球范围的广泛扩散。其结果是，越来越多的全球南方国家在这场浪潮中日益依赖美国，客观上增强了美国金融和文化在全球的影响力。

20世纪末，世界深陷于对未来方向的巨大不确定性之中。正是在这个理论与实践皆模糊不清的时代，英国和美国为应对自身的经济困境，开始大力推行新自由主义的政治经济政策。时任英国首相的玛格丽特·撒切尔那句著名的强硬宣言“别无选择”（TINA），将新自由主义经济方案强势推上历史舞台。这些新自由主义改革不仅重塑了英美两国的政治经济格局，更通过世界银行和国际货币基金组织等关键多边机构被强制推向全球。这一时期，融入由发达资本主义国家主导的全球化进程被

描绘成国家发展的唯一可行道路。因此，亚非拉大多数第三世界国家在发展过程中，不得不接受这些多边机构强加的结构调整方案。自1990年起，世界银行和国际货币基金组织的发展贷款开始附带苛刻条件。这些条件要求债务国削减政府财政与医疗支出，取消货币兑换限制，并减少粮食储备。这一系列条件直接加剧了许多第三世界国家的贫困，甚至恶化了饥荒状况，促使埃及经济学家萨米尔·阿明将这种发展倒退现象形象地称为“第四世界化”。

对“别无选择”教条的坚定信念同时困住了全球南方与北方。到20世纪90年代，西方发展模式被强势推广为唯一可行的发展道路。美国新自由主义经济学被作为终极真理在世界各大学府讲授，其毕业生纷纷占据关键政治金融职位，将新自由主义经济教条奉为行动纲领。在人类历史的短暂时期里，这几乎确实验证了弗朗西斯·福山宣称的“历史终结论”，将自由民主制标榜为人类政治的终极归宿，正是这种单极思维的体现。此类思想不仅否定了其他文明的发展路径，更扼杀了人类追求更美好未来的可能性。

历史终结论的信念植根于物质现实，即美国在世界市场中的主导地位。美国垄断性消费市场的基础是多方面的，建立在几个关键支柱之上：

（一）由无处不在的资本主义消费文化所产生的巨大需求；

（二）美国作为核心国家，吸引了来自全球南方的全球资本与“热钱”，从而刺激了进一步的消费；

（三）源于美元霸权的“铸币税”收益，使得美国实质上拥有印钞权；

（四）以这种独特的印钞权为支撑的、政府对美国消费者的现金补贴；

（五）由一小部分超级富豪和高收入专

业人士所产生的巨额消费；

（六）根植于体系之中的浪费性消费模式，以及由社会与宗教组织通过福利分发所驱动的广泛消费；

（七）以及私有化医疗保健领域内的巨额开支。

这种高度相互依存的结构催生了深刻的的不平等，而正是这种不平等结构本身内在地产生了对抗霸权结构的对立面。这种不平等在全球范围内表现为全球北方与全球南方之间的差距，在各国内部则体现为不同社会阶层间的显著差异。在全球北方，尤其是英美国家，这种不平等状态被生动地表述为“99% 对抗 1%”的社会分裂，同时金融市场以利润为导向的快速增长与实体经济的缓慢增长之间也出现了严重脱节。

在全球范围内，新自由主义推动的增长对大多数人和国家而言越来越类似于“没有发展的增长”。经济增长产生的利润并未真正再投资于生产性活动，也没有投入到改善广大群众生活的经济事业中。这正是新自由主义经济学在其实践运用中给世界造成的最根本伤害。

针对普遍存在的不平等现象，披着捍卫西方文明与民族国家外衣的白人至上主义意识形态，已在众多欧洲国家蜕变为强大的政治运动。这些右翼的、种族主义的和保护主义的情绪，与西方泛左翼某些派系存在一种晦暗的共通性：对新自由主义全球化造成的社会经济后果深感不满。教育、医疗和公共社会服务的无节制私有化，加剧甚至固化了社会不平等。面对日益深化的鸿沟，种族敌意常被武器化以转移公众视线，回避对深层制度性问题的任何深入探究。“中国制造正在取代本土产品”“移民正在抢走本地工作”“外国富豪推高当地房价”等论调，都遵循着同样危险的逻辑——用种族主义与仇外心理来掩盖这些

国家内部制度化的社会经济不平等。

不可否认，过去三十年来新自由主义全球化导致社会不平等的显著加剧，缺乏监管的金融资本无序扩张严重侵蚀普通民众利益，跨国公司普遍存在的利润转移与合法避税行为，加之日益严峻的环境问题，确实为西方左翼政治力量在年轻一代中的复兴奠定了社会基础。这些因素也构成了当下全球南方要求变革的关键结构性动因。

在欧洲，这种势头表现为意大利五星运动的兴起、英国工党内部科尔宾主义的涌现，以及希腊激进左翼联盟和西班牙“我们能”党在议会选举中取得的历史性胜利。在美国，我们看到“占领华尔街”运动等力量，以及伯尼·桑德斯等人倡导的“新新政社会主义”。这些力量虽散落在“全球北方”内部，却具有与南方相似的特征，它们与整个全球南方一道，通过对全球南方问题的理论阐述，有望获得真正的历史能动性，从而真正改变历史。

全球南方的回归及其理论潜力

然而今天，我们正站在新的历史节点上。全球南方国家迎来了重新定义自身发展道路的宝贵机遇。今年是万隆会议召开70周年，会议倡导的文明平等、自主发展、国际关系民主化等原则至今仍闪耀着历久弥新的智慧光芒。它有力地提醒我们：人类对进步的追求永无止境，每个文明都保有探索真正属于自身道路的权利。

近年来，“全球南方”一词在国际政治经济讨论中强势回归。2024年，中国使用全球南方的“群体性崛起”一词来表述其对这一历史现象的理解。“群体性”这一术语需要进一步的理论关注，因为它将“全球南方”视为一个历史和政治的连续体，尽管自认为是全球南方一部分的国家之间存

在着截然不同的社会政治和文化条件。“全球南方”通过共同追求更民主公正的世界秩序来确认自身的“群体性”，在这种秩序中，所有国家可以享有平等的地位。因此，从全球南方的视角看，发展不仅是经济议题，更是涉及国家及其人民在社会政治文化层面获得自主权的全面转型。本文旨在通过辩证总体性的视角，对全球南方的发展实践进行理论化阐释。这种总体性方法能帮助我们理解全球南方在社会经济发展上的合力，也使我们突破受方法论个人主义影响的以西方中心发展认识论。

事实上，若将中国式现代化道路理解为去依附化与追求普遍平等的进程，就能清晰地发现中国现代化经验蕴含的理论普遍性。2015年，习近平主席在纪念万隆会议60周年的讲话中，正是通过“你中有我、我中有你”的人类命运共同体理念，向世界揭示了新时代的平等与发展这一命题。^[5]这不仅建立在中国共产党于整个20世纪政治革命、国家建设和经济发展所积累的经验之上，更拓展了万隆时代的愿景：通过多边跨国合作建立一个新的全球秩序，以

抗衡霸权集团、废除垄断利益、缓解社会内部与区域间的不平等，并根除欠发达状态。这一愿景曾由前殖民地和半殖民地国家以及世界上广大的不发达地区所共享。这些诉求将成为团结全球和平力量的动力，也是我们当前关于全球南方问题讨论的最根本目标。

历史证明，西方现代化理论描绘的美好图景不仅未能帮助许多后发国家实现现代化，反而导致其政治动荡、经济衰退、社会撕裂。正如党的二十大报告所言：“我国不走一些国家通过战争、殖民、掠夺等方式实现现代化的老路，那种损人利己、充满血腥罪恶的老路给广大发展中国家人民带来深重苦难。”

从依附性发展到再生产积累

从“全球南方”的广阔视角来看，现代化道路的关键在于后发国家对自身主体性的自觉认知与自主发展——我们所说的“自主发展能力”。这种能力主要指一个国家在不平等的国际政治经济结构中，能



“全球南方”通过共同追求更民主公正的世界秩序来确认自身的“群体性”

够根据自身独特的资源禀赋和发展阶段，独立决定本国发展路径与目标，保护发展成果与福利免遭掠夺，并将其转化为未来发展资源的能力。自主发展能力包含物质与精神双重维度。在物质层面，一个国家独立运用资源禀赋或比较优势实现发展潜能，需要包括基础设施、专业技术及相关人才在内的一系列物质资源作为支撑。缺乏这些支撑，就难免受制于人，或永久沦为原材料与初级产品工厂而被锁在价值链低端，无法实现跃升。或者，它可能拥有资源却只是眼睁睁看着利润流失，使得任何独立选择发展道路的承诺都沦为空谈。

关于发展中国家现代化进程中“自主性”的讨论，不仅需要辩证地联系资本主义世界市场的整体结构，还必须探讨人类能动性的来源及其在历史创造中的关键作用。当今发展问题的根本前提是：大工业已将地球上的人们相互连接，使所有地方性的小市场都成为世界市场的一部分。^[6]然而这个由少数早期工业化国家全球扩张所驱动的世界市场，既没有解放大众，也未能从根本上改善他们的社会境况，因为其生产力并不属于人民所有。^[7]

从“全球南方”发展中国家的诉求来看，这种自主性本质上是对生产力的集体主张。“人民所有”的生产力不应被抽象地视为社会主义生产关系的一般性机械复制。从“全球南方”国家当前的政治经济发展现状出发，处于全球价值链底端的国家在坚持不干涉原则基础上追求自主时，需要坚守的首要原则就是主张生产与扩大再生产权。人类能动性正源于这种建设人民所有之国的奋斗历程。

在此基础上，一国通过参与国际贸易、生产以及接受贷款、援助和直接投资所产生的价值，能够以固定资产投资形式重新投入国内社会经济循环并促进扩大再生产

的程度，成为衡量发展中国家自主能力的关键指标。与此同时，影响国家维持这种“生产—扩大再生产”循环能力的条件极为复杂。国土面积、资源禀赋、地理位置、人口规模、人口素质、经济结构与基础设施状况，以及该国经济结构对资本主义世界市场“中心”的依附程度，都是必须纳入分析的变量。除这些物质基础条件外，国家政党能力、精英立场、文化教育水平及宗教/文明传统等因素同样值得考量。这一分析层面不仅有助于我们评估发展中国家追求自主现代化的意愿强度，也揭示了它们有效组织社会和在其公民中培养与自主现代化相符的主体意识的能力。

通过引入以国家为本、以人为本的发展赋权观，能够清晰界定中国发展合作与西方发展援助在认识论和实践层面的根本差异。这一方法不仅为中国发展合作效果评估提供了可量化的衡量标准，也为全球南方国家现代化进程提供了宝贵借鉴经验，同时恪守不干涉内政原则。例如在国家建设方面，许多后发国家起步晚、底子薄，常面临自然资源、财政资金和人力资源的严重制约，发展进程明显受阻。在此情形下，组织赋权尤为重要。现代政党等组织能有效动员和集中有限的社会资源。

在国际合作层面，发展中国家间的集体团结与互助尤为重要。基于不干涉原则的外部合作，不仅为众多弱小国家的发展赋能提供了物质动力，更为其进步创造了更为有利的地缘政治条件。从追求整体赋能发展的视角来看，中国自革命根据地建设时期就秉持的国际主义互助精神，以及改革开放以来的国际发展合作实践，体现了同一基本理念在不同历史条件下的演进历程。

“历史辩证法最终必然使南北经济关系消失。”^[8]陈其人在其开创性著作《南北经济关系研究》中以这一有力论断作结。


诚然，面向解放的发展是全球南方乃至全人类长期奋斗的目标。在这场旷日持久的探索中，中国式现代化创造性地解答了西方经典现代化理论和传统左翼现代化理论都未能解决的命题：如何在推动生产力进步的同时消除不平等？如何保障真正的自由？中国既没有盲从西方现代化理论“小政府”的教条，而是以更有力的手段推进工业化与经济高速发展，运用更积极的公共政策实现经济社会资源公平分配；也没有完全陷入左翼现代化理论对国际分工的悲观拒斥，而是充分发挥比较优势，以开放姿态深度融入全球经济发展，以负责任的态度积极参与全球治理进程。^[9]

中国式现代化在理论层面打破了旧有发展理论的宿命论，为后发国家提供了非资本主义现代化道路的可能性和可行性。中国的发展也必须在“全球南方”寻求自主发展的更宏大历史进程中找到其意义和普遍性。这一宏大进程从20世纪50年代延续至今。中国深刻认识到，帝国主义霸权的瓦解和国际秩序的改善，既不能单打独斗实现，也无法脱离资本主义世界市场现存的不平等结构而达成。因此关于“全球南方”发展的讨论，必须在完整的南北框架下展开。南南合作与南北对话并不矛盾；更重要的是，“全球南方”追求平等与解放的这段历史征程能够瓦解国际体系中现存的南北失衡状态。早在20世纪90年代初，陈其人就在其关于南北经济关系的研究中明确阐述了这一观点。他强调，对“落后国家”能否跨越“卡夫丁峡谷”向更高级的公有制社会过渡的探索，同时也蕴含着改造北方国家的历史使命与可能性。^[10]

正如周恩来在1955年万隆会议上所言，随着“越来越多的亚非国家摆脱了或正在

摆脱着殖民主义的束缚”，“今天的亚洲和非洲已不再是昨天的亚洲和非洲”。亚非人民在“长期的努力”后，“把命运掌握在自己手中”的意识正不断增强。这标志着“昨天的亚洲和非洲”实现了彻底新生。共同的苦难与奋斗经历，使亚非各国形成了争取“自由和独立”、改变“殖民主义统治所造成的落后状态”的“共同意志”。在这一漫长转型过程中，亚非人民培育出“互相同情和互相关切”之情，使亚非国家得以和平共处，实现“友好合作”。^[11]

周恩来在万隆会议演讲中的主张最终凝结为和平共处五项原则，这些原则在万隆会议的最后公报中得到确认。在此语境下，主权不仅包含不干涉内政和领土完整的原则，还包含对集体性的国际责任的承认。正如万隆会议闭幕公报所述，这些责任包括承认所有种族平等、承认国家无论大小一律平等，促进共同利益与合作，并依照《联合国宪章》通过和平方式解决一切国际争端。^[12]

一种立足于实践并旨在解放的理论必然具有普世性。这种普世性不仅需要跨越时间维度，更需在空间维度上体现，涵盖全人类。天安门城楼上的两条标语提醒我们：解放自我与解放全体，解放中国与解放世界，始终是互为因果、辩证统一的过程。在这条通往人类解放的永恒征途上，我们所有人——所有的追求与所有的思想——都在向着那个历史必然的过渡阶段迈进。正是在当下这个迈向解放的过渡时刻，孤独而短暂的个体得以相互联结。在这种联结中，人类历史获得了不朽性。在这种不朽与解放中，我们都是过渡时期的人。由人类书写的历史，终将以人类的彻底解放作为最高完成形态。

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The Southern Problem and Beyond

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Keywords: Global South; autonomous development; Antonio Gramsci

The Southern Problem from a Gramscian Perspective

By 1920, the uneven development in Italy had already caught the attention of the Turin communists. The south of Italy, which was dominated by an agrarian mode of production was subjugated by the Northern bourgeoisie, hence being reduced to “the status of colonies to be exploited.”^[1] Despite being in the same country, the developmental disparity between an “industrialized North” and an “agricultural South” left two sides in a perpetual mode of confrontation. The South, depicted as socially backward and culturally lazy, was taken by the bourgeoisie intellectuals almost like a shackle, restraining the social development of Italy in general.^[2] With the South, the level of social disintegration was also to its extreme. As a mass, the Southerners were “incapable of giving a unified expression to their aspirations and needs.”^[3]

Gramsci’s insight brought forward the problem of combined but uneven development. Neither the South nor the North could truly develop without the presence of the other. Yet, neither was able to acquire consensus as a unified entity. To Gramsci, the solution of the problem falls on the possibility of achieving a “mass formation”, in which the proletariat and the peasant masses of the South could organically ally together under the support of the mass of organic intellectuals.^[4]

What Antonio Gramsci keenly observed a little over 100 years ago can almost be transferred to describing contemporary world. Nowadays, such an uneven level of development and the socio-political problems emerged with it are not limited to Italy. It is, with the neoliberal globalisation, a problem on a global scale. Uneven development and political hegemony constitute intractable structural problems inherent in the global process of capitalist modernization. This disparity did not pose a significant problem so long as the production and consumption within different communities remained largely isolated from one another. Analogous to how Italy’s “Southern Question” emerged within the historical project of forging a unified Italian community, it is precisely through the formation of a global capitalist market that the “Global South” problem, as a world-historical phenomenon, has materialized. Moreover, this inequality is a holistic phenomenon, encompassing multiple dimensions of political-economic and socio-cultural unevenness. Consequently, overcoming this state of inequality necessitates a comprehensive social transformation. Development oriented towards such social transformation must extend beyond mere economic and market considerations; it demands a multi-level, holistic empowerment of both state and society.

The Unravelling of Development Theory and the Rise of Neoliberalism

The combined and uneven development created the Global South problem. The solution

to the problem lies within the Global South's long project of striving for independence and a self-reliant form of development. To the capitalist north, the pathway to modernisation is a homogenic top-down process. Modernisation is also like the consequence of power and cultural diffusion from the dominating core to the dependent semi-peripheral and peripheral. Such a modernisation is usually only associated with a capitalist mode of economic development and the comprehensive social transformation caused by the expansion of such a capitalist mode of production.

With the rise of European capitalism and its relentless global colonial expansion, humanity truly began to coalesce into what Marx called, a “world market.” This global market, at its core, embodied two fundamental aspects. Firstly, it signified the global integration of production. Secondly, it marked the regularized, worldwide flow of goods. While Western economics tends to generalize this flow through concepts like demand, exchange, and division of labor, such generalizations often obscure a crucial characteristic of this “world market”: its unidirectional nature.

Prior to the 1950s, a clear trend was discernible: labor, raw materials, and primary agricultural products flowed outwards from colonies and semi-colonies, sustaining the economic growth of colonizing powers. As the world transitioned into the industrial era, particularly after the Second Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, competition intensified among Western capitalist nations. This period saw the increasing export of industrial manufactured goods and financial capital to colonies and semi-colonies.

However, this outward flow did not foster the development of mature consumer markets in these colonies and semi-colonies—markets that could genuinely rival those in industrialized Western nations. Instead, this outward movement of goods and capital primarily served to create greater avenues for the global circulation of Western financial capital. Within the



Gramsci's insight brought forward the problem of combined but uneven development.

nascent industrial development of colonies and semi-colonies, a comprador bourgeoisie began to emerge. This elite class, deeply dependent on the imperialist world market system, accumulated wealth in their home territories but ironically sought to consume that wealth in the colonial mother countries.

The first three decades of the Cold War era saw the possibility of diversification of such a world market circulation. The Soviet Union actively promoting intra-regional integration among socialist nations and transnational circulation with the Third World nations. Barter exchanges and internationalist aids were the main methods used to facilitate such a circulation. However, this rather ambitious attempt of diversify the world market failed when the Soviet Union was in retreat. This brief window of development for the then Third World nations was abruptly closed, leaving the most of the Third World nations more vulnerable to and dependent on external capital and market. The Soviet Union promoted an economic model that features with a collectivist development path, a planned economic system, and a value orientation emphasizing social equity. Though the Soviet Union ultimately dissolved, its existence demonstrated that the Western model was not the only choice for human development.

The decline of a Soviet-driven model of international circulation was echoed by the rapid rise of a neo-liberal mode of globalisation in the 1980s. While the landscape of the international division of labor has undeniably shifted since the 1980s with the rise of neoliberal globalization, seeing manufacturing flow from developed nations in North America and Europe to developing countries, this change did not genuinely dismantle the United States structural hegemonic position within the world market. Rooted in dollar hegemony, America's monopolistic control over global capital and consumer markets has fueled the widespread diffusion of its service trade across the globe. Consequently, a growing number of Global South nations have found themselves increasingly reliant on the U.S. in this wave, objectively contributing to a greater global influence for American finance and culture.

By the end of the 20th century, the world wrestled with a profound uncertainty about its future direction. It was precisely during this era of both theoretical and practical ambiguity that the UK and the US, responding to their own economic troubles, began to aggressively champion neoliberal political and economic policies. Margaret Thatcher, the then-British Prime Minister, famously articulated the forceful assertion that "There Is No Alternative" (TINA), thrusting neoliberal economic solutions to the forefront of history. These neoliberal reforms not only reshaped the political and economic landscapes of Britain and America but were also coercively exported globally through the pivotal multilateral institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. During this period, integration into a globalization process dominated by developed capitalist nations was depicted as the sole viable path for national development. Consequently, most Third World countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in their pursuit of development, found themselves compelled to accept the structural adjustment programs imposed by these multilateral bodies. From 1990 onwards, development loans from the World Bank and IMF began to carry stringent conditions. These included demands that debtor nations reduce government fiscal and healthcare spending, remove barriers to currency convertibility, and decrease food reserves. This raft of conditions directly exacerbated poverty and even intensified famine in many Third World nations, leading the Egyptian economist Samir Amin to famously describe this

regression in development as “fourth worldisation.”

The firm conviction of TINA doctrine trapped both the Global South and North alike. By the 1990s, the Western development model was aggressively promoted as the sole viable path to development. American neoliberal economy was taught as the ultimate truth across the universities in the world, whose graduates rushed to key political and financial positions holding firmly neoliberal economic indoctrination as their playbooks. For a short period in human history, it almost did appear as what Francis Fukuyama pronounced as “the end of history”, asserting liberal democracy as humanity’s ultimate political destination, embodied this unipolar mindset. Such thinking not only invalidated the developmental trajectories of other civilizations but also stifled humanity’s potential to pursue a better future.

The end of history conviction was rooted in a material reality, namely the domination position of the US in the world market. The foundation of the United States’ monopolistic consumer market is multifaceted, resting on several key pillars:

- (1) Immense demand generated by a pervasive capitalist consumer culture;
- (2) The attraction of global capital and “hot money” from the Global South, drawn to the US as a core nation, which fuels further consumption;
- (3) The “seigniorage” benefits derived from dollar hegemony, allowing the US to essentially print money;
- (4) Government cash subsidies to American consumers, underpinned by this unique printing capability;
- (5) Massive consumption generated by a small class of ultra-rich and high-income professionals;
- (6) Wasteful consumption patterns embedded within the system, and extensive consumption driven by social and religious organizations through the distribution of welfare;
- (7) And significant spending within the privatized healthcare sector.

This highly interdependent structure has given rise to profound inequality, and it is precisely this unequal structure that inherently generates the antithesis to the hegemonic structure itself. This inequality manifests globally between the Global North and Global South, and domestically, it is evident across different social strata within countries. In the Global North, particularly in Anglo-American nations, this unequal state is vividly expressed as the “99% versus 1%” societal divide, alongside a severe disconnect between the rapid, profit-driven growth of financial markets and the sluggish growth of the real economy.

Globally, the growth fostered by neoliberalism increasingly resembles “growth without development” for most people and nations. The profits generated by economic growth are not genuinely reinvested into productive activities or into economic endeavors that improve the lives of the broad masses. This represents the most fundamental damage inflicted upon the world by the practical application of neoliberal economics.

As a response to prevailing inequalities, white supremacist ideologies, cloaked in the rhetoric of defending Western civilization and the nation-state, have morphed into potent

political movements across numerous European countries. These right-wing, racist, and protectionist sentiments share a murky commonality with some segments of the Western pan-Left: a profound dissatisfaction with the socio-economic consequences of neoliberal globalization. The unbridled privatization of education, healthcare, and public social services has exacerbated, and even entrenched, societal inequalities. In the face of this deepening disparity, racial animosity is frequently weaponized to divert public attention, sidestepping any probing inquiry into the underlying systemic issues. The arguments that “Chinese manufacturing is displacing domestic products,” “immigrants are stealing local jobs,” or “foreign billionaires are inflating local housing prices” all follow the same dangerous logic, using racism and xenophobia to obscure institutionalized socio-economic inequalities within these nations.

Undeniably, the profound amplification of social inequality over the past three decades due to neoliberal globalization, the unchecked expansion of largely unregulated financial capital that has significantly eroded the interests of ordinary people, and the widespread profit shifting and legal tax avoidance by multinational corporations, coupled with escalating environmental concerns, have indeed formed the social bedrock for the resurgence of left-wing political forces in the West among younger generations. These factors also constitute crucial structural elements that have fueled the Global South’s demands for transformative change today.

In Europe, this momentum is evident in the rise of movements such as Italy’s Five Star Movement, the emergence of Corbynism within the British Labour Party, and the historic parliamentary victories of Greece’s Syriza and Spain’s Podemos. In the United States, we’ve seen forces like the Occupy Wall Street movement and the advocacy for “New-New Deal Socialism” by figures like Bernie Sanders. These forces, scattered within the “Global North” but possessing characteristics akin to the South, alongside the entire Global South, hold the potential to acquire genuine historical agency through the theoretical articulation of the Global South Problem, thereby truly transforming history.

The Return of the Global South and its Theoretical Potential

Today, however, we stand at a new historical juncture. Nations of the Global South have been presented with a precious opportunity to redefine their own developmental paths. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, whose principles of civilizational equality, autonomous development, and the democratization of international relations continue to shine with enduring wisdom. It serves as a powerful reminder that humanity’s pursuit of progress is ceaseless, and every civilization retains the right to explore a path that is truly its own.

The term “Global South” has made a powerful return to the international political and economic discussions in the recent years. In 2024, China used the term “collective rise” of the Global South conveying its understanding of such a historical phenomenon. The term “collective” requires further and more theoretical attention. It takes the “Global South” as a historical and political continuum despite the vastly different socio-political and cultural conditions among the nations which self-identified as part of this project. The “Global South” recognizes its own “collectiveness” through a shared aspiration for a more democratic

and just world order, in which all states could share an equal position. From the Global South perspective, the notion of development, hence, is not only an economic issue, but a comprehensive transformation that involves socio-political and cultural empowerment of state and its people. This paper proposes to theorize the practices of development in the Global South through the lenses of dialectical totality. This totality approach allows us to comprehend the influence of the Global South synergy on socio-economic development. It also enables us to think beyond the Western-centric developmental epistemology which is influenced by the methodological individualism.

In fact, if we conceptualize China's modernization trajectory as a process of de-dependence and the pursuit of universal equality, then the theoretical universality embedded in China's modernization experience becomes readily apparent. In 2015, President Xi Jinping addressed the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference. In his speech, he brought the issue of equality and development in this new era to the world's attention through the concept of a "community of shared future where you are in me and I am in you."^[5] This not only builds upon the Chinese Communist Party's experiences in political revolution, nation-building, and economic development throughout the 20th century, but also extends the vision of the Bandung era. That vision, shared by former colonial and semi-colonial nations and the vast underdeveloped regions of the world, sought to establish a new global order through multilateral transnational cooperation. This order aimed to counter hegemonic blocs, abolish monopolistic interests, alleviate internal social and inter-regional inequalities, and eradicate underdevelopment. These aspirations will serve as the driving force for uniting peaceful forces worldwide, representing the most fundamental objective of our current discourse on the Global South problem.

History has proven that the rosy path painted by Western modernization theories not only failed to help many late-developing countries achieve modernization but, in fact, contributed to their political instability, economic decline, and social fragmentation. As the report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China stated: "Our country will not take the old path of some countries that achieved modernization through war, colonization, and plunder. That old path, which harms others and benefits oneself, and is full of bloody crimes, has brought profound suffering to the peoples of the vast number of developing countries."

From Dependent Development to Accumulation for Reproduction

From the broader perspective of the "Global South", the key to the modernization path lies in late-developing countries' self-awareness and self-development of their own subjectivity – what we term "autonomous development capability". This capacity primarily refers to a nation's ability, within an unequal international political and economic structure, to independently determine its own development path and goals based on its unique resource endowments and stage of development, to protect its developmental achievements and welfare from plunder, and to transform them into future development resources. Autonomous development capability encompasses both material and spiritual dimensions. On the material front, a nation's independent utilization of its resource endowments or comparative advantages to realize its development potential requires a series of material resources, including infrastructure, specialized technology, and relevant talent, as support. Without these, it risks being beholden to others, or permanently confined to the bottom of the value

chain as a raw material or primary product factory, unable to rise. Alternatively, it might possess resources yet merely watch as profits flow away, rendering any independent choice of development path an empty promise.

Discussions on the “autonomy” of developing countries in their modernization process must not only be dialectically linked to the overall structure of the capitalist world market but also address the source of human agency and its pivotal role in the creation of history. Today, the fundamental premise of the development question is that large-scale industry has interconnected the people on Earth, making all small local markets part of the world market.^[6] However, this world market, driven by the global expansion of a few early industrialized nations, neither liberates the masses nor fundamentally improves their social conditions, because its productive forces are not owned by the people.^[7]

From the demands of the “Global South” developing countries, this autonomy is, in essence, a collective claim over productive forces. Productive forces “owned by the people” should not be abstractly viewed as a general, mechanical reproduction of socialist production relations. From the current political and economic development status of “Global South” countries, the primary principle that countries at the bottom of the global value chain need to uphold in their pursuit of autonomy, based on the principle of non-interference, is the assertion of the right to production and expanded reproduction. Human agency thus originates from this endeavor of building a nation owned by the people.

On this foundation, the extent to which value generated by a nation’s participation in international trade, production, and the acceptance of loans, aid, and direct investment can be reinvested into its domestic socio-economic cycle in the form of fixed asset investment, thereby contributing to expanded reproduction, becomes a crucial indicator of a developing country’s autonomous capacity. Concurrently, the conditions affecting a nation’s ability to sustain this production-expanded reproduction cycle are complex. Factors such as a nation’s land area, resource endowments, geographical location, population size, population quality, economic structure, and infrastructure, as well as the degree of its economic structure’s dependence on the “center” of the capitalist world market, are all variables that must be included in the analysis. Beyond these material foundational conditions, factors such as the nation’s party capacity, elite stance, cultural education, and religious/civilizational traditions also warrant consideration. This layer of analysis not only helps us gauge the strength of developing countries’ will to pursue autonomous modernization but also reveals their capacity to effectively organize society and cultivate among their citizens a subjective consciousness aligned with autonomous modernization.

By introducing a nation-based, people-oriented view of empowering development, we can clearly define the fundamental epistemological and practical differences between China’s development cooperation and Western development aid. This approach also provides quantifiable metrics for evaluating the effects of China’s development cooperation and offers valuable reference experiences for the modernization of Global South countries, all while upholding the principle of non-interference. For example, in terms of nation-building, many latecomer countries started late and with a weak foundation. They often face severe constraints in natural, financial, and human resources, which significantly hinder their progress. In such situations, organizational empowerment becomes crucial. Modern political parties and similar organizations can effectively mobilize and concentrate limited social resources.

At the level of international cooperation, the collective solidarity and mutual assistance among developing countries are particularly vital. External cooperation, predicated on non-interference, not only provides the material impetus for empowering development in many smaller and weaker nations but also creates more favorable geopolitical conditions for their progress. From the perspective of pursuing overall empowering development, China's consistent commitment to internationalist mutual assistance—dating back to its revolutionary base area construction period—and its international development cooperation since the reform and opening-up era, represent the historical evolution of the same underlying philosophy under different historical conditions.

“Historical dialecticism will ultimately lead to the disappearance of North-South economic relations.”^[8] Chen Qiren concludes his groundbreaking *Research on North-South Economic Relations* with this powerful statement. Indeed, development oriented towards liberation is a long-term endeavor for the Global South and, indeed, for all humanity. In this protracted pursuit, Chinese-style modernization has creatively answered questions that neither classical Western modernization theory nor traditional left-wing modernization theory could resolve: How can we achieve progress in productive forces while simultaneously eliminating inequality? How can we guarantee true freedom? China did not blindly adhere to the rigid Western modernization theory's dogma of a small government. Instead, it employed more robust means to advance industrialization and rapid economic development, utilizing more proactive public policies to achieve a fair distribution of economic and social resources. Nor did it fall entirely into the pessimistic rejection of the international division of labor often seen in left-wing modernization theories. Instead, China has fully leveraged its comparative advantages, integrating deeply into global economic development with an open mindset and actively participating in the process of global governance with a responsible stance.^[9]

Chinese modernization, at the theoretical level, shatters the fatalism of old development theories, presenting late-developing countries with the possibility and feasibility of non-capitalist paths to modernization. China's development must also find its significance and universality within the broader historical process of the “Global South” seeking autonomous development. This overarching process has been continuous from the 1950s to the present day. China deeply understands that the dissolution of imperialist hegemony and the improvement of the international order cannot be achieved by acting alone, nor can they be realized in isolation from the existing unequal structure of the capitalist world market. Therefore, discussions about the development of the “Global South” must unfold within a holistic North-South framework. South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue are not contradictory; more importantly, this historical journey of the “Global South” seeking equality and liberation can dismantle the existing North-South imbalance in the international system. As early as the beginning of the 1990s, Chen Qiren clearly articulated this point in his research on North-South economic relations. He emphasized that the exploration of whether “backward countries” can cross the “Valle Caudina” and transition to a higher form of public ownership society also harbours the historical mission and possibility of transforming the Northern countries.^[10]

As Zhou Enlai articulated in his 1955 Bandung speech, with “more and more Asian and African countries having shaken off or in the process of shaking off the shackles of colonialism,” “today's Asia and Africa are no longer the Asia and Africa of yesterday.” The

consciousness among Asian and African peoples of “taking their destiny into their own hands” was steadily growing after “long efforts against colonialism.” This symbolized a complete renewal for the “Asia and Africa of yesterday.” Their shared experiences of suffering and struggle fostered a “general will” (*volonté générale*) among the nations of Asia and Africa to achieve “freedom and independence” and “change the backward state caused by colonial rule.” In this protracted transitional process, the peoples of Asia and Africa developed a sense of “sympathy and concern,” enabling Asian and African nations to coexist peacefully and achieve “friendly cooperation.”^[11]

Zhou Enlai’s assertions in his Bandung speech ultimately crystallized into the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which were affirmed in the final communiqué of the Bandung Conference. Sovereignty, in this context, encompasses not only the principles of non-interference and territorial integrity but also an acknowledgment of collective international responsibilities. As articulated in the Bandung Conference’s concluding communiqué, these responsibilities include recognizing the equality of all races and, of all nations, large and small, promoting common interests and cooperation, and resolving all international disputes through peaceful means in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.^[12]

A theory grounded in practice and aimed at liberation must inherently be universal. This universality needs to manifest not only across time but also spatially, encompassing all of humanity. The two slogans emblazoned on the Tiananmen remind us that liberating oneself and liberating all, liberating China and liberating the world, have always been mutually causative and dialectical processes. In this eternal journey towards human liberation, all of us—all our pursuits and all our thoughts—are moving towards that historical inevitability of transition. It is within this present moment, this transition towards liberation, that solitary and fleeting individuals become interconnected. In this connection, the history of humanity gains immortality. In this immortality and liberation, we are all people of the transitional period. The history shaped by humanity will inevitably culminate in humanity’s ultimate liberation. ■

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[摘要]

今天的世界正经历从单极秩序向新秩序转型的过渡期。随着美国的主导地位在过去三十年间持续衰落，冷战结束后形成的自由主义国际规范和价值体系陷入危机，西方式民主、人权等“普世价值”已逐渐失去吸引力，历史正在进入一段普世价值的“真空状态”。

与此同时，全球南方国家的崛起，正推动世界从普世价值的“真空”状态转向一个多元化的世界秩序。基于南方国家自身发展模式与意识形态的多样性，未来我们很可能会看到针对全球议题和议程出现多重标准、多元认知。这种多元的新国际规则也将更具代表性和包容性。在此背景下，中国式现代化挑战了盛行数个世纪的西方中心主义发展理论霸权，为多元世界的构建贡献了宝贵经验。

普世价值“真空”期与全球南方国家的作用

[越南] 黄惠英

关键词：普世价值“真空”期 中国式现代化 多极化世界

我们正身处一个关键的历史时刻，世界秩序正在经历从单极格局向新格局的深刻转变。这种结构性变迁罕见却影响深远，往往伴随着暴力冲突或战争。无论人们欢迎还是抗拒，全球秩序的更迭总会带来不确定性、失控感、社会动荡、价值观冲突以及身份认同与话语体系的重构。世界的未来在某种程度上取决于我们今日的选择。预测未来本质上是困难的，但这项努力至关重要——唯有如此，我们才能更好地为充满变数的未来做好准备。

过渡时期

过去30年间，世界的权力平衡发生了快速转变，世界秩序从冷战时期的美苏两极对抗演变为苏联解体后的单极格局，美国成为唯一超级大国。而自21世纪第二个

十年以来，世界一直处于“复杂过渡”的时期。当前世界秩序的“过渡复杂性”体现在国际政治学者间将其定义为单极、两极或多极的深刻分歧中，这与过去形成鲜明对比——学界对冷战时期属于两极格局、战前体系属于多极格局以及冷战后世界属于单极格局存在广泛共识。

可以说，当前世界秩序正处于从单极秩序转向另一种秩序的过渡时期。然而，它尚未完全摆脱单极化的阴影，美国霸权的本质和影响力仍深深植根于国际生活的各个层面。与此同时，它也尚未完成彻底转型，形成具有显著特征、可被命名的新秩序。冷战后出现的单极秩序以美国压倒性的经济、军事、技术和规范力量为基础。这一秩序对维护全球和平发挥了重要作用。然而历史表明，任何世界秩序都不会永恒存在，因为它们遵循周期性规律。随着全

球治理架构与国际法治体系的严重衰退，当前的国际权力格局被打乱，现行世界秩序面临根本性的挑战。

普世价值的“真空”期

过渡阶段的一个直接后果是，世界可能进入一个普世价值缺失的时期。苏联解体后，新自由主义国际主义从一种严格意义上的西方秩序扩展为更具野心的全球性秩序。冷战结束后形成的单极世界秩序被称为自由主义秩序，而自由主义成为主导意识形态。然而，30多年来，全球秩序首次不再体现西方国家的秩序。随着自由民主国家的相对衰落，自由主义——及其平等、自由、民主和人权的价值观——已逐渐失去吸引力。美国的主导地位在过去30年间持续衰落，其倡导的民主体制正面临日益严峻的挑战。西方领导人试图通过将基于规则的国际秩序与《联合国宪章》所载原则相结合，

来赋予前者合法性。他们强调该秩序具有普世性，非西方专属。然而，越来越少的非西方政府认同这一观点。在他们看来，“自由主义秩序”或“基于规则的国际秩序”是由西方利益塑造、以西方权力为中心，并由西方根据自身意愿选择遵守或无视的体系。唐纳德·特朗普赢得第二个总统任期后不久，德国最著名的周刊之一《明镜》发表社论指出：“特朗普重返白宫表明自由民主制度已经失败。它未能为战后时代提供连贯的架构……旧时代正在终结，新时代即将开启。没有什么比特朗普再次当选美国总统更能清晰地标志这一转变。西方已失去主导地位，那早已摇摇欲坠的共同价值观基础正在土崩瓦解。”^[1]

与此同时，中国是唯一有能力挑战美国世界超级大国地位的崛起中大国。然而，中国尚未建立起一套具有全球普世性的价值体系。中国一直着力推广其融合了马克思主义中国化、现代化与传统文化的价值体



随着自由民主国家的相对衰落，自由主义已逐渐失去吸引力

系，但这些努力在境外的影响仍非常有限。短期内，这一状况难以发生实质性的改变。尽管部分国家可能钦羡中国的经济发展并借鉴其经济奇迹，但很难全盘采纳或复制中国的发展模式，主要原因在于中国软实力与国际地位的局限性。

因此，无论是美国还是中国，都无法领导一个获得普遍认同的意识形态运动，这可能导致未来数年全球意识形态领域出现“真空”状态。其后果在于：由于普世价值构成了构建全球规范体系的基础，对自由主义价值观的挑战也可能导致当前建立在自由主义基础上的法律监管体系出现危机。若缺乏新建立的价值体系，全球规范将以什么为基础？其结果是，各国在维持对现有规范的承诺、制定新规范、应对全球挑战以及遏制不断升级的战争行为方面将面临更大的挑战。大国间共识的日益下降可能阻碍对违规行为的谴责或惩罚。在这种不确定的法律环境中，国家和非国家行为体（actors）可能会轻视某些规范，并认为这样做的风险不大。这可能导致某些行为体选择性地遵守或提出替代性规范。在既有的国际论坛中，多边规范的建立将遇到越来越多阻碍。部分行为体可能试图通过倡导多数表决机制或由地区/非国家行为体主导的机构，将规范制定讨论从基于共识的政府间组织中转移出去。如果国际规范变得更加本地化，仅适用于某些特定地区或国家集团，那么执行和遵守未来的协议将更加困难。因此，国际规范面临着碎片化为本地或区域规范的风险。政府和政治派别在遵守基本原则方面的共识的削弱，将使国际社会应对全球挑战的国际合作变得复杂、困难，并最终削弱应对这些挑战的集体行动。随着规范共识的逐渐瓦解，未来的合作更可能局限于按地域或意识形态划分的小型集团内部。虽然这有助于在次

全球层面协调应对挑战，但也削弱了各国在全球层面共同寻求有效解决方案的能力。部分国家对不侵犯边界、禁止暗杀及限制特定武器系统等规范的遵守程度下降——部分源于网络、机器人、人工智能和空间技术的进步——将加剧误判与冲突的风险。此外，非国家行为体日益掌握这些技术，不仅加剧了对民族国家的威胁，也增加了其被卷入非预期对抗的可能性。

全球南方国家的崛起及其在未来的角色

“全球南方”一词所指代的发展中国家，其中许多曾是西方列强的殖民地。早在 20 世纪 60 年代联合国文件中就出现了“南方”的提法。冷战结束后，人们添加“全球”前缀形成了“全球南方”这一术语。在全球化背景下，该术语强调互联互通，象征着跨区域多边联盟，如 1955 年万隆会议、不结盟运动、联合国 77 国集团以及金砖国家合作机制。该词也凸显了亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲国家日益增长的经济和政治影响力。^[2]

全球南方国家拥有世界 85% 以上的人口和近 40% 的全球 GDP。到 2030 年，印度尼西亚、巴西、墨西哥、土耳其和南非的 GDP (购买力平价) 总和预计将超过德国、意大利、西班牙、荷兰和瑞典的总和。^[3] 基于购买力平价 (PPP) 的 2050 年全球 GDP 分布预测表明，发展中国家在 GDP 占比上将超越发达国家。中国国务院发展研究中心的一份报告同样强调，全球南方国家将在全球经济中扮演日益重要的角色。该报告预测，到 2035 年，全球南方国家的 GDP 将超过发达经济体，占全球经济和投资比重近 60%。^[4]

未来 30 年间，世界各地将呈现差异化的人口增速，这将导致全球人口分布发生显著重组。预计到 2037 年，中亚与南亚

地区将成为全球人口最稠密的区域。与之形成鲜明对比的是，欧洲与北美地区人口预计将在 21 世纪 30 年代末期达到峰值，随后因长期低生育率而开始下降。^[5] 这些人口结构变化凸显了全球南方国家的崛起态势。

虽然全球南方国家通常不被视为军事或经济强国，但它们拥有多样优势，如能源和自然资源，且正成为新兴市场。包括沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔在内的许多国家，掌控着全球石油和天然气供应的重要份额。这使它们在全球经济和地缘政治谈判中拥有相当大的筹码，并通过欧佩克（OPEC）等组织行使这种影响力。印度尼西亚、巴西和南非等国家在发展中国家中扮演着关键角色，其经济增长率高于发达经济体。^[6] 2022 年巴西国内生产总值超过 2.2 万亿美元，是南美洲最大的经济体，也是金砖国家的重要成员。此外，土耳其、马来西亚和越南等国家正通过各自的文化、旅游和外交手段提升国际影响力。展望未来，全球南方国家有望继续运用其软实力、资源及不断扩大的市场，在国际组织中增强话语权。

许多全球南方国家地处战略要地，在大国竞争中发挥着关键作用。例如，作为中东地区的核心角色，阿拉伯联合酋长国是塑造地区安全格局的战略合作伙伴。同样，位于印太核心地带的东盟国家，在中美竞争日益激烈的背景下，对维护地区稳定具有战略意义。作为东盟实际领导者，印度尼西亚在制定地区贸易与安全规则方面贡献卓著。巴西，作为南美洲最大的国家之一，能够通过南方共同市场和金砖国家组织等机构影响地区规范。巴西还是全球气候行动的重要参与者，这得益于其在保护亚马孙雨林中的关键作用。全球南方许多不结盟国家预计将通过组建灵活联盟来提升地缘政治影响力，正如东盟、南方共同

市场和海湾国家之间的合作所展示的那样。这些国家还可能在地区和全球冲突中扮演调解者角色，提供外交与和解方案而非直接参与对抗。

许多全球南方国家正日益具备制定地区标准并推动特定领域全球倡议的能力。例如，欧佩克组织能左右石油产量与定价规则。未来几年，欧佩克国家还可能主导可再生能源项目，例如绿色氢能的生产。巴西、南非以及马尔代夫等小岛国在联合国气候变化谈判中发挥着关键作用。这些国家主张在发达国家与发展中国家之间建立公平的减排责任规则。东南亚国家正通过《区域全面经济伙伴关系协定》（RCEP）制定区域标准，其中印度尼西亚和越南发挥着重要作用。RCEP 有望在 2030 年前成为全球最大自由贸易协定，重塑亚洲贸易与投资规范。金砖国家正在建立新开发银行（NDB）等替代性机构，以与国际货币基金组织及世界银行等西方主导的机构竞争。未来，全球南方国家将继续倡导符合其地区与全球利益的规则。东盟与欧佩克预计将在贸易和能源规则制定中发挥核心作用。此外，这些国家将借助金砖国家机制和联合国等平台扩大话语权。全球南方国家正日益成为国际秩序中不可或缺的力量。在大国博弈背景下，它们有望运用自身的中介地位，为发达国家与发展中国家共同制定灵活互利的规则。随着这些国家经济实力和地缘政治影响力的增长，它们可能逐步重塑全球在能源、贸易和气候变化等领域的治理格局。

全球南方国家的崛起或将推动世界从普世价值的“真空”状态转向一个多元化的格局。在这样一个多元化的世界秩序中，我们必须认识到复杂性、矛盾性和对立价值观的现实存在。很可能会看到针对全球议题和议程出现双重标准或多元认知。这

种多元性可能成为未来世界的决定性特征，新的全球秩序将在西方主导的规范与价值观面临挑战的背景下逐渐形成，这些挑战主要源自全球南方国家带来的发展模式与意识形态的多样性。

对于许多南方国家，中国的经济和外交影响力日益增长。中国积极动员这些国家支持其改革全球治理体系的议程。这些国家往往与中国一样渴望更公平的世界秩序，并对西方的主导地位存在各种不满。“一带一路”倡议现有 151 个参与国。全球发展倡议之友小组目前拥有 81 个成员，而“77 国集团和中国”则包括 134 个国家。这些群体中的绝大多数成员都来自全球南方国家。在 COP27 气候大会上，77 国集团与西方国家政府之间的分歧凸显了发展中国家为了捍卫其集体利益而各自组织起来的新的决心与能力。同样，它们对乌克兰战争的回应也表明其日益不愿追随西方立场，而是希望最大限度地保持战略独立性与灵活性，对价值观问题采取多元化处理方式。例如，联合国大会谴责俄罗斯的决议有 141 个国家投票支持，但约有 50 个全球南方国家通过反对决议（5 国）、弃权（35 国）或未参与投票（12 国）等方式表达了异议。^[7] 值得注意的是，没有一个全球南方国家加入西方对俄制裁，这表明它们无意在国际舞台上孤立俄罗斯。通过抵制西方施压谴责俄罗斯，发展中国家正在国际关系中维护其独立立场。全球南方国家希望表明，它们的决策是基于对国家利益的审慎考量，而非外部压力。这一立场并不必然意味着对俄罗斯政策的认可或支持。然而，它削弱了西方孤立俄罗斯的努力，并损害了其制裁的有效性。全球南方国家对俄乌冲突的反应体现了它们多元的价值观。这些反应也标志着单极秩序的终结，在这种秩序下，全球南方国家的利益长期被边缘化。

这同样凸显了构建更加公平的世界秩序的必要性。

数十年来，发展中国家大多被视为国际外交的对象，而非拥有自身重要议程的行动者。尽管它们在联合国大会中占多数，却依然在关键决策机构如联合国安理会、国际货币基金组织、世界银行和二十国集团中无足轻重。这种局面即将发生深刻改变。随着发展中国家整体影响力在国际权力格局日益碎片化的背景下不断增强，全球南方国家正要求获得与其提升地位相匹配的话语权。迄今为止，西方对这一现实的承认仍主要停留在口头层面。例如，尽管美国总统乔·拜登曾提议给予非洲联盟二十国集团永久席位^[8]，但该倡议至今仍未落实。与此同时，发展中国家在国际货币基金组织和世界银行的投票权比例仍然严重偏低。^[9] 全球南方国家将日益推动形成更具代表性的国际秩序。这种代表性比以往任何时候都更重要，因为一个缺乏代表性的“秩序”——即大多数国家几乎没有发言权——只会导致失序甚至混乱。在此背景下，各国立场将出现分歧，从而无法应对气候变化和流行病等需要全球协作的挑战。

全球南方正作为一个统一区域崛起。全球南方国家的参与和投入不仅有助于催生新的世界秩序，更能塑造其结构与规则，这些规则可能与现行体系存在显著差异。

中国式现代化：对构建多元世界的贡献

过去，中国常使用“中国特色现代化”这一表述，强调其现代化进程的独特性。如今，“中国式现代化”的概念则意味着它既独特，又具有普适性。在中共二十大上，习近平主席指出：“中国式现代化既有各国现代化的共同特征，更有基于自己国情的中国特色。”通过这一理念，中国表明

中国式现代化能为其他国家寻求合适繁荣发展道路提供宝贵的启示。

中国在短短几十年内实现了现代化——这一过程在西方花了数百年。它奇迹般地从一个贫穷落后的国家崛起为世界第二大经济体。如前所述，虽然其他国家可能无法完全复制中国模式，但其现代化进程的示范效应十分显著。许多发展中国家在参与全球化并寻找适合本国国情的发展道路时，都能从中国的现代化历程中获得深刻启示。

作为全球南方最大的国家，中国通过其国家发展的理论体系，为全球价值观的多元化做出了重大贡献。这在一定程度上有助于弥合普世价值观“真空”时期的断层，为未来建立更加公平的国际规则和规范体系铺平了道路。

过去，西方的资本主义现代化被视为现代化的唯一路径，西方文明则被认为是人类文明的最终形态。中国人以往视欧洲人为低等的“蛮夷”。而鸦片战争以来，中国在工具、制度、思想、文化等各领域逐渐效仿西方。鸦片战争后兴起的洋务运动标志着中国现代化的开端。在洋务运动的30年间，中国试图向西方学习科学技术，特别是获取与枪炮和军舰相关的知识。洋务运动建立了多个军事和民用工业，为中国工业部门的早期发展做出了贡献。1895年，中日甲午战争的失败促使中国掀起新一轮自我反思，并重新努力向西方学习制度改革，发起了百日维新。辛亥革命后，中国更加意识到自身文化的落后。五四运动便是一场倡导西方文化理念的运动。中华人民共和国成立后，中国走上了一条与西方截然不同的发展道路。然而，中国人民始终保持着开放包容的态度，将西方视为发展经验的重要借鉴。毛泽东时代，中国主要借鉴苏联的发展模

式；而邓小平时期，中国则广泛向美国学习现代化建设经验，追求国家繁荣发展。

随着“中国式现代化”理念的提出，中国首次完全跳脱出西方范式，致力于构建超越西方中心主义思想和话语体系的新理论体系。中国式现代化表明，现代化不等于西方化。中国式现代化有五个特征：人口规模巨大的现代化、全体人民共同富裕的现代化、物质文明和精神文明相协调的现代化、人与自然和谐共生的现代化、走和平发展道路的现代化。要成功实现中国式现代化，中国必须克服诸多挑战。作为一个拥有庞大人口的发展中国家，中国面临着艰巨任务：要在960万平方公里的土地上，引领14多亿人口、56个民族共同迈入现代社会，其规模远超任何现有发达国家。若中国成功实现这一目标，将成为一项令人钦佩的成就。此外，通过推动可持续发展，中国能够成为其他寻求经济增长与环境保护和社会进步相平衡的国家的典范。虽然中国式现代化的最终成效尚待观察，但构建基于中国历史和实践条件的理论体系，对于塑造未来多极化与多元化世界具有重要意义。

单极世界秩序已走向终结。随着全球权力向多极化结构转移，一个关于普世价值的“真空”期已然出现。世界必须逐步接受多元价值体系与治理模式的共存共生。这些体系与模式间的差异如此显著，以至于我们难以断言任何一种价值是唯一普世准则。中国模式最显著的特征在于其灵活性，这体现为一条解放思想、探索新路径的永不停歇之路。在历史发展的崎岖道路上，中国展现出根据环境变化调整思维与政策的非凡能力。这是中国应当更广泛与世界分享的经验。■

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The “Vacuum” Period of Universal Values and the Role of Global South Countries

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Keywords: “vacuum” period of universal values; Chinese-style modernization; multipolar world

We are living through a pivotal historical moment in which the world is undergoing a profound transformation from a unipolar order to a new one. Such shifts are rare yet consequential, and are often accompanied by violence or war. Regardless of whether they are welcomed or resisted, changes in the global order invariably bring uncertainty, loss of control, social upheaval, contestation of values, and reconstruction of identities and discourses. The future of the world depends partly on the choices we make today. Forecasting the future is an inherently difficult task, yet it is essential because it allows us to better prepare for an uncertain future.

The Transitional Period

Over the past three decades, the world has witnessed a rapid shift in the balance of power. This has led to an increasing imbalance in the global power structure and a transformation of the world order. The world order evolved from the bipolar U.S.-Soviet rivalry of the Cold War, to a unipolar moment after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The United States emerged as the only superpower, and the world has been in a complex transitional period since the second decade of the 21st century. The current “transitional complexity” of the world order is evident in the deep divisions among international political scholars (who define it as unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar). This sharply contrasts with the past, when there was a broad consensus on defining the Cold War era as bipolar, the pre-Cold War system as multipolar, and the post-Cold War world as unipolar.

Arguably, the current world order is in a transitional period, shifting from a unipolar order to a different one. However, it has not yet fully emerged from the shadow of unipolarity, in which the nature and influence of American hegemony are deeply embedded in all aspects of international life. At the same time, it has not yet undergone a complete transformation into a new order with distinguishable features that allow it to be named. The unipolar order that emerged after the Cold War was underpinned by the United States’ overwhelming economic, military, technological, and normative power. This order played a significant role in maintaining global peace. However, history has shown that no world order lasts forever, as they follow cyclical patterns. The current balance of power is being disrupted, posing a fundamental challenge to the existing world order, as the global governance architecture and international legal system experience a serious decline.

The “Vacuum” period of universal values

A direct consequence of the transitional phase is that the world may enter a period marked by an absence of universal global values. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, neoliberal internationalism expanded from a strictly Western order into a far more ambitious one at global level. The unipolar world order that emerged after the Cold War was referred to as the liberal order, and liberalism became the dominant ideology. However, for the first time in over 30 years, the global order does not reflect the order of Western countries. Alongside the relative decline of liberal democracies, liberalism - with its values of equality, freedom, democracy, and human rights - has gradually lost its appeal. The United States' dominant role has steadily diminished over the past three decades, and the democracy it champions is facing increasing challenges. Western leaders have sought to legitimize the rules-based international order by aligning it with the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They emphasize that this order is universal, not Western. Nevertheless, fewer and fewer non-Western governments are convinced by this argument. For them, the “liberal order” or the “rules-based international order” is shaped by Western interests, centered on Western power, and adhered to or disregarded by the West as they see fit. Shortly after Donald Trump won a second presidential term, Der Spiegel, one of Germany's most well-known weekly magazines, published an editorial arguing that: “Donald Trump's return to the White House shows that liberal democracy has failed. It proved unable to provide a coherent structure to the post war era... An old era is coming to an end, and a new one is beginning. Nothing marks this shift as clearly as the election of Donald Trump to a second term as president of the United States. The West has lost its dominance and the shared foundation of values, which has been crumbling for some time, is now collapsing.”^[1]

Meanwhile, China is the only rising power capable of challenging the United States' status as the world's superpower. However, it has yet to establish a system of universal global values. Currently, China is focusing on promoting its own value system, which combines sinicization of Marxism, modernization and traditional cultural values. However, China's efforts in this



China's efforts to promote its own value system remain very limited beyond its borders.

regard remain very limited beyond its borders, and is unlikely to change substantively in the near future. While some countries may admire China's economic development and draw lessons from its economic miracle, it is difficult for them to adopt or replicate China's development model. The main reason is China's limited soft power and global status.

Thus, neither the United States nor China can lead a universally accepted ideological movement, which may result in a global ideological "vacuum" in the coming years. The consequence is that: since universal values form the basis for constructing a global normative system, challenges to liberal values may also lead to a crisis in the current legal and regulatory systems built upon liberalism. Without a newly established value system, what will serve as the basis for global norms? As a result, states will face greater challenges in maintaining their commitments to existing norms, formulating new ones, addressing global challenges, and curbing escalating behaviors. The declining consensus among major powers may hinder efforts to denounce or penalize violations. In such a fluid legal environment, states and non-state actors may perceive lower risks in disregarding certain norms. This could lead some to engage in selective adherence or proposals of alternative norms. The establishment of multilateral norms will encounter growing obstacles in established international forums. Some actors may attempt to shift norm-setting discussions away from consensus-based intergovernmental institutions by advocating for majority-vote mechanisms or institutions led by regional or non-state actors. If international norms become more localized, applying only to some specific regions or groups of states, enforcing and complying with future agreements will be even more challenging. Thus, international norms risk fragmenting into localized or regional norms. The erosion of consensus among governments and political factions regarding adherence to fundamental principles complicates, or even hinders international cooperation on global challenges, ultimately weakening collective actions in response to those challenges. As normative consensus erodes, cooperation will likely take place within smaller groupings divided along regional or ideological lines. While this may facilitate coordinated responses to challenges at sub-global levels, it hinders states' ability to jointly pursue effective solutions at the global level. The erosion of compliance by some states with norms such as non-violation of borders, prohibition of assassinations, and restrictions on certain weapons systems - partly driven by advancements in cyber, robotics, artificial intelligence, and space technologies - will heighten the risks of miscalculation and conflict. Furthermore, non-state actors' growing access to these technologies intensifies threats to nation-states and increases the likelihood that they will be drawn into unintended confrontations.

The Rise of Global South Countries and their role in the Future

The term "Global South" refers to developing countries, many of which were former colonies of Western powers. Early references to "the South" appeared in United Nations documents in the 1960s. After the Cold War, the term "global" was added to create "the Global South". In the context of globalization, the term "Global South" emphasizes interconnectedness, and signifies transregional and multilateral coalitions such as the 1955 Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 at the United Nations, and the BRICS. The term also highlights the growing economic and political influence of countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.^[2] The Global South accounts for over 85% of the world's population

and nearly 40% of the global GDP. By 2030, the combined GDP (PPP) of Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, and South Africa is expected to surpass that of Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden combined.^[3] Forecasts of global GDP distribution based on purchasing power parity (PPP) by 2050 suggest that developing countries will surpass developed countries in GDP share. A report by the Development Research Center of the State Council of China also highlights that Global South countries will play an increasingly important role in the global economy. The report forecasts that the GDP of Global South countries will surpass that of developed economies by 2035, accounting for nearly 60% of the global economy and investment.^[4]

The global demographic landscape is poised for significant transformation. Over the next three decades, different regions of the world will experience varying rates of population growth. This will lead to a substantial redistribution of the global population. Central and South Asia are expected to become the world's most populous regions by 2037. In contrast, Europe and North America are projected to reach their population peaks in the late 2030s, and then begin to decline due to prolonged low birth rates.^[5] These demographic shifts highlight the rise of countries in the Global South.

Although Global South countries are not usually considered military or economic powers, they have diverse strengths, such as energy and natural resources, and they are emerging markets. Many nations, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, control significant portions of the global oil and gas supply. This gives them considerable leverage in global economic and geopolitical negotiations, which they exercise through organizations like OPEC. Countries such as Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa play crucial roles in developing markets and have higher economic growth rates than developed economies.^[6] With a GDP exceeding \$2.2 trillion in 2022, Brazil is the largest economy in South America and an important member of the BRICS. Additionally, countries such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Vietnam are leveraging their cultures, tourism, and diplomacy to increase their international influence. Looking ahead, countries in the Global South are expected to continue using their soft power, resources, and growing markets to amplify their voice in international organizations.

Many of Global South countries are located in strategically important regions and play pivotal roles in major power competitions. For example, as a central actor in the Middle East, the United Arab Emirates serves as a strategic partner in shaping regional security dynamics. Similarly, ASEAN countries, located at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, play a strategic role in maintaining regional stability amid growing competition between the United States and China. As the de-facto leader of ASEAN, Indonesia contributes substantially to the development of regional rules governing trade and security. Brazil, one of the largest nations in South America, can influence regional norms through organizations such as Mercosur and BRICS. Brazil is also a leading actor in global climate efforts, thanks to its vital role in preserving the Amazon rainforest. Many non-aligned states in the Global South are expected to increase their geopolitical influence by forming flexible coalitions, as exemplified by collaboration among ASEAN, Mercosur, and Gulf nations. These countries are also likely to assume intermediary roles in regional and global conflicts, offering diplomatic and reconciliatory solutions rather than engaging in direct competition.

Many of Global South countries are becoming more capable of shaping regional standards

and promoting global initiatives in specific areas. OPEC, for instance, can influence oil production and pricing regulations. In the coming years, OPEC countries may also spearhead renewable energy initiatives, such as green hydrogen production. Brazil, South Africa, and small island states like the Maldives play key roles in climate change negotiations at the United Nations. These countries advocate for equitable emission reduction responsibility rules between developed and developing countries. Southeast Asian countries are developing regional standards through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), in which Indonesia and Vietnam play substantial roles. The RCEP is expected to become the world's largest free trade agreement by 2030, shaping trade and investment norms across Asia. The BRICS is establishing alternative institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB), to compete with Western-led organizations like the IMF and the World Bank. In the future, countries in the Global South will continue to advocate for rules that align with their regional and global interests. ASEAN and OPEC are expected to play a central role in shaping trade and energy regulations. Furthermore, these countries will leverage platforms like the BRICS and the UN to amplify their voices. Global South countries are now becoming an indispensable part of the international order. Amidst great-power competition, they are expected to use their intermediary positions to establish flexible and mutually beneficial rules for developed and developing states alike. As these countries grow in economic strength and geopolitical influence, they may gradually reshape global governance in areas such as energy, trade, and climate change.

The rise of Global South countries could transform the world from a “vacuum” of universal values into a pluralistic one. In such a pluralistic world order, we must recognize the realities of complexity, contradictions, and opposing values. We are likely to witness the emergence of double standards or pluralistic perceptions regarding global issues and agendas. This pluralism may become a defining characteristic of the future world, where a new global order emerges amid challenges to Western-led norms and values arising from the diversity of development models and ideologies largely introduced by Global South countries.



The rise of Global South countries could transform the world from a “vacuum” of universal values into a pluralistic one.

China has actively mobilized Global South countries, over which it wields significant and growing economic and diplomatic influence, to support its agenda for reforming global governance. These countries often share China's desire for a more equitable world order and harbor various grievances toward Western dominance. The BRI currently has 151 participating countries. The Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative (GDI) currently has 81 members, while the Group of 77 (G77) and China includes 134 countries. The vast majority of members in all of these groups are from the Global South. At COP27, the divide between the G77 and Western governments highlighted a renewed determination and ability among developing countries to organize independently to defense of their own collective interests. Similarly, their responses to the war in Ukraine illustrate a growing hesitation to follow the West's lead. Instead, they want to maximize their strategic independence and flexibility, adopting diverse approaches to values. While 141 countries voted in favor of the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia's military aggression, around 50 Global South countries expressed dissent either by voting against the resolution (5 countries), abstaining (35 countries), or not participating in the vote (12 countries).^[7] Notably, no Global South country has joined Western sanctions against Russia, indicating that they do not intend to isolate Russia in the international arena. By resisting Western pressure to condemn Russia, developing countries are asserting their independent stance in international relations. Global South countries want to demonstrate that their decisions are based on carefully calculated assessments of national interests rather than external pressure. This position does not necessarily indicate approval or endorsement of Russia's policies. However, it weakens the West's efforts to isolate Russia and undermines the effectiveness of its sanctions. Global South countries' responses to the Russia-Ukraine conflict reflect their diverse values. These responses also signal the end of the unipolar order, in which interests of Global South countries have long been marginalized. This also underscores the need for a more equitable world order.

For decades, developing countries have largely been viewed as objects of international diplomacy rather than as actors with their own serious agendas. Although they constitute the majority in the United Nations General Assembly, they remain insignificant within key decision-making bodies such as the UN Security Council, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the G20. This situation is set to change profoundly. As developing countries' overall influence grows amid an increasingly fragmented international power structure, the Global South is demanding influence commensurate with its elevated role. Thus far, the West's acknowledgment of this reality has largely been rhetorical. For example, although U.S. President Joe Biden proposed granting the African Union a permanent seat in the G20,^[8] the initiative has yet to materialize. Meanwhile, voting shares of developing countries in the IMF and the World Bank remain disproportionately low.^[9] The Global South will increasingly shape a more representative international order. This is more important than ever as an "order" that lacks representation - wherein the majority of nations have minimal voice - is a prescription for disorder or even chaos. In such a context, countries will diverge in their positions and become incapable of addressing challenges such as climate change and pandemics, which require global cooperation.

The Global South is emerging as a unified region. The participation and engagement of Global South countries not only contribute to the birth of a new world order, but also help shape its structure and rules, which may differ significantly from the current system.

Chinese-style Modernization: A Contribution to Building a Pluralistic World

In the past, China often used the term “modernization with Chinese characteristics,” emphasizing the unique features of its modernization process. Today, the notion of “Chinese-style modernization” implies that it encompasses both unique characteristics and universal applicability. At the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping stated, “Chinese-style modernization contains elements that are common to the modernization processes of all countries, but it is more characterized by features that are unique to the Chinese context”. Through this concept, China conveys that Chinese-style modernization can provide valuable insights for other nations seeking suitable paths to prosperity and development.


China achieved modernization in just a few decades - a process that took the West centuries. It has risen miraculously from a poor, underdeveloped nation to become the world’s second-largest economy. As mentioned above, while other countries may not be able to fully replicate Chinese model, the demonstrative effect of its modernization is significant. Many developing countries can be profoundly inspired by China’s modernization journey as they engage in globalization and search for a development path that suits their national conditions.

As the largest country in the Global South, China has made significant contributions to the diversification of global values through its theoretical system for national development. This has partly helped bridge the gaps during the “vacuum” period of universal values, paving the way for a more equitable international system of rules and norms in the future.

In the past, the West’s capitalist modernization was seen as the only path to modernization, and Western civilization was regarded as the final form of human civilization. For over 100 years, from the Opium War (1840) until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949), China copied the West in every aspect, including tools, institutions, ideas, and culture. The Yangwu Movement, which began after the Opium War, marked the start of China’s modernization. Previously, the Chinese considered Europeans to be “barbarians” (蛮夷), belonging to a lower class. However, the attack on the Yuanmingyuan Summer Palace in Beijing by Western forces awakened the Chinese people. During the 30 years of the Yangwu Movement, China sought to learn from the West in the fields of science and technology, particularly acquiring knowledge related to firearms and warships. The Westernization Movement established several military and civilian industries, contributing to the early development of industrial sectors in China. In 1895, China was defeated by Japan in the First Sino-Japanese War. This defeat prompted another wave of self-reflection and renewed efforts to learn from Western institutional reforms, as seen during the Hundred Days’ Reform. Following the Xinhai Revolution, China became more aware of its cultural backwardness. The May Fourth Movement was a campaign to adopt Western cultural ideals. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the country took a distinct developmental path from the West. Nevertheless, the Chinese have maintained an open-minded attitude, viewing the West as a valuable source of developmental experience. During the Mao era, China relied heavily on the Soviet Union’s development models, while under Deng Xiaoping, China was willing to learn extensively from the United States in its pursuit of modernization and prosperity.

With the introduction of “Chinese-style modernization,” China has fully diverged from

Western paradigms for the first time, striving to develop a new theoretical system that transcends Western-centric ideas and discourse systems. Chinese-style modernization demonstrates that modernization does not equate to Westernization. The five key characteristics of Chinese-style modernization include: the modernization of a huge population; the modernization of realizing common prosperity for all; the modernization of harmony between material and spiritual civilization; the modernization of harmony between humanity and nature; and the modernization of peaceful development. To successfully achieve Chinese-style modernization, China must overcome numerous challenges. As a developing country with a huge population, China faces the daunting task of guiding more than 1.4 billion people belonging to 56 ethnic groups into a modern society across 9.6 million square kilometers of land, a scale far exceeding any existing developed country. If China succeeds, it will be an admirable achievement. Furthermore, by fostering sustainable development, China could serve as a role model for other countries seeking to balance economic growth with environmental protection and social progress. While the ultimate effectiveness of Chinese-style modernization remains to be seen, developing a theoretical system based on China's history and practical conditions is a significant contribution to shaping a future multipolar and pluralistic world.

The unipolar world order has come to an end. As global power shifts toward a multipolar structure, a "vacuum" period of universal values has emerged. The world must gradually accept the coexistence of diverse value systems and governance models. These systems and models may vary to such an extent that it is impossible to confidently claim that any single value is the only universal norm. A distinctive feature of the Chinese Model is its flexibility, which represents a relentless path of liberating thought and exploring new approaches. Throughout its bumpy development path in history, China has demonstrated an exceptional ability to adapt its mindset and policies in response to changing circumstances. This is an experience China should share more extensively with the rest of the world. 

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[摘要]

本文指出了上世纪末的“亚洲价值观”与“全球南方”两套话语作为自由主义替代方案的意识形态同构性。基于东南亚案例，文章批判性地揭示全球南方面临三重张力：其一，反西方叙事中潜藏的文化本质化倾向，导致对“南方”内部多元性的系统性遮蔽；其二，区域内经济发展模式与治理体系的异质性，挑战了“南方团结”的想象基础；其三，南南合作中小国对大国的依赖，有可能形成新的中心-边缘格局。作者强调，要突破这种话语与实践的悖论，必须超越简单的南北二元对立，在承认内部差异性的前提下，构建基于地方性知识生产与制度创新的新型南南合作机制。唯有如此，全球南方框架才能超越修辞上的团结，为重构国际秩序提供真正的替代性方案。

同质性的迷思： 亚洲价值观与全球南方的文化局限

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[中国] 赵凯莉

关键词：亚洲价值观 南南合作 人类命运共同体

定义“全球南方”

冷战结束后，“全球南方”和“全球北方”的地缘政治与经济称谓逐渐取代了“第一世界”与“第三世界”、“发达国家”与“发展中国家”等早期的二元分类。1980年勃兰特委员会的报告《北方与南方：生存计划》通过“南北分裂”这一地理隐喻，正式阐述了全球不平等。^[1]然而，这一概念二分法的根源可追溯至1955年的万隆会议，在该会议上，亚非国家通过挑战殖民遗产和倡导自主发展，集体宣称自己为“南方”。这种早期的全球南方身份表述构建了一种反霸权的政治经济叙事，以对抗西方主导的全球秩序。^[2]作为对国家间团结的一种象征性表达，全球南方认可其成员多样的世

界观和知识体系，这反映在对身份形成、文化归属和权力关系的多样化处理方式中。^[3]

作为全球南方的重要组成部分，东南亚为南方世界复杂的后殖民状况提供了关键见解。20世纪90年代，李光耀和马哈蒂尔等政治领导人曾提出“亚洲价值观”话语，为区域发展模式提供了意识形态基础，但亚洲金融危机后，亚洲价值观框架的可信度受到严重破坏。

全球南方的话语与亚洲价值观的话语相似，与其说是一种植根于文化的世界观，不如说是一种意识形态驱动的政治项目^[4]，两者都是对西方文化和政治主导地位的回应。本文从东南亚视角对全球南方进行文化批判，探讨这些话语既作为赋权策略，又作为某种约束所发挥的作用。文章认为，

全球南方仍在与一个根本矛盾作斗争——或许可称之为“文化盲点”：即它始终未能切实触及它声称所代表的文化特异性。


自由主义规范的替代方案

全球南方话语和亚洲价值观框架有着相似的基本逻辑，在共同的政治 - 文化语法中运作。两者都借鉴了两个相互交织的范式：通过文化相对主义强调文化差异，以及优先考虑发展而非个人权利，后者常被阐述为自由主义民主规范的一个替代方案。

亚洲价值观话语挑战了西方自由民主、个人主义和人权规范的普遍性。通过李光耀和马哈蒂尔等领导人的阐述，这一话语强调社群主义高于个人权利，社会和谐高于异议，尊重权威和等级制度，以及经济发展优先于自由民主。这些价值观常常被直接拿来与西方自由主义理念形成对比。^[5]同样，许多全球南方国家拒绝西方道德帝国主义，认为政治和人权标准必须植根于

当地历史、文化和社会经济背景。例如，印度政府经常主张，其独特的文明遗产和治理挑战使得西方关于宗教自由或性别平等的某些规范并不适用。^[6]西方对亚洲某些做法的批评常常被斥为道德优越感的体现，因为它未能考虑到治理庞大且社会经济多样化人口的复杂性。在东南亚经济快速增长的背景下，这种发展型国家的家长式模式对全球南方的政治思想产生了重大影响。它优先考虑经济增长和社会稳定而非政治自由化，提出在有限的政治自由与物质发展之间进行权衡。在这种模式下，强大的中央权威通常被视为有效国家建设和减贫的必要条件。

亚洲价值观虽然曾引起巨大争议，但它无疑挑战了西方自由主义的规范框架和主导的国家治理模式。与此同时，全球南方已成为一个日益重要的规范竞争领域，更多国家在此阐述关于发展、治理和价值体系的替代性、非西方路径。在此背景下，全球规范和知识的多元化越来越获得认可，



李光耀、马哈蒂尔等人提出的亚洲价值观挑战了西方自由民主、个人主义和人权规范的普遍性

为重塑国际秩序提供了新的可能性。

在东南亚，世界上最大的穆斯林占多数的民主国家印度尼西亚，展示了一种独特的宗教与现代治理融合模式。通过以“潘查希拉”（Pancasila，建国五项基本原则）作为其宪法基础，印度尼西亚维护宗教多元主义，同时承认伊斯兰教的文化中心地位。伊斯兰价值观在金融、法律和社会治理等多个领域被制度化。这体现在伊斯兰合规金融部门的发展、权力下放后伊斯兰法律规范纳入区域法规（特别是在亚齐省），以及利用宗教群众组织加强公共服务提供等方面。^[7]印度尼西亚的民主制度基于多党选举、法治和宪法制衡，有机地将宗教原则与民主治理相结合。

同样是穆斯林占多数的国家，邻国文莱达鲁萨兰国和马来西亚采用了明显不同的宗教治理模式，这是由不同的历史轨迹和宪法安排所塑造的。在文莱，伊斯兰教通过“马来伊斯兰君主制”的概念深深植根于国家的政治身份中，该概念将马来文化、伊斯兰价值观和绝对君主制正式整合为国家治理的意识形态基础。苏丹既是国家元首，也是最高宗教权威，拥有广泛的行政、立法和司法权力。自2014年《伊斯兰刑法》（*Syariah Penal Code Order*）颁布以来，文莱加强了神权政治框架，使伊斯兰教不仅作为道德指南针，更成为法律和国家合法性的正式来源，尽管在实践中，执法仍具有选择性，并受到国际监督和国内实用主义的制约。^[8]

相比之下，马来西亚则遵循君主立宪制模式，采取联邦宗教治理结构。虽然伊斯兰教被承认为联邦的宗教，但其实施在很大程度上是去中心化的，由每个州的苏丹或州长管辖。国家并行运作伊斯兰法院与民事法院双重法律体系，主要监督穆斯林的个人和家庭事务。自20世纪80年代以来，

伊斯兰教在治理中的作用发生了显著变化，公共机构、教育和法律规范日益伊斯兰化。尽管马来西亚实行选举民主和多元法律体系，但国家越来越多地利用伊斯兰教作为政治合法化的工具，在多元文化紧张局势下，常常强化马来-穆斯林的至上地位。^[9]因此，文莱和马来西亚的案例都体现了伊斯兰教如何与君主制和民族主义交织在一起，形成将宗教正统和国家权威置于民主多元主义之上的治理模式。

在东亚，中国的治理模式通常被视为儒家优绩主义（meritocracy）的当代版本。^[10]它强调选拔德才兼备的领导人，倡导以人民为中心的治理理念。通过制度化的干部选拔、考核和培训机制，该体系确保各级官员具备强大的行政能力和公共服务意识。在中国共产党的领导下，国家不断完善治理能力，有效统筹资源用于重大工程和国家优先事项。这种模式深深植根于中国的历史和文化传统，代表了治理机构和能力现代化的持续努力，为全球南方的其他国家提供了替代性的发展范式。

在非洲，传统权威体系在许多国家的社会治理中继续发挥重要作用。一个特别有影响力的框架是非洲社群主义，这是一种基于集体价值观和去殖民伦理的范式。它具有三个核心特征：第一，人格的关系性概念，即通过履行社群责任来塑造个人身份；第二，基于共识的决策过程，加纳阿散蒂酋长领地的审议传统便是例证；第三，拒绝西方个人主义和二元思维，支持适应现代治理挑战的本土世界观。^[11]此外，传统司法系统与正式法律机构并行运作。博茨瓦纳的“克戈特拉”——由部落首领主持的社区法庭——就是一个显著的例子，在正式司法机构之外调解民事和家庭纠纷。尽管是法外机制，但这些机构履行着重要的社会文化治理职能，特别是在农村地区。

这些模式体现了非洲社会独特的集体主义精神，并从文化连续性而非外来法律主义中获得合法性。

这些以区域为基础的模式反映了全球南方内部更广泛的运动，旨在抵制规范霸权并主张具有文化共鸣的替代方案。尽管形式各异，但它们共同挑战了西方自由主义规范的假定普世性，并在全球话语中扩大了合法治理实践的范围。

全球南方的同质性迷思

无论是在亚洲价值观还是全球南方话语中，“西方”常常被本质化，并被构建为一个同质且在道德上具有侵入性的“他者”。通过诉诸深刻的文化差异，亚洲价值观和全球南方的叙事都采用文化相对主义作为关键的方法论和意识形态工具。然而，在实践中，亚洲价值观框架构建了一个理想化的、统一的“东方”，与一个衰败的“西方”形成道德对立。^[12]这种二元逻辑强化了而非消除了西方帝国主义话语最初产生的东西方二分法，同时边缘化了所谓“东方”内部的文化多样性和不同声音。

由于全球南方的概念通常是相对于外部参照物——“西方”来定义的，因此存在将其同质化的倾向。实际上，它是一个极其多样化且内部有差异的国家群体。这种对立框架可能掩盖了一个事实，即许多被归类为全球南方的国家，除了非西方身份或殖民历史之外，几乎没有实质性的共同点。虽然统一的南方叙事可能具有象征或战略意义，特别是在后殖民和反霸权话语中，但它可能会掩盖经济发展、政治结构、区域愿望和历史经验方面的关键差异。仔细观察会发现，全球南方远非单一整体，而是包含了广泛的背景，难以进行简单分类。

全球南方的经济差距仍然很大。区域增长差异尤为明显：东南亚是全球增长最快的地区之一，2024年的GDP总和为3.95万亿美元（人均5750美元），而撒哈拉以南非洲的GDP为1.88万亿美元（人均1540美元）。即使在东盟内部，区域内的不平衡等也很显著——新加坡的人均GDP（90670美元）是柬埔寨（2750美元）的33倍。全球南方经济体日益分为两大类：越南和印度等新兴经济体，它们成功融入全球价值链，2024年的增长率分别为7.1%和6.5%；以及阿根廷等陷入困境的经济体，因长期财政紧缩导致经济萎缩（-1.7%）。^[13]

政治制度的多样性同样明显。印度（联邦议会制）和巴西（联邦总统制共和国）等自由民主国家维护多党竞争、定期选举和权力分立。相比之下，越南和卢旺达等集权政权通过不同机制集中权力：越南的一党制围绕国家领导的“四大支柱”展开，而卢旺达在保罗·卡加梅的长期总统任期内保持着严格的国家控制。新加坡和土耳其等混合政权则模糊了界限。在这些国家，形式上的多党选举与实质上的权力集中并存。

尽管在言辞上承诺多极化和抵制西方主导，但全球南方因不同地缘政治背景和经济优先事项所塑造的竞争性区域野心而分裂。东盟经济体寻求加强其在区域供应链中的作用，并吸引外国制造业投资。非洲国家虽然对基础设施投资持开放态度，但越来越强调债务可持续性和摆脱新形式依赖的自主性。在拉丁美洲，战略联盟存在分歧：巴西和阿根廷深化与中国的关系，以制衡美国的影响力，而哥伦比亚和厄瓜多尔仍保持与美国的经济和军事同盟。区域间竞争也延伸到绿色能源领域。例如，摩洛哥和南非旨在成为欧洲绿色氢的主要

供应国，而越南和马来西亚等东南亚经济体通过扩大太阳能光伏产品出口，在竞争激烈的全球市场中占据一席之地。

殖民遗产进一步塑造了全球南方与外部力量的多样化接触。非洲国家在全球论坛上往往将去殖民化和历史正义作为关键主题，而东盟成员国则倾向于关注发展自主性和经济主权。同时，拉丁美洲国家经常围绕共同抵制美国霸权联合起来。在东南亚内部，与前殖民宗主国的关系远非一致，大致可分为三类：对抗型，以强烈的反殖民情绪为特征（如印度尼西亚与荷兰、越南与法国）；务实型，出于功能性目的保留殖民时期行政遗产（如新加坡和文莱与英国）；以及矛盾型，以持久的经济联系和有限的文化亲缘性的并存为特征（如马来西亚与英国）。因此，不能将全球南方理解为一个连贯或统一的集团。其内部多样性由复杂的历史、经济和政治轨迹所塑造，这要求我们采用更细致和差异化的研究方法——一种抵制本质主义并突出其内部多元性的方法。

南南权力不对称

尽管全球南方常被描绘为一个基于互助和平等原则的共同体，但该群体内部仍存在结构性不对称。区域大国、资源丰富的国家和经济发达的国家经常占据主导地位，导致内部等级制度和事实上的核心 - 外围动态。

在东南亚，东盟体现了这些内部不平衡。印度尼西亚是该地区人口最多、经济实力最强的成员国，2023 年的 GDP 为 1.3711 万亿美元，约为老挝（142 亿美元）的 97 倍。其人口为 2.786962 亿，是文莱（45.05 万）的 600 多倍。^[14] 印度尼西亚越来越多地利用其市场规模、自然资源和地缘战略位置，

在区域治理中施加结构性权力。值得注意的是，其 2020 年对未加工镍矿的出口禁令旨在促进国内下游产业发展，并吸引外国对本地冶炼业的投资。这一政策不仅重塑了区域能源转型矿产供应链，还迫使菲律宾等其他资源出口国重新评估自己的产业战略和资源治理框架。^[15]

类似的非对称性现象在更广泛的全球南方地区同样可见，尤其体现在东盟、非洲联盟（AU）和拉丁美洲及加勒比国家共同体（CELAC）等区域组织中。这些组织竞相获得作为全球南方合法代表的话语权，这种竞争既受到内部能动性的影响，也受到西方主导的国际体系选择性认可机制的影响。2023 年，非洲联盟获得了二十国集团的永久成员资格，标志着重大的制度突破。相比之下，东盟尽管历史更悠久，但缺乏同等的全球地位，继续依赖印度尼西亚等有影响力的成员国在主要治理论坛中间接代表自己。2011 年成立的拉丁美洲及加勒比国家共同体面临更大的障碍，其全球参与在很大程度上局限于阿根廷和巴西等个别大国。

中国影响力的增长进一步复杂化了全球南方内部的动态。尽管中国通过“一带一路”倡议、全球发展倡议、全球安全倡议和全球文明倡议等举措，将自己定位为南南团结的倡导者，但这些努力引发了所谓“新帝国主义”的指控。批评者认为，中国在非洲和东南亚不断扩大的影响力强化了不对称依赖，挑战了全球南方作为整体抵抗外部支配的后殖民叙事。^[16] 在东南亚，中国投资因其经济效用通常受到欢迎，但政策制定者仍对“过度依赖”中国的长期战略风险保持警惕。^[17] 作为回应，印度试图通过“亚非增长走廊”等举措提供替代模式，将自己定位为更透明和尊重主权的发展伙伴。

对中国角色的批评往往基于一种简单的大国 - 小国二元论，援引 GDP、领土和人口规模等指标。^[18] 这一框架假定大国不可避免地支配小国，并倾向于忽视受援国的能动性。此外，中国崛起的同时，西方“威胁叙事”也不断强化，所谓的“中国威胁论”将中国的全球目标视为本质上具有破坏性的。^[19] 这些叙事反映了对西方霸权衰落和欧洲中心主义全球体系崩解的更广泛焦虑。

相比之下，中国主张其倡议旨在推动全球治理民主化和促进世界多极化。无论是通过“一带一路”的“共商共建共享”原则、全球文明倡议提出的文明对话，还是“人类命运共同体”愿景，中国都将自身定位为寻求改革而非主导国际秩序的负责任大国。这些倡议侧重于满足全球南方国家的发展需求和主权关切，推动更具包容性和公平性的全球政治经济。^[20] 通过这种方式，中国明确展现出对西方中心范式的有意脱离，提供了一种植根于非西方哲学和政治传统的多边实践路径。

全球南方框架的“未来”

在全球秩序持续重构和反全球化情绪高涨的背景下，全球南方的概念面临新的理论审视和实践不确定性。一方面，不断变化的地缘政治和日益扩大的南北发展差距重新激发了对南南合作和替代发展模式的兴趣。另一方面，持续存在的区域内不平等和资本主义结构的固化，继续削弱这种合作所追求的团结，使其显得脆弱且常常支离破碎。对于东南亚——一个以异质性的地缘政治、复杂纠葛的殖民历史和各不相同的后殖民路径为特征的地区——其在全球南方话语中的定位尤为微妙。

超越传统的地缘政治和经济框架，文化视角揭示了身份协商、话语重组和权力

关系的多重维度，这些维度塑造了全球南方在不同国家语境中的想象与实践方式。在抵制西方规范主导地位的过程中，东南亚国家频繁援引本土文化框架和文明话语来阐述非西方主体性——这一点最显著地体现在“亚洲价值观”的兴起中。然而，正如亚洲价值观话语在促成文化自我主张的同时也压制了内部多样性一样，将全球南方框架作为外交或政治工具加以工具化使用，可能会掩盖该地区复杂的社会文化和政治异质性。

这种政治化并非没有先例。20世纪90年代，亚洲价值观的言论为后殖民时代的东南亚国家政府提供了一个平台，使其能够在西方规范面前彰显文化自信。但这一叙事同时也为等级制治理结构、父权制意识形态以及对异见声音的压制提供了合法性。同样，如今的全球南方话语尽管在批判西方霸权和新自由主义秩序方面具有价值，却可能掩盖该地区与全球资本主义之间的复杂纠葛，并复制内部的排斥机制。

由此引发了一个更深层次的问题：南南合作能否超越修辞上的团结，成为一个有意义且互惠的集体发展框架？新加坡与柬埔寨、马来西亚与缅甸之间存在的显著不对称，以及中国和印度等地区大国的影响，使平等合作的前景变得复杂。若不解决这些失衡问题，合作可能会重蹈其试图打破的等级制度的覆辙。南南合作要实现其承诺，就必须建立在以地方能动性和共享治理为优先事项的机制之上，而非仅仅依靠雄心勃勃的口号。

从这个意义上说，亚洲价值观的话语类似于阿拉伯神话中的凤凰：象征意义深远，寄托着复兴的希望，但在实践中往往难以捉摸。尽管它曾作为对抗西方霸权的有力武器一度盛行，却在面对该地区的内部复杂性时陷入困境。同样，全球南方作



亚洲价值观和全球南方不是固定的类别或既定的意识形态，而是不断演进的话语形态

为一种反霸权话语具有重要意义，但如果它不能认真对待内部多样性、不对称性和结构性不平等，其变革潜力就会受到限制。因此，不应将亚洲价值观和全球南方视为固定的类别或既定的意识形态。相反，必须将它们理解为不断演进的话语形态——它具有流动性和争议性，并持续受到不断变化的政治、文化和制度力量的塑造。

“未来”这一概念在全球南方话语中具有象征力量。它常被用来批判当前的全球不平等现状，同时构想更公正、更自主的替代方案。例如，中国提出的“人类命运共同体”愿景就提供了一种非西方的、基于文明传统的全球治理模式，强调相互尊重、相互依存与共同发展。同样，东盟的《2045年愿景：我们共同的未来》勾勒出一个区域团结与全球影响力的前瞻性叙事。这些构想不仅是承载愿景的框架，也是在

仍主要由西方规范塑造的国际体系中，构建后殖民时代的能动性并主张意识形态自主性的工具。

然而，这种面向未来的话语值得批判性审视。谁来定义这个“未来”？谁的价值观、议程和利益被优先考虑，而谁的又被边缘化？在包容性语言的背后，这些愿景往往掩盖了结构性不平等、区域等级制度和内部多元性。在东南亚语境中，寄望于“共同体”或“共同命运”可能掩盖了权力、发展和话语权方面的不对称。因此，我们不应将“全球南方”或“亚洲价值观”视为固定或不言自明的类别，而必须将它们理解为话语建构——具有流动性、争议性，并持续受到文化政治和地缘政治权力关系的塑造。最终，任何对全球未来的有意义重塑都必须以平等参与和多元能动性为核心，而非停留于修辞上的共识。■

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The Myth of Homogeneity: Asian Values and the Cultural Limits of the Global South

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Keywords: Asian values, South-South cooperation, Community with a Shared Future for Mankind

Defining the “Global South”

Since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical and economic designations of the “Global South” and “Global North” have gradually replaced earlier binary classifications such as “First World” versus “Third World” and “developed” versus “developing” countries. The 1980 Brandt Commission report, *North-South: A Programme for Survival*, formally articulated global inequalities through the geographical metaphor of the “North–South divide”.^[1] Yet, the roots of this conceptual dichotomy can be traced back to the 1955 Bandung Conference, where Afro-Asian nations collectively asserted their position as the “South” by challenging colonial legacies and advocating for autonomous development. This early articulation of Global South identity constructed a counter-hegemonic politico-economic narrative in opposition to Western-dominated global orders.^[2] As a symbolic expression of solidarity, the Global South acknowledges the diverse worldviews and knowledge systems of its constituent members, which are reflected in pluralistic approaches to identity formation, cultural belonging, and power relations.^[3]

Southeast Asia, as an integral component of the Global South, offers critical insights into its postcolonial complexities. The “Asian Values” discourse advanced by political leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad in the 1990s provided an ideological basis for regional development models. However, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the credibility of the Asian Values framework was significantly undermined.

The discourse of the Global South, much like that of Asian Values, is less a culturally embedded worldview than an ideologically driven political project.^[4] Both emerged as responses to Western cultural and political dominance. This paper offers a cultural critique of the Global South from a Southeast Asian perspective, examining how these discourses function as strategies of both empowerment and constraint. It argues that the Global South continues to grapple with a fundamental contradiction—what might be called its “cultural blind spot”: a persistent failure to engage meaningfully with the very cultural specificities it claims to represent.

Alternatives to Liberal Norms

The Global South discourse and the Asian Values framework share homologous foundational logics, operating within a common political-cultural grammar. Both draw upon two

intertwined paradigms: the emphasis on cultural difference framed through cultural relativism, and a prioritization of development over individual rights, often articulated as an alternative to liberal democratic norms.

The Asian Values discourse challenges the universality of Western liberal democracy, individualism, and human rights norms. Articulated by leaders such as Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad, it emphasizes communitarianism over individual rights, social harmony over dissent, respect for authority and hierarchy, and the prioritization of economic development before liberal democracy. These values are often explicitly framed in contrast to Western liberal ideals.^[5] Similarly, many Global South states reject what they perceive as Western moral imperialism, arguing that political and human rights standards must be rooted in local histories, cultures, and socio-economic contexts. For example, the Indian government often contends that its unique civilizational heritage and governance challenges render certain Western norms on religious freedom or gender equality inapplicable.^[6] Western criticisms on certain practices in Asia are frequently dismissed as moral superiority that fails to account for the complexities of governing vast and socio-economically diverse populations. In the context of rapid economic growth in Southeast Asia, this paternalistic model of the developmental state has significantly influenced Global South political thinking. Prioritizing economic growth and social stability over political liberalization, it promotes a trade-off between limited political freedoms and material development. Under this model, strong central authority is often deemed necessary for effective nation-building and poverty reduction.

While the discourse on Asian Values has generated significant controversy, it undeniably challenges the normative frameworks of Western liberalism and dominant models of state governance. Parallel to this, the Global South has emerged as an increasingly salient arena for norm contestation, where more countries articulate alternative, non-Western approaches to development, governance, and value systems. Against this backdrop, the pluralization of global norms and epistemologies continues to gain traction, offering new possibilities for reshaping the international order.

In Southeast Asia, Indonesia—the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy—demonstrates a distinctive model of religious–modern governance integration. Through the adoption of *Pancasila* (Five Principles) as its constitutional foundation, Indonesia upholds religious pluralism while recognizing the cultural centrality of Islam. Islamic values are institutionalized across several domains, including finance, law, and social governance. This is evident in the development of a Sharia-compliant financial sector, the incorporation of Islamic legal norms into regional regulations (particularly in Aceh) after decentralization, and the use of religious mass organizations to enhance public service delivery. Indonesia’s democratic system—based on multiparty elections, the rule of law, and constitutional checks and balances—has organically synthesized religious principles with democratic governance.^[7] This hybrid model demonstrates that religion and democracy need not be inherently oppositional, but can instead be mutually constitutive within context-specific configurations that retain both local legitimacy and global resonance.

Although also Muslim-majority countries, neighboring Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia adopt markedly different models of religious governance, shaped by distinct historical



Malaysia follows a constitutional monarchy model with a federated religious governance structure.

trajectories and constitutional arrangements. In Brunei, Islam is deeply embedded in the state's political identity through the concept of *Melayu Islam Beraja* (Malay Islamic Monarchy), which formally integrates Malay culture, Islamic values, and absolute monarchy as the ideological foundation of national governance. The Sultan serves as both the head of state and the supreme religious authority, wielding extensive executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Since the promulgation of the *Syariah Penal Code Order* in 2014, Brunei has reinforced a theocratic framework that positions Islam not merely as a moral compass but as a formal source of law and state legitimacy, though in practice, enforcement remains selective and moderated by international scrutiny and domestic pragmatism.^[8]

In contrast, Malaysia follows a constitutional monarchy model with a federated religious governance structure. While Islam is recognized as the religion of the federation, its implementation is largely decentralized, falling under the jurisdiction of each state's Sultan or governor. The country maintains a dual legal system, where *Syariah* courts operate alongside civil courts, primarily overseeing personal and family matters for Muslims. The role of Islam in governance has evolved significantly, particularly since the 1980s, with the growing Islamization of public institutions, education, and legal norms. Despite Malaysia's electoral democracy and plural legal system, the state increasingly utilizes Islam as a tool of political legitimation, often reinforcing Malay-Muslim supremacy in the face of multicultural tensions.^[9] Both Brunei and Malaysia, therefore, exemplify how Islam can be entwined with monarchy and nationalism to produce governance models that prioritize religious orthodoxy and state authority over democratic pluralism.

In East Asia, China's governance model is often framed as a contemporary adaptation of Confucian meritocracy.^[10] Emphasizing the selection of virtuous and competent leaders, it promotes a people-centered governance ethos. Through institutionalized mechanisms for cadre selection, evaluation, and training, the system ensures that officials at all levels possess strong administrative capabilities and public service awareness. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, the state has continually refined its governance capacity, effectively mobilizing resources for large-scale initiatives and national priorities. Deeply rooted in China's historical and cultural traditions, this model represents an ongoing effort to modernize governance institutions and capabilities, offering alternative developmental paradigms for other countries in the Global South.

In Africa, traditional authority systems continue to play a vital role in social governance across many nations. A particularly influential framework is African communalism, a paradigm grounded in collective values and decolonial ethics. It is marked by three core features: first, a relational conception of personhood, where individual identity is shaped through fulfilling communal responsibilities; second, consensus-based decision-making processes, as exemplified by the deliberative traditions of Ghana's Ashanti chieftaincy; and third, a rejection of Western individualism and dualistic thinking in favor of indigenous worldviews adapted to modern governance challenges.^[11] Additionally, traditional justice systems operate alongside formal legal institutions. Botswana's *kgotla*—community courts presided over by tribal chiefs—offer a notable example, mediating civil and familial disputes outside the formal judiciary. Though extra-legal, these institutions perform vital sociocultural governance functions, especially in rural areas. Such models embody the unique collectivist ethos of African societies and derive their legitimacy from cultural continuity rather than imported legalism.

These regionally grounded models reflect the broader movement within the Global South to resist normative hegemony and assert culturally resonant alternatives. While divergent in form, they collectively challenge the presumed universality of Western liberal norms and expand the repertoire of legitimate governance practices in global discourse.

The Myth of Homogeneity in the Global South

Whether in the discourse of Asian Values or the Global South, the “West” is often essentialized and constructed as a homogeneous and morally intrusive “Other”. Through appeals to deep cultural difference, both the Asian Values and Global South narratives adopt cultural relativism as a key methodological and ideological tool. In practice, however, the Asian Values framework constructs an idealized and unified “East” positioned in moral opposition to a decaying “West”.^[12] This binary logic reinforces rather than dismantles the East–West dichotomy initially produced by Western imperialist discourse, while simultaneously marginalizing internal cultural diversity and dissenting voices within the so-called “East”.

As the concept of the Global South is often defined in opposition to an external referent—the “West”—there is a tendency to homogenize what is. In reality, an immensely diverse and internally differentiated grouping of states. This oppositional framing can obscure the fact that many countries categorized under the Global South share few substantive commonalities

beyond their non-Western status or colonial past. While the narrative of a unified South may serve symbolic or strategic purposes, especially in postcolonial and anti-hegemonic discourse, it risks flattening crucial distinctions in economic development, political structure, regional aspirations, and historical experiences. A closer examination reveals that the Global South is far from monolithic; rather, it comprises a wide spectrum of contexts that defy simplistic categorization.

Economic disparities across the Global South remain substantial. Regional growth differentials are particularly pronounced: Southeast Asia, among the fastest-growing regions globally, recorded a combined GDP of US\$3.95 trillion (US\$5.75 thousand per capita) in 2024, while Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP stood at US\$1.88 trillion (US\$1.54 thousand per capita). Even within ASEAN, intra-regional inequality is stark—Singapore's per capita GDP (US\$90.67 thousand) exceeds that of Cambodia (US\$2.75 thousand) by a factor of 33. Increasingly, Global South economies diverge into two broad categories: emerging economies such as Vietnam and India, which are successfully integrated into global value chains and recorded growth rates of 7.1% and 6.5% respectively in 2024; and struggling economies such as Argentina, which faces economic contraction (-1.7%) due to prolonged fiscal austerity.^[13]

Diversity is equally evident in political systems. Liberal democracies such as India (a federal parliamentary system) and Brazil (a federal presidential republic) uphold multiparty competition, regular elections, and separation of powers. In contrast, authoritarian regimes such as Vietnam and Rwanda centralize power through different mechanisms: Vietnam's one-party system revolves around the "four pillars" of state leadership, while Rwanda maintains tight state control under the prolonged presidency of Paul Kagame. Hybrid regimes, such as Singapore and Turkey, blur the lines. In these countries, formal multiparty elections coexist with the concentration of power in practice.

Despite rhetorical commitments to multipolarity and resistance to Western dominance, the Global South is fractured by competing regional ambitions shaped by distinct geopolitical contexts and economic priorities. ASEAN economies seek to strengthen their role in regional supply chains and attract foreign manufacturing investment. African states, while open to infrastructure investment, increasingly emphasize debt sustainability and autonomy from new forms of dependency. In Latin America, strategic alignments diverge: Brazil and Argentina are deepening ties with China as a counterbalance to U.S. influence, whereas Colombia and Ecuador remain economically and militarily aligned with the United States. Inter-regional competition also extends to the green energy sector. Morocco and South Africa, for example, aim to become leading suppliers of green hydrogen to Europe, while Southeast Asian economies such as Vietnam and Malaysia expand their exports of solar photovoltaic products, positioning themselves in a competitive global market.

Colonial legacies further shape the Global South's variegated engagements with external powers. African nations often foreground decolonization and historical justice as key themes in global forums, whereas ASEAN member states tend to focus on development autonomy and economic sovereignty. Latin American countries, meanwhile, frequently coalesce around a shared resistance to U.S. hegemony. Within Southeast Asia itself, relations with former colonial powers are far from uniform and can be broadly categorized into three

types: antagonistic, defined by strong anti-colonial sentiment (e.g., Indonesia–Netherlands, Vietnam–France); pragmatic, involving the retention of colonial administrative legacies for functional purposes (e.g., Singapore and Brunei with the United Kingdom); and ambivalent, marked by enduring economic ties but limited cultural affinity (e.g., Malaysia–U.K.). Hence, the Global South cannot be understood as a coherent or unified bloc. Its internal diversity, shaped by complex historical, economic, and political trajectories, necessitates a more nuanced and differentiated approach to its study—one that resists essentialism and foregrounds its internal pluralism.

South–South Power Asymmetry

While the Global South is often portrayed as a community founded on principles of mutual assistance and equality, structural asymmetries persist within this grouping. Regional powers, resource-rich states, and economically advanced countries frequently assume dominant positions, giving rise to internal hierarchies and a de facto core–periphery dynamic.

In Southeast Asia, ASEAN exemplifies these internal imbalances. Indonesia, the region’s most populous and economically powerful member, recorded a GDP of US\$1,371.1 billion in 2023—approximately 97 times that of Laos (US\$14.2 billion). Its population of 278,696.2 thousand is over 600 times larger than that of Brunei (450.5 thousand).^[14] Indonesia increasingly leverages its market size, natural resources, and geostrategic location to assert structural power in regional governance. Notably, its 2020 export ban on unprocessed nickel ore aimed to promote domestic downstream industries and attract foreign investment in local smelting. This policy not only reconfigured regional supply chains for energy transition minerals, but also pressured other resource-exporting states—such as the Philippines—to reassess their own industrial strategies and resource governance frameworks.^[15]

Similar asymmetries are visible in the broader Global South, particularly within regional organizations such as ASEAN, the African Union (AU), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). These organizations compete for discursive authority as legitimate representatives of the Global South, a competition shaped both by internal agency and the selective recognition mechanisms of the Western-dominated international system. In 2023, the AU secured permanent membership in the G20, marking a significant institutional breakthrough. In contrast, ASEAN—despite its longer history—lacks equivalent global standing and continues to rely on influential member states like Indonesia to gain indirect representation in major governance forums. CELAC, established in 2011, faces even greater hurdles, with global engagement largely limited to individual heavyweights such as Argentina and Brazil.

China’s growing influence further complicates dynamics within the Global South. While Beijing positions itself as a champion of South–South solidarity through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), these efforts have attracted accusations of “neo-imperialism”. Critics argue that China’s expanding footprint in Africa and Southeast Asia reinforces asymmetric dependencies, challenging the foundational postcolonial narrative of the Global South as uniformly resisting external domination.^[16] In Southeast Asia, Chinese investment is generally welcomed for its economic utility, yet

policymakers remain wary of “overreliance” and the long-term strategic risks of dependence on Beijing.^[17] India, in response, has sought to offer an alternative model through initiatives such as the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), positioning itself as a more transparent and sovereignty-respecting development partner.

Nonetheless, critiques of China’s role often rely on a simplified great power–small state binary, grounded in indicators such as GDP, territory, and population size.^[18] This framework presumes an inevitable dominance of large states over smaller ones and tends to overlook the agency of recipient countries. Moreover, the rise of China has been accompanied by the intensification of Western threat narratives, with the so-called “China Threat Theory” framing Beijing’s global ambitions as inherently destabilizing.^[19] Such narratives reflect broader anxieties over the erosion of Western hegemony and the potential reordering of a Eurocentric global system.

China, by contrast, argues that its initiatives aim to democratize global governance and promote a multipolar world. Whether through the BRI’s principle of “extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits”, the civilizational dialogue proposed under the GCI, or the vision of a “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind”, China presents itself as a responsible power seeking to reform, rather than dominate, the international order. These initiatives focus on addressing the development needs and sovereignty concerns of Global South states, advancing a more inclusive and equitable global political economy.^[20] In doing so, China articulates a deliberate departure from Western-centric paradigms and offers a multilateral praxis grounded in non-Western philosophical and political traditions.

The “Future” of the Global South Framework

Amid the ongoing reconfiguration of global order and the rise of anti-globalization sentiments, the concept of the Global South faces renewed theoretical scrutiny and practical uncertainty. On one hand, the shifting geopolitics and the widening North–South development gap have revitalized interest in South–South cooperation and alternative models of development. On the other hand, persistent intra-regional inequalities and the entrenchment of capitalist structures continue to undermine the solidarity such cooperation aspires to, rendering it fragile and often fragmented. For Southeast Asia—a region marked by geopolitical heterogeneity, colonial entanglements, and divergent postcolonial paths—its position within the Global South discourse is particularly nuanced.


Beyond traditional geopolitical and economic framings, a cultural perspective reveals the layers of identity negotiation, discursive realignment, and power relations that shape how the Global South is imagined and enacted across different national contexts. In resisting the normative dominance of the West, Southeast Asian states frequently invoke indigenous cultural frameworks and civilizational discourses to articulate non-Western subjectivities—most notably seen in the rise of “Asian Values”. Yet, just as the Asian Values discourse enabled cultural self-assertion while simultaneously suppressing internal diversity, the instrumental use of the Global South framework as a diplomatic or political tool risks flattening the region’s complex socio-cultural and political heterogeneity.

This politicization is not without precedent. In the 1990s, the rhetoric of Asian Values provided postcolonial Southeast Asian governments with a platform to assert cultural confidence against Western norms. However, this narrative also served to legitimize hierarchical governance structures, patriarchal ideologies, and the suppression of dissenting voices. Likewise, today's Global South discourse, while valuable in critiquing Western hegemony and the neoliberal order, may obscure the region's ambivalent entanglements with global capitalism and reproduce internal exclusions.

A deeper question thus arises: Can South–South cooperation moves beyond rhetorical solidarity to become a meaningful and reciprocal framework for collective advancement? Stark asymmetries—such as those between Singapore and Cambodia, or between Malaysia and Myanmar—alongside the influence of regional powers like China and India, complicate prospects for equitable collaboration. Without addressing these imbalances, cooperation risks replicating the very hierarchies it seeks to dismantle. If South–South cooperation is to fulfil its promise, it must be grounded in institutional mechanisms that prioritize local agency and shared governance, rather than aspirational slogans.

In this sense, the discourse of Asian Values resembles the phoenix of Arab mythology: powerful in symbolism and imbued with the hope of renewal, yet often intangible in practice. While it soared as a counterpoint to Western dominance, it faltered when confronted with the region's internal complexities. The Global South, likewise, carries critical weight as a discursive counter-hegemony, but its transformative potential is limited if it fails to engage seriously with internal diversity, asymmetries, and structural inequalities. Thus, both Asian Values and the Global South should not be treated as fixed categories or settled ideologies. Rather, they must be understood as evolving discursive formations—fluid, contested, and continually shaped by shifting political, cultural, and institutional forces.

The notion of “the future” carries symbolic power in Global South discourse. It is often invoked to critique existing global inequities while imagining more just and autonomous alternatives. China's vision of a “Community of Shared Future for Mankind”, for instance, offers a non-Western, civilizational model of global governance based on mutual respect, interdependence, and shared development. Similarly, ASEAN's *Vision 2045: Our Shared Future* articulates a forward-looking narrative of regional cohesion and global relevance. These imaginaries serve not only as aspirational frameworks but also as instruments for constructing postcolonial agency and asserting ideological autonomy in an international system still largely shaped by Western norms.

Yet, such future-oriented discourses merit critical interrogation. Who defines this “future”? Whose values, agendas, and interests are prioritized—and whose are sidelined? Beneath their inclusive language, these visions often obscure structural inequalities, regional hierarchies, and internal pluralisms. In the context of Southeast Asia, the invocation of “community” or “common destiny” can mask asymmetries in power, development, and voice. Rather than treating “the Global South” or “Asian values” as fixed or self-evident categories, we must understand them as discursive constructs—fluid, contested, and continually shaped by cultural politics and geopolitical power relations. Ultimately, any meaningful reimagining of global futures must center not just shared rhetoric, but equitable participation and pluralistic agency. 

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[摘要]

本文探讨了亚洲区域主义转型的紧迫性与可能性，批判当前以市场为中心的区域整合模式在应对危机与不平等时的缺陷。作者提出，新型区域主义应植根于人民、思想和记忆来实现区域融合，通过重建被殖民主义割裂的跨国联系来培育相互理解的机制。文章主张构建包含文化基础设施、教育协作和公民社会网络的从经济走廊转向社会公域，将东南亚与东亚的共同历史转化为集体行动的资源，并在全球南方框架下发展超越大国博弈的南南合作范式。这一愿景的实现需要政府、学界、文化工作者与青年群体共同参与，以重塑亚洲作为动态实践而非地理实体的未来想象。

共同的历史，共同的未来： 迈向新亚洲区域主义

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关键词：文化区域主义 历史意识 全球南方协作

十字路口的亚洲

21世纪通常被称为“亚洲世纪”，这是对当前该地区人口规模、经济活力及地缘政治影响力的承认。然而，亚洲崛起的故事远非一帆风顺。在可见的增长与影响力标志之下，潜藏着更深层的紧张：主要大国间的战略互疑、支离破碎的文化想象，以及国家内部与国家间持续存在的不平等挑战。虽然经济指标可能表明一体化趋势，但政治和社会现实往往讲述着更为分裂的故事。

我们正经历着一个深刻变革的时代。冷战结束后形成的旧秩序确定性——包括美国单极霸权、全球市场自由主义以及趋同发展的承诺——正在瓦解。取而代之的是一个多极化世界，其形成源于不断变化的联盟关系、分崩离析的全球机构，以及

主导大国日益加深的合法性危机。亚洲各国如今正航行在一个比以往任何时候都更加紧密相连，却又充满纷争的世界中。

在这种环境下，区域主义已不再是奢侈品或外交姿态，而是战略必需。但我们所追求的区域主义类型至关重要。过去三十年间，亚洲地区——特别是东亚与东南亚之间——的区域合作主要停留在交易层面，以经济相互依存、贸易协定和战略对冲为核心。虽然这类合作带来了增长与相对稳定，但也暴露出关键弱点。当经济网络中断时（如新冠疫情期间），或当大国对区域选择施加过度影响时，以市场为中心的区域主义局限性便暴露无遗。

当今我们需要的不仅是更多区域主义，而是一种新型区域主义，它将文化、社会关系与历史意识置于核心地位。这种区域主义不仅能缓解地缘政治紧张或提升经济效益，

更能为长期团结与韧性奠定基础。这种区域主义将让我们得以构想并建设一个更具包容性、更人性化、更植根于共同经验的区域。

近期在雅加达举行的“全球南方与东南亚”论坛将这一问题推至风口浪尖。来自亚洲各地的学者与实践者齐聚一堂，不仅批判西方在全球事务中的主导地位，更致力于提出区域合作的新框架。贯穿讨论的主线之一是对重拾并振兴区域主义的文化与社会维度的迫切召唤。亚洲如果要开辟自己的前行道路，就必须铭记联结各民族的相互交织的过去，并建立能在当下尊重这些联结的制度体系。

市场中心化整合的脆弱性

从诸多方面来看，亚洲的经济成就令人瞩目。过去几十年来，在贸易、投资和产业转型的推动下，该地区已成为全球经济增长引擎。东盟+3、区域全面经济伙伴

关系协定（RCEP）以及众多双边自由贸易协定等机制，将东亚和东南亚经济体编织成紧密的相互依存网络。这一架构帮助各国应对全球市场波动、吸引资本流动并实现生产网络多元化。

但经济一体化虽属必要，却不足以构建具有韧性与凝聚力的区域共同体。这些安排的内在逻辑本质上仍是交易性的：市场准入、资本流动、供应链布局和劳动力迁移。它们旨在服务全球化市场中的国家利益，而非培育区域认同感或共同目标意识。

这种市场优先的导向在危机时期显得尤为棘手。新冠疫情暴露出合作机制在压力下会多么迅速地瓦解——医疗物资被囤积、疫苗分配政治化、边境管控各自为政。尽管经历了数十年的经济互赖，该地区仍缺乏集体应对所需的制度性与规范性框架。面对气候灾害、移民潮和数字虚假信息等跨国界挑战时，同样的问题反复出现，却始终缺乏区域性的联合行动机制。



亚洲的经济一体化不足以构建具有韧性与凝聚力的区域共同体

此外，市场一体化对解决该地区根深蒂固的结构性不平等收效甚微。贸易和投资的收益往往流向精英阶层和中心城市，边缘化群体则被抛在后面。在某些情况下，一体化甚至加剧了劳动力不稳定、环境恶化以及文化同质化问题。若缺乏文化交流、社会发展和政治协调方面的配套努力，区域主义的美好愿景恐将沦为徒有其表的空壳——一个被 GDP 驱动却毫无实质内涵的空洞容器。

更令人担忧的是，区域合作正日益面临被大国竞争裹挟的风险。随着中美博弈加剧，许多亚洲国家不得不进行微妙平衡：在经济增长上依赖中国，在安全领域仰仗美国。这种双重依赖或许压缩了构想替代性未来的空间。

这揭示了一个根本性的失衡：亚洲通过市场推进区域主义，却忽视了通过人民、思想和记忆来实现区域融合。我们建立了贸易走廊和投资区，却未能搭建文化桥梁或构建集体叙事。我们有数据证明相互依存，却鲜有培育相互理解的机制。如果要让区域主义超越技术官僚项目，就必须拓宽其维度并深化其根基。

由此可见，亚洲区域主义的下一阶段必须实现质的飞跃。它需要将文化政策、历史意识和社会发展作为核心支柱，而非事后补充或软性配套。它必须为公民社会、艺术家、学者和社区创造空间，让他们与政府和企业共同塑造区域议程。最重要的是，它应当由植根于共同历史的未来愿景驱动，而非仅仅受市场需求或权力博弈的摆布。

共享的历史，被遗忘的团结

现代亚洲最根深蒂固的迷思之一，是认为各国在孤立中发展，成为被边界、语言或殖民遗产清晰区隔的独特文化实体。

事实上，东亚与东南亚的历史始终深度交织。数个世纪以来，这片区域的定义要素从来不是国界线，而是人员、商品、思想、仪式与抗争的流动。

从三佛齐和满者伯夷的古航海网络，到汉字文化圈朝贡路线上的文化传播，区域互动始终是常态而非例外。佛教典籍从印度和中国传至今日的印尼群岛与马来半岛。伊斯兰学者自由穿梭于亚齐、北大年和棉兰老之间。关于王权、治理与正义的政治思想与物质交换相伴流转，其形塑过程往往既受本土化改造的影响，也受跨区域流动的影响。

殖民主义深刻打破了这种动态平衡。欧洲列强在该地区的霸权扩张不仅重划了疆界，更重构了集体记忆。身份认同被纳入帝国统治的逻辑框架：种族、宗教和地域被分门别类，经过量化处理以适应欧洲认知体系。荷兰、英国、法国、西班牙和美国殖民政权都奉行分而治之策略，割裂相邻社会间的悠久联系，将共享的世界改造成相互竞争的管辖区。

民族国家继承了这套殖民遗产的主体架构。独立后，多数后殖民政府推行的国家历史叙事与象征体系，都将内部团结置于区域联系之上。在学校课程、外交话语和大众媒体中，“民族国家”成为构想过去与未来的核心框架。这在独立后的国家建设背景下不难理解，但代价不容忽视。

如今，该地区许多共同的历史仍深埋在层层民族叙事之下。例如，反殖民团结的遗产很少被作为区域力量铭记。然而越南、印度尼西亚、菲律宾和缅甸的运动常常相互交流策略、提供庇护或共享思想谱系。1955 年万隆会议的精神虽被零星提及，却鲜少被用作当代合作的基石。

这种历史健忘症会带来后果。若缺乏对共同历史的强烈感知，便更难构想共同

的未来。若不重拾该地区长期共处、相互调适与影响的传统，就难以抵御民族主义、仇外心理和战略竞争带来的狭隘压力。

这里还存在一个被错失的机遇：历史不仅能激发民族自豪感，更能成为区域认同的引擎。重拾文化交融与政治团结的往事，有助于培养更深层次合作所需的共情与信任。这些历史提醒我们曾共同对抗过相同的敌人，即殖民主义、剥削与流离失所，也见证过彼此赋予的力量。在全球局势动荡的当下，这些历史教训比以往任何时候都更具现实意义。

但记忆需要主动培育。这不仅需要档案修复，更需要建立博物馆、教育体系、节庆活动和媒体等公共平台，以通俗易懂且引发共鸣的形式呈现区域叙事。同时需要跨界的学术合作：历史学家、人类学家、艺术家和行动主义者携手重构该地区多元的过往。从这个意义上说，历史不仅是事实的储藏室，更是政治想象的疆域。

通过文化与社会重构区域主义

要建立更具韧性与包容性的区域主义，我们必须扭转固有认知：从GDP指标转向文化纽带，从自上而下的政策转向基层共创，从经济走廊转向社会公域。亚洲区域合作的未来不能仅靠贸易与外交维系，更需要深厚的文化社会联结，以及源于共同意义、记忆与愿景——而非交易利益——的归属感来激活。

在此语境下，文化绝非可有可无的附属品。它是想象力的基础设施，决定了我们如何看待自我与他者的关系、珍视何种价值、认可谁的声音，以及如何化解分歧。在东亚与东南亚这般多元的地区，文化历来既是紧张的源头，也是相互调适的资源。正是这种双重特性，使其成为新型区域主

义不可或缺的要素：这种区域主义不会抹除差异，而是借此构建团结。

这一愿景在雅加达举行的“全球南方与东南亚”论坛上得到了有力阐述。我作为呼吁文化转型的声音之一，主张区域主义的社会文化维度并非边缘议题而是基础要素。我着重强调了建设区域性文化基础设施的重要性，即建立能让故事、图像和价值观持续跨国界流动的体系。我们不应将文化视为国家软实力的工具，而应将其视为公地：一个共享创造力、记忆与对话的空间。

这样的文化基础设施在实践中会是什么形态？

第一，这将涉及区域性内容政策，例如为数字流媒体平台设定东南亚制作内容的配额。正如欧洲国家实施文化保护措施以支持本土产业，亚洲国家也可采用类似框架，确保本地区叙事在数字领域获得可见度。

第二，联合文化创作应得到激励与支持。汇聚亚洲多国创作者的影视、戏剧、文学和音乐项目，既能催生反映区域丰富性的混合形态，又能促进协作与信任。区域电影基金、跨境出版合作及联合策展等，都是可能的实践形式。

第三，我们需要发展共享遗产与教育计划。这包括重新思考学校如何教授历史、博物馆如何呈现跨国历史，以及学术机构如何合作开发立足本地区的课程体系。试想一个由河内、雅加达、马尼拉和曼谷高校联合运营的东南亚研究项目，其目的不在于统一知识标准，而是促进对话与比较研究。

第四，区域文化基础设施必须实现实体与数字的双重整合。文化中心、艺术家驻留项目、流动博物馆和多语种数字平台，都可以成为这个去中心化交流网络的关键节点。这些空间不仅用于展示作品，更是

构建艺术家、思想家、社群与政策制定者之间关系的桥梁。

第五，我们必须承认并支持文化劳动作为地区发展的核心组成部分。艺术家、策展人、译者和教育者不仅仅是娱乐提供者或服务人员，他们是意义的构建者。任何对地区主义的严肃投入，都必须包含对文化工作的可持续资金支持机制，以及对那些常在不稳定环境中工作的文化从业者的权利与尊严保障。

关键在于，这一切都不意味着存在单一的“亚洲身份”或同质化的文化政策。相反，使这个地区强大的正是其多元性。目标不是消除差异，而是构建能让这些差异相遇、互动与转化的基础设施。通过这种方式，区域主义成为一个鲜活的进程——不是固定的蓝图，而是由历史意识塑造，并以相互尊重为基础的动态关系网络。

全球南方想象与南南合作

要真正重新构想亚洲的区域主义，我们必须在更广阔的框架——即全球南方——中作出努力。这一术语本身存在争议；有人批评其模糊性，也有人赞赏其战略灵活性。但本质上，全球南方不仅是一个地缘政治范畴，更是一个想象力的场域。它指向那些曾经经历殖民统治、在世界经济中遭受不平等整合，并在全球治理中面临后殖民边缘化的国家与社群，而它们如今追求的不仅是对现有体系的融入，更是对这些体系的彻底变革。

在这方面，东亚与东南亚具有独特的地位。这片区域承载着帝国征服与反殖民抗争的历史印记，它探索了多条通往现代化的道路，将社会和经济发展与国家协调相结合，将精神传统与技术创新相结合。然而尽管其多样性丰富，外界仍习惯以单

一维度定义该地区：作为市场前沿、战略博弈场，抑或全球趋势的被动接受者。

这正是全球南方想象力至关重要的所在。它提供了一种超越集团政治或超级大国依附的合作逻辑，这种逻辑根植于共同的历史经验，以及对认知、经济和政治自主的追求。全球南方不囿于中美或西方与其他国家的二元对立，而是凸显南南国家间的关系，以及那些常被纵向依赖关系遮蔽的横向联结。

因此，南南合作的逻辑必须超越贸易协定与技术援助。它应优先考虑共同发展、知识交流和联合制度建设。不仅要重视从外部引进的最佳实践，更要注重本土化创新：那些源自地方实践，并在面临相似困境的地区间共享的理论、方法与模式。

在雅加达论坛期间，多位学者谈及这一需求。一位越南学者将当下描述为“普世价值真空期”——在这个时代，无论是西方自由主义还是旧式社会主义模式，都无法为公平与可持续性提供令人信服的蓝图。她认为这种真空状态为全球南方创造了发展自身规范性框架的空间：这些框架应反映现实生活与真实诉求，而非抽象理想。

另一位来自柬埔寨的演讲者提出，东盟可以发展为全球南方的战略中心——不是形式上的制度性中心，而是作为和平共处、凝聚共识和多边务实主义的典范。这一愿景挑战了将全球南方视为被动反应或四分五裂的固有认知，反而将该地区定位为替代方案的实验室：不追求乌托邦，但勇于实验；不谋求霸权，但持续创新。

事实上，全球南方的构想让我们得以追问更本质的问题：如果发展不再仅以GDP衡量，其真正内涵应当是什么？如果主权必须通过共享方能行使，它又意味着什么？当现代性被不同文化逻辑与历史经验所塑造时，可能呈现何种形态？

在此框架下，区域主义成为一种世界建构的方法。它让各国建立的团结超越了地理或经济利益的局限，并植根于相互承认与集体学习。它邀请我们铭记万隆——将其不仅视为历史事件，更看作未竟的事业。一个尚未兑现的承诺。

这自然需要新的基础设施，不仅是贸易与外交层面，更是思想维度。我们需要跨国研究枢纽、多语种出版平台、协作式媒体网络以及促进南南交流的青年论坛。这些必须成为孕育替代性变革理论的空间：不是借鉴西方经典，而是从南方本土社群的叙事、挫折与希望中构建。

谁来构建这种区域主义？

构建以共享历史为基础、以文化团结为纽带，并与更广阔的全球南方相连的新亚洲区域主义愿景，不能仅仅停留在愿望层面。它必须付诸实践。那么，关键问题就变成了：谁来构建它？

长期以来，亚洲区域主义一直是国家和技术官僚的领域。政府部门谈判协议，峰会发表宣言，地区委员会用精心斟酌的措辞起草公报。尽管这些努力有其价值，特别是在管理国家间关系方面，但它们往往受限于政治谨慎、官僚惰性以及平衡各国竞争利益的需要。最终产生的通常是最大公约数：稳定但肤浅的合作，缺乏深度的进展。

要使区域主义的真正未来具有变革性，就不能仅靠政府推动，而需要更广泛的行动者生态系统共同推进：民间社会组织、文化机构、高校、媒体网络和青年运动。这些力量能够赋予区域主义以社会肌理、文化内涵与政治想象力。

以高校为例，它们可以发挥关键作用，不仅是作为技术知识的传授场所，更应成

为区域思维的枢纽。联合学位项目、教师交流、区域性研究合作以及多语种出版平台，都能构建长期的知识纽带。课程体系可重新设计，以纳入跨国历史与比较视角，这既能帮助后代培养超越国界的思维，又能使其不忘文化根基。

文化机构同样至关重要。博物馆、剧院、图书馆和电影节可以成为区域叙事与对话的场域。艺术家驻留计划和联合创作能培育跨越语言与语境的新美学表达。我们不应将艺术文化视为国家品牌工具，而应将其定位为区域公共资源，作为相遇、共创与实验的发生空间。

无论是传统媒体还是数字媒体，都能帮助弥合叙事鸿沟。亚洲国家间往往通过西方媒体滤镜或缺乏多元性的国有平台来了解彼此。独立的跨区域新闻报道与内容制作，可以凸显合作故事、挑战刻板印象，并促进关于本地区共同挑战与机遇的理性讨论。

同时，青年网络或许提供了最具前景的领域。当今的年轻人比以往任何一代都更具互联性、流动性和协作精神。学生交流、气候运动、数字社区和创业网络早已跨越国界运作。只要获得适当的支持，他们就能成为构建开放包容、以正义为驱动的区域未来的建筑师。

在雅加达举行的“全球南方与东南亚”论坛展现了这种潜力。它并非封闭的精英聚会，而是学者、学生、记者和实践者间的开放对话。这一对话摒弃正式规程，促成坦诚反思。最重要的时刻并非出现在全体会议中，而是在印尼大学生与中国学者“面对面”的对话环节——抽象的辩论让位于彼此的好奇、分歧与共鸣。

这正是区域主义必须培育的空间：一个不管控思想而是孕育思想的空间，一个不压制差异而是包容差异的空间；在这里，

区域不是固化的实体而是动态发展的项目。

当然，这并不意味着要放弃国家的作用。相反，政府在为合作提供制度框架（条约制定、资金支持、协调沟通以及政治意愿）方面仍至关重要。但它们不能单独行动，也不应垄断区域发展重点的界定权。

事实上，政府能做出的最有力贡献之一就是培育并守护自下而上的区域主义空间。这意味着要支持学术自由、艺术自主、公民参与和跨境协作，意味着要认识到安全不仅关乎疆界，更关乎社会包容、文化尊严与生态韧性，也意味着要将发展重新定义为共同繁荣，而非资源攫取与零和竞争。

结语：我们共同想象的未来

想象一个区域意味着什么？

不是由条约划定的版图，不是以出口和增长率衡量的经济体，而是作为人民、历史、抗争与希望构成的共同体。这个问题正是我们必须构建的新亚洲区域主义的核心所在。这种区域主义不应始于战略需要，而应源于相互承认。其力量不仅来自市场或军事部署，更源于记忆、意义与共同愿景铸就的深层纽带。

本文的要旨始终在于：当前由贸易、外交和技术官僚框架主导的区域主义模式，已无法应对我们面临的挑战与机遇。这个时代的断层线——气候危机、数字割裂、民主衰退与日益扩大的不平等——无法仅凭GDP弥合。它们需要植根于文化联结与历史意识的新型团结。

这种团结已以碎片形式存在。它存在于曾跨越国界流传的反殖民抵抗故事中，闪烁在语言、饮食和音乐的共同仪式里，跃动于日益选择跨国合作的学者、艺术家

和活动家网络中。现在需要的是政治意愿和制度想象力，将这些碎片汇集编织成持久之物。

这正是共同历史的承诺：不是作为怀旧，而是成为基石。它提醒我们，彼此的过去并非如教导般割裂。越南革命者、爪哇农民、菲律宾作家和泰国学生的斗争，都是更宏大区域叙事的一部分。我们的伤痕与智慧能够彼此对话。

但共同历史只是等式的一边。我们还需要打造一个共同的未来。在这个未来里，亚洲不仅适应全球权力格局的变迁，更要共同塑造全新的潮流。在这个未来里，发展不再是相互竞争，而是相互关怀。在这个未来里，身份认同不再局限于民族主义，而是向区域多元性敞开。在这个未来里，“亚洲”这个概念本身将被重新诠释，不再是被动的地理名词，而是鲜活的实践课题。

要实现这一未来，我们必须投资于互联互通的基础设施。我们必须为跨境文化创作、共同历史清算和南南知识共创创造空间。我们必须让下一代能够相互学习，求同存异，并共同梦想。我们必须抵制那些狭隘逻辑——无论是强权政治、经济原教旨主义还是文明本质主义——这些逻辑会将我们的地区降格为他人的战略棋子。

新的亚洲区域主义不仅可能实现，而且已在酝酿之中。但唯有我们精心培育，它才能蓬勃发展。如果我们不将其视为对西方衰落或中国崛起的反应，而是视为一种自身的生成力量。如果我们有足够的勇气跨越国界相互信任，并有足够的耐心培养能够承受差异与距离的团结习惯。

我们所需要的这个区域尚未完全成形，但已触手可及。而它的诞生将取决于我们是否愿意去共同铭记与想象。■

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Shared Histories, Shared Futures: Toward a New Asian Regionalism

Hilmar Farid

Keywords: cultural regionalism; historical consciousness; Global South cooperation

A Region at a Crossroads

The twenty-first century has often been called the “Asian century,” a recognition of the demographic weight, economic dynamism, and geopolitical relevance that the region now commands. Yet the story of Asia’s rise is far from linear. Beneath the visible markers of growth and influence lie deeper tensions: strategic mistrust among major powers, a fragmented cultural imagination, and the persistent challenge of inequality within and between nations. While the economic metrics may suggest integration, the political and social realities often tell a more fractured story.

We are living through a moment of profound transformation. The old certainties of the post-Cold War order, which involve American unipolarity, global market liberalism, and the promise of convergence, are dissolving. In their place, a multipolar world is emerging, shaped by shifting alliances, fractured global institutions, and a deepening crisis of legitimacy among dominant powers. Countries across Asia are now navigating a world that is both more interconnected and more contested than ever before.

In this environment, regionalism is no longer a luxury or a diplomatic gesture. It is a strategic necessity. But the kind of regionalism we pursue matters deeply. For much of the past three decades, regional cooperation in Asia, particularly between East and Southeast Asia, has been largely transactional, centered on economic interdependence, trade agreements, and strategic hedging. While these forms of cooperation have delivered growth and relative stability, they have also exposed critical vulnerabilities. When economic networks are disrupted, as during the COVID-19 pandemic, or when major powers exert disproportionate influence on regional choices, the limits of market-centric regionalism become painfully clear.

What we need today is not just more regionalism, but a new kind of regionalism, one that places culture, social relations, and historical consciousness at its core. This regionalism would not only mitigate geopolitical tensions or enhance economic performance but also lay the groundwork for long-term solidarity and resilience. It would enable us to imagine and build a region that is more inclusive, humane, and grounded in shared experiences.

The recent Global South and Southeast Asia Forum held in Jakarta brought this question to the fore. Scholars and practitioners from across Asia gathered not only to critique Western dominance in global affairs but also to propose new frameworks for regional cooperation. One of the strongest threads running through the discussions was the urgent need to reclaim

and revitalize the cultural and social dimensions of regionalism. If Asia is to chart its own path forward, it must do so by remembering the entangled pasts that bind its peoples—and by building institutions that honor those connections in the present.

The Fragility of Market-Centric Integration

In many ways, the economic success story of Asia is impressive. Over the past few decades, the region has become an engine of global growth, driven by trade, investment, and industrial transformation. Mechanisms like ASEAN+3, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and numerous bilateral free trade agreements have knit the economies of East and Southeast Asia into dense webs of interdependence. This architecture has enabled countries to navigate the volatility of global markets, attract capital, and diversify production networks.

But economic integration, while necessary, is not sufficient for building a resilient and cohesive region. The underlying logic of these arrangements remains largely transactional: access to markets, capital flows, supply chains, and labor mobility. They are calibrated to serve national interests in a globalized marketplace, not to cultivate a sense of regional belonging or shared purpose.

This market-first orientation becomes especially problematic during times of crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic revealed how quickly cooperation could collapse under stress.



Mechanisms like ASEAN+3 have knit the economies of East and Southeast Asia into dense webs of interdependence.

Medical supplies were hoarded, vaccine distribution became politicized, and border controls tightened without coordination. Despite decades of economic interdependence, the region lacked the institutional and normative frameworks needed to respond collectively. The same pattern has emerged in the face of climate-related disasters, migration flows, and digital misinformation, challenges that transcend national boundaries but lack regional mechanisms for joint action.

Moreover, market integration has done little to address the deep structural inequalities within the region. The benefits of trade and investment often accrue to elite sectors and urban centers, while marginalized communities are left behind. In some cases, integration has exacerbated labor precarity, environmental degradation, and cultural homogenization. Without corresponding efforts in cultural exchange, social development, and political coordination, the promise of regionalism risks becoming a hollow shell, an empty vessel animated by GDP but devoid of meaning.

There is also a growing danger that regional cooperation becomes subordinated to great-power competition. As the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies, many Asian nations find themselves caught in a delicate balancing act: relying on China for economic growth while depending on the U.S. for security guarantees. This dual dependency may limit the space for imagining alternative futures.

What this reveals is a fundamental imbalance: while Asia has pursued regionalism through markets, it has neglected regionalism through people, ideas, and memory. We have built trade corridors and investment zones, but not cultural bridges or collective narratives. We have statistics that show interdependence, but few institutions that nurture mutual understanding. If we want regionalism to be more than a technocratic project, we must widen its scope and deepen its roots.

In this light, the next phase of Asian regionalism must be qualitatively different. It must incorporate cultural policy, historical consciousness, and social development as central pillars, not as afterthoughts or soft components. It must create room for civil society, artists, scholars, and communities to shape the regional agenda, alongside governments and corporations. And most importantly, it must be driven by a vision of shared futures rooted in shared histories, not merely by the demands of markets or the calculus of power.

Shared Histories, Forgotten Solidarities

One of the most enduring myths of modern Asia is that its countries developed in isolation, distinct cultural entities neatly separated by borders, languages, or colonial legacies. In truth, the histories of East and Southeast Asia are profoundly entangled. For centuries, the region was defined less by national boundaries and more by circulation: of people, goods, ideas, rituals, and resistance.

From the ancient maritime networks of the Srivijaya and Majapahit polities to the cultural diffusion along the tributary routes of the Sinosphere, regional interaction was the norm, not the exception. Buddhist texts traveled from India and China to the archipelagos of present-day Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula. Islamic scholars moved fluidly across

Aceh, Pattani, and Mindanao. Political ideas about kingship, governance, and justice circulated alongside material exchanges, often shaped as much by local adaptation as by transregional flows.

Colonialism disrupted this dynamic profoundly. The imposition of European empires in the region did not merely redraw boundaries but also recoded memory. Identities were reshaped within the logic of imperial administration: race, religion, and region were categorized, measured, and managed to fit European epistemologies. Dutch, British, French, Spanish, and American colonial regimes all pursued divide-and-rule tactics, severing long-standing relations between neighboring societies and converting shared worlds into rival jurisdictions.

Nation-states inherited much of this architecture. After independence, most postcolonial governments embraced national histories and symbols that prioritized internal unity over regional connection. In school curricula, diplomatic discourse, and popular media, the “nation” became the primary frame through which the past and future were imagined. This was understandable in the context of post-independence nation-building. But it came at a cost.

Today, many of the region’s shared histories remain buried under layers of national narrative. The legacy of anti-colonial solidarity, for example, is rarely remembered as a regional force. Yet movements in Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Burma often exchanged tactics, offered refuge, or shared ideological lineage. The spirit of the 1955 Bandung Conference is remembered in fragments but seldom mobilized as a foundation for contemporary cooperation.

This historical amnesia has consequences. Without a strong sense of shared pasts, it becomes harder to imagine shared futures. Without recovering the region’s long traditions of coexistence, adaptation, and mutual influence, it becomes difficult to resist the narrowing pressures of nationalism, xenophobia, or strategic competition.

There is also a missed opportunity here: history can serve as an engine of regional identity, not just national pride. Recovering stories of cultural entanglement and political solidarity can help build the empathy and trust necessary for deeper cooperation. It can remind us that we have faced common enemies before, i.e., colonialism, exploitation, and displacement, and that we have found strength in one another. In times of global uncertainty, these lessons are more relevant than ever.

But memory must be cultivated. This requires not just archival recovery but also public platforms, such as museums, education systems, festivals, and media, that can present regional narratives in accessible and resonant forms. It also requires collaborative scholarship: historians, anthropologists, artists, and activists working across borders to reconstruct the region’s plural pasts. In this sense, history is not merely a repository of facts. It is a terrain of political imagination.

Rethinking Regionalism Through Culture and Society

To build a more resilient and inclusive regionalism, we must reorient our assumptions:

from GDP metrics to cultural ties, from top-down policy to grassroots co-creation, and from economic corridors to social commons. The future of regional cooperation in Asia cannot be sustained by trade and diplomacy alone. It must be animated by deeper cultural and societal linkages and by a sense of belonging that emerges not from transactional interests, but from shared meanings, memories, and aspirations.

Culture, in this context, is not a soft add-on. It is the infrastructure of imagination. It determines how we see ourselves in relation to others, what we value, whose voices we recognize, and how we resolve differences. In a region as diverse as East and Southeast Asia, culture has long been both a source of tension and a resource for mutual adaptation. It is precisely this dual character that makes it essential for a new kind of regionalism: one that does not erase difference but builds solidarity through it.

This vision was powerfully articulated during the Global South and Southeast Asia Forum in Jakarta. I was among the voices calling for cultural transformation and argued that the social and cultural dimensions of regionalism are not peripheral but foundational. I emphasized the importance of building regional cultural infrastructure, systems that allow for the sustained circulation of stories, images, and values across national boundaries. Rather than seeing culture as an instrument of national soft power, we should approach it as a commons: a shared space of creativity, memory, and dialogue.

What might this cultural infrastructure look like in practice?

First, it would involve regional content policies, for example, setting quotas for Southeast Asian-produced media on digital streaming platforms. Just as European countries have implemented cultural protection measures to support their local industries, Asian nations could adopt similar frameworks to ensure that the region's own narratives are visible in the digital sphere.

Second, joint cultural production should be incentivized and supported. Film, theater, literature, and music projects that bring together creators from multiple Asian countries can generate hybrid forms that reflect the region's richness while fostering collaboration and trust. Regional film funds, cross-border publishing partnerships, and co-curated exhibitions are just some examples of what this could look like.

Third, we need to develop shared heritage and education initiatives. This includes rethinking how history is taught in schools, how museums present transnational histories, and how academic institutions can collaborate to develop regionally grounded curricula. Imagine a Southeast Asian Studies program jointly run by universities in Hanoi, Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok, not to standardize knowledge, but to promote dialogue and comparison.

Fourth, regional cultural infrastructure must be physically and digitally integrated. Cultural centers, artist residencies, mobile museums, and multilingual digital platforms can serve as nodes in a decentralized network of exchange. These are not only spaces for showcasing work but also for building relationships—among artists, thinkers, communities, and policymakers.

Fifth, we must recognize and support cultural labor as a key component of regional development. Artists, curators, translators, and educators are not merely entertainers or

service providers. They are the architects of meaning. Any serious investment in regionalism must include sustainable funding mechanisms for cultural work, as well as protections for the rights and dignity of cultural workers who often operate in precarious conditions.

Crucially, none of this implies a singular “Asian identity” or a homogenized cultural policy. On the contrary, what makes the region strong is its plurality. The goal is not to erase differences but to create the infrastructure through which those differences can meet, interact, and transform. In this way, regionalism becomes a living process—not a fixed blueprint but an evolving network of relations, shaped by historical consciousness and grounded in mutual respect.

Global South Imagination and South–South Cooperation

To truly reimagine regionalism in Asia, we must situate our efforts within a broader framework: that of the Global South. The term itself has been debated; some critique its vagueness, others embrace its strategic flexibility. But at its core, the Global South is not simply a geopolitical category. It is a field of imagination. It refers to those countries and communities that have experienced colonial domination, unequal integration into the world economy, and postcolonial marginalization in global governance, and who now seek not just inclusion in existing systems, but transformation of those systems altogether.

In this regard, East Asia and Southeast Asia are uniquely positioned. The region bears the imprint of imperial conquest and anti-colonial resistance. It has navigated multiple paths to modernity, blending social and economic development with state coordination and spiritual traditions with technological innovation. Yet despite its diversity, the region continues to be defined externally: as a market frontier, a site of strategic rivalry, or a passive recipient of global trends.

This is where the imagination of the Global South becomes critical. It provides an alternative logic for cooperation that is not anchored in bloc politics or superpower allegiance but in shared historical experience and the pursuit of epistemic, economic, and political autonomy. Instead of defaulting to the binary between the United States and China, or between the West and the Rest, the Global South foregrounds the relations among countries of the South and the horizontal linkages that have often been eclipsed by vertical dependency.

The logic of South–South cooperation, therefore, must go beyond trade agreements and technical assistance. It must prioritize co-development, knowledge exchange, and joint institution-building. It must value not just best practices imported from elsewhere but contextual innovation: theories, methods, and models that emerge from local struggles and are shared across regions facing similar dilemmas.

During the Jakarta forum, several scholars spoke to this need. One Vietnamese academic described the present as a moment of “universal value vacuum,” a period in which neither Western liberalism nor old models of socialism offer convincing blueprints for justice and sustainability. This vacuum, she argued, creates space for the Global South to develop its own normative frameworks: ones that reflect lived realities and aspirations rather than abstract ideals.

Another speaker from Cambodia proposed that ASEAN could evolve into the strategic center of the Global South not in a formal, institutional sense, but as a model of coexistence, consensus-building, and multilateral pragmatism. This vision challenges the perception of the Global South as reactive or fragmented. Instead, it positions the region as a laboratory of alternatives: not utopian, but experimental; not hegemonic, but generative.

Indeed, the imagination of the Global South allows us to ask deeper questions: What does development mean if it is not measured solely by GDP? What does sovereignty entail if it must be shared in order to be exercised? What forms of modernity are possible when shaped by different cultural logics and historical experiences?

In this frame, regionalism becomes a method of world-making. It is a way for countries to build solidarities that are not reducible to geography or economic interest but grounded in mutual recognition and collective learning. It is an invitation to remember Bandung, not only as a historical event, but as an unfinished project. A promise not yet realized.

This, of course, requires new infrastructures, not only of trade and diplomacy, but of thought. We need transnational research hubs, multilingual publishing platforms, cooperative media networks, and youth forums that foster South–South exchange. These must be spaces where alternative theories of change can emerge: not borrowed from Western canon, but built from the narratives, failures, and hopes of communities across the South.

Who Will Build This Regionalism?

The vision of a new Asian regionalism, which is grounded in shared histories, shaped by cultural solidarity, and connected to the broader Global South, cannot remain merely aspirational. It must be built. And the critical question then becomes: who will do the building?

For too long, regionalism in Asia has been the domain of states and technocrats. Ministries negotiate agreements, summit declarations are issued, and regional commissions draft communiqués in carefully calibrated language. While these efforts have their place, especially in managing interstate relations, they are often limited by political caution, bureaucratic inertia, and the need to navigate competing national interests. What emerges is usually the lowest common denominator: stable but shallow cooperation, progress without depth.

If the future of regionalism is to be truly transformative, it must be carried forward not only by governments but also by a wider ecosystem of actors: civil society organizations, cultural institutions, universities, media networks, and youth movements. These are the forces capable of giving regionalism its social texture, cultural meaning, and political imagination.

Universities, for example, can play a pivotal role not just as sites of technical knowledge but as hubs of regional thinking. Joint degree programs, faculty exchanges, regionally grounded research collaborations, and multilingual publishing platforms can build long-term intellectual ties. Curricula can be reimagined to include transnational histories and comparative perspectives, helping future generations to think beyond national borders without losing their roots.

Cultural institutions are equally vital. Museums, theaters, libraries, and film festivals can become spaces for regional storytelling and dialogue. Artist residencies and co-productions can cultivate new aesthetic vocabularies that speak across languages and contexts. Rather than seeing art and culture as national branding tools, we can frame them as regional commons, as spaces of encounter, co-creation, and experimentation.

Media, both traditional and digital, can help bridge the narrative divide. Too often, Asian countries learn about each other through Western media filters or via state-run platforms with limited pluralism. Independent, transregional journalism and content production can highlight stories of collaboration, challenge stereotypes, and foster informed debate about the region's shared challenges and possibilities.

Youth networks, meanwhile, offer perhaps the most promising frontier. Young people today are more connected, mobile, and collaborative than any generation before. Student exchanges, climate movements, digital communities, and entrepreneurial networks already operate beyond borders. With the right support, they can become the architects of a regional future that is open, inclusive, and driven by justice.

The Global South and Southeast Asia Forum held in Jakarta provided a glimpse of this potential. It was not a closed, elite gathering. It included scholars, students, journalists, and practitioners engaged in open dialogue, breaking away from formal protocols and allowing for honest reflection. One of the most important moments came not in the plenary sessions but during a "Face to Face" dialogue involving Indonesian university students and Chinese scholars. In that space, abstract debates gave way to curiosity, disagreement, and connection.

This is the kind of space that regionalism must cultivate: a space where ideas are not managed but generated, where difference is not suppressed but engaged; where the region is not a fixed entity but a project in motion.

Of course, this does not mean abandoning the role of states. On the contrary, governments remain crucial in providing the institutional scaffolding for cooperation: treaties, funding, coordination, and political will. But they cannot act alone. Nor should they monopolize the definition of regional priorities.

In fact, one of the most powerful contributions that governments can make is to enable and protect the space for bottom-up regionalism. This means supporting academic freedom, artistic autonomy, civic participation, and cross-border collaboration. It means recognizing that security is not only about borders but also about social inclusion, cultural dignity, and ecological resilience. It means reframing development not as extraction and competition, but as mutual flourishing.

Conclusion: The Future We Imagine Together

What does it mean to imagine a region?

Not as a map drawn by treaties, not as an economy measured in exports and growth rates, but as a community of peoples, histories, struggles, and hopes. This question lies at the heart

of the new Asian regionalism we must now build. A regionalism that begins not from strategic necessity, but from mutual recognition. One that draws its strength not only from markets or military arrangements, but from the deeper bonds of memory, meaning, and shared vision.

Throughout this essay, I have argued that the current model of regionalism, which has been dominated by trade, diplomacy, and technocratic frameworks, is insufficient for the challenges and opportunities we face. The fault lines of our time—climate disruption, digital fragmentation, democratic erosion, and widening inequality—cannot be bridged by GDP alone. They require a new kind of solidarity, one rooted in cultural connection and historical consciousness.

That solidarity already exists in fragments. It lives in the stories of anti-colonial resistance that once traveled across borders. It flickers in the shared rituals of language, cuisine, and music. It pulses in the networks of scholars, artists, and activists who are increasingly choosing to collaborate across national lines. What is needed now is the political will and institutional imagination to gather these fragments and weave them into something enduring.

This is the promise of a shared history: not as nostalgia, but as a foundation. A reminder that our pasts are not as separate as we have been taught to believe. That the struggles of Vietnamese revolutionaries, Javanese peasants, Filipino writers, and Thai students are part of a larger regional arc. That our wounds and our wisdom can speak to one another.

But shared history is only one side of the equation. We must also commit to a shared future. One in which Asia does not simply adapt to the shifting currents of global power but helps shape a different current altogether. A future in which development is redefined not as competition, but as mutual care. A future in which identity is not reduced to nationalism but opened toward regional plurality. A future in which the idea of Asia itself is reclaimed, not as a passive geography, but as a living project.

To realize this future, we must invest in the infrastructures of connection. We must make space for cross-border cultural production, joint historical reckoning, and South–South knowledge co-creation. We must empower the next generation to learn from one another, to disagree, and to dream together. And we must resist the narrowing logics—of power politics, economic fundamentalism, or civilizational essentialism—that would reduce our region to someone else’s strategy.

A new Asian regionalism is not only possible, it is already in motion. But it will only flourish if we nourish it. If we treat it not as a reaction to Western decline or Chinese ascent, but as a generative force in its own right. If we are brave enough to trust each other across borders and patient enough to build the habits of solidarity that can withstand difference and distance.

The region we need is not yet fully born. But it is within reach.

And its birth will depend on our willingness to remember and to imagine *together*. ■

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[摘要]

本文探讨了印度尼西亚的殖民遗产如何塑造其当前的经济困境，并将其置于全球南方国家共同面临的挑战中分析。作者指出，印尼的贫困根源在于荷兰殖民统治遗留的结构性缺陷——工业基础缺失、资本外流、教育匮乏及巨额债务。尽管独立后经历了国有化运动和经济改革，但印尼仍深陷依附性经济模式，依赖进口生产资料且缺乏高端制造能力。通过与中国的发展路径对比，文章揭示了自主工业化的重要性，并呼吁全球南方国家加强合作，打破帝国主义主导的经济秩序，推动真正的多边发展规划。

殖民遗产与印尼的欠发达： 一个全球南方的挑战

[新加坡] 马克斯·莱恩

关键词：殖民遗产 结构性贫困 全球南方合作

我不是全球南方的公民。6月11日，当我坐在印度尼西亚大学的会议室里时，这一认知尤为强烈。会议室里坐满了来自中国以及几乎整个东南亚地区的代表——当然，东道主印度尼西亚的代表也在其中。作为参会者中唯一一位来自全球北方的白人（基因上是苏格兰-维京混血），我感到有些格格不入。

这场名为“全球南方与东南亚”的会议，核心议题是全球南方国家的经济合作——这并非停留在空谈层面，而是已经在金砖国家集团（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国、南非）这一形式得以体现，印度尼西亚现已加入该集团，尽管其合作方向尚不明确。

我是新加坡东南亚研究所尤索夫·伊萨研究院的高级访问研究员，这或许能解释为何我的参会信息显示来自新加坡。但我所表达的观点并不代表所在机构，而是源自我自20世纪70年代以来对印度尼西亚政治与经济的观察。或许有些讽刺：一个

来自新加坡智库的白人在谈论印度尼西亚。

本次会议的主旨十分明确：回应全球南方意识的觉醒，这种觉醒既存在于前殖民地国家，也存在于西方殖民国家的社会内部。尽管许多人期望建立某种多极世界，但现实世界正日益两极分化而非多极化：一边是被压迫的全球南方，另一边是由美国主导的、通过跨国公司及世界银行、国际货币基金组织和亚洲开发银行等机构主导世界的全球北方。

那么印尼处于什么位置？印尼真的属于全球南方吗？全球南方的本质是结构性贫困。我在演讲中强调：印尼和中国本质上都是贫穷国家。若不理解结构性贫困与依附性的现实，我们就无法解读全球动态。这不仅是地理划分，更是剥削者与被剥削者之间的分野。

不妨看看原始数据。2022年印度尼西亚人均GDP为5000美元，而美国为7.6万美元，荷兰为5.6万美元，澳大利亚为6.5

万美元。成人平均净资产方面，印度尼西亚为 17350 美元，美国为 551347 美元，荷兰为 352814 美元。前殖民国家的财富中位数是印度尼西亚等前殖民地国家的 183 倍。

残酷的事实是：尽管自然资源丰富，但由于缺乏加工自然资源的资本和技术能力，印尼仍然贫困。在全球南方国家中，只有中国在生产资料制造部门（马克思《资本论》中的第一部类）相对先进。国产机床等实际生产资料的自给率已达 30%~40%，中国计划到 2030 年实现高端机床 70% 以上的自给率，尽管在超精密磨削和五轴数控系统等领域仍需突破。中国从早期经济规划就优先发展自主的生产资料制造能力，并在 21 世纪初加速这一进程。

全球北方仍垄断着创造新型生产技术的能力，尽管其体系充满内部矛盾。美国国内生产的实际生产资料约占 60% 以上。

承认印尼的结构性贫困与依附性很重要。没有诚实的认知，就永远无法追问：为什么印尼如此贫穷落后？这个问题最为关键，因为若不了解贫困落后的根源，就

找不到解决方案。

印尼为何贫困？

那么印尼为何贫困？首要且决定性的原因是殖民势力在群岛近 300 年的经济、政治和文化统治。这种统治并非总是以 20 世纪那种直接殖民形式出现，但自 16 世纪起，欧洲殖民势力（尤其是荷兰）就主导着社会发展的各个领域。此处无须回顾 300 年历史，只需考察二战前 20 世纪 30 年代荷属东印度的经济状况。在讨论该状况前，请读者回忆二战期间殖民列强（尤其是美国、英国、德国和日本）几乎“无限”的工业能力——从航母、潜艇、战斗轰炸机到数百万辆吉普车、卡车、坦克，以及数千亿发弹药，全球炸弹和炮弹产量估计在 3500 万至 4500 万吨之间。

而同期的印尼呢？荷兰殖民者从未建立过一座现代工厂。最大的工厂不过是碾磨甘蔗和烟叶的作坊。1941 年巴达维亚工业事务部彼得·西特森编制的《荷属东印度



印尼为何贫困？首要且决定性的原因是殖民势力在群岛近 300 年的经济、政治和文化统治

工业发展》报告显示，在 6943.5 万人口中仅有 324210 人从事“工业”——基本为零。此外，这些工作场所的平均规模是 58 名工人：所以，它们是作坊而非工厂。该报告另一部分给出的 1941 年数据显示，工人的总数更少（146771 人），年均收入 318 荷兰盾，实际上几乎为零。换句话说，根本不存在工业，“工业发展”完全是误称。作坊式生产占据主导。值得记住的是马克思对手工业（及其改进）与工业化之间的区分：改进手工业涉及增加工具，使个体工人更具生产力，而工业化则是引入实际替代人力的机器。即便在手工业层面，1941 年的荷属东印度也落后得可怜。

在与重新入侵的荷兰殖民者进行近四年战争后，为尽快结束共和国与荷兰殖民武装的冲突，1949 年印尼共和国领导层做出多项让步。包括采用联邦制结构使荷兰能继续在某些地区施加影响；允许荷兰资本恢复对殖民统治时期所有企业的所有权和控制权；并同意荷兰继续控制西巴布亚以待后续谈判。更重要的是，共和国领导层接受了荷兰关于荷属东印度殖民政府欠荷兰政府债务的主张，同意新成立的印尼政府偿还该债务。因此在荷兰军事和国家机器撤离印尼的第一天，根据 1949 年圆桌会议协定，印尼就欠荷兰 43 亿荷兰盾（在今天约合 1300 亿美元）。在支付 35 亿荷兰盾后，1956 年 8 月阿里·沙斯特罗阿米佐约政府暂停了支付。1966 年，苏哈托政府继续支付并完成了偿还。

因此，在击败殖民者卷土重来的战争结束后的第一天，新生的印尼既无实质制造能力，又已负债累累。但这还不是全部。荷兰几乎没有留下任何有发展价值的东西，因为他们已将大量财富转移出境用于本国发展。据已故研究者亚历克·戈登计算，在日本入侵印尼前的六十年间（1880～1940

年），通过各种方式汇回荷兰的资金达 569 亿荷兰盾。按现今购买力计算约 62 亿美元，这超过了当时荷兰一年的国民生产总值。因此，印尼既无重要制造业，又无资本积累（全在荷兰），且从建国首日就背负巨额债务。

不仅如此。荷属东印度最多只有 10%~12% 的儿童上小学。而同期荷兰已实现几乎 100% 的义务教育普及率。独立之初的印尼主要还是乡村国家，人口超过 2 万的城市屈指可数。

当完全独立来临时，面对 20 世纪下半叶由所有前殖民国家主导的世界，印尼政府和人民所面临的是一个完全没有工业、没有资本、没有真正教育体系、几乎没有城市，且背负巨额外债的国家。工业的缺失意味着它无法创造和积累资本。

显然，印尼至今贫困的主要原因是殖民遗产。这是整个全球南方的共同命运，也是大多数全球南方国家意识统一的基础。

还有第二个原因。印尼民族革命本质上是反殖民革命。其社会革命程度有限，因为并未颠覆生产资料所有权，包括未实行土地集体化。首先，如上所述，印尼领导层对荷兰的让步之一就是允许荷兰资本保留革命前拥有的一切。虽然工业基础薄弱，但荷兰重新控制了所有矿山、种植园，以及航运公司、银行和进出口企业。殖民资本对整个现代经济主要部门的私有制得以延续。重大投资仍由荷兰资本的利润需求而非国家发展优先事项决定。

独立后不久，印尼共产党（PKI）和印尼民族党（PNI）等印尼政坛的左翼力量就开始发起取消债务、将西巴布亚纳入印尼以及将所有荷兰企业国有化的运动。国有化的潜在威胁导致荷兰放缓了对其拥有的种植园和矿山的投资。1956~1957 年，在工会工人占领后，印尼议会将所有荷兰企业

国有化。从那时起，大部分现代经济就掌握在国家手中。但这些企业生产水平低下，新管理层缺乏经验或腐败，许多企业内部持续发生劳资冲突，且这一过程发生在内战和政治动荡时期。

荷兰企业的国有化运动只是印尼国内通过社会革命完成民族革命斗争的一个方面。除要求将帝国主义国家（荷兰、英国、比利时）的企业国有化外，左翼还要求土地改革（将土地从富人手里分配给穷人）和其他社会主义改革。这场运动由印尼共产党和印尼民族党中不断壮大的左翼领导，并得到苏加诺总统支持。然而，由于担心引发军队中反左翼势力发动政变，印尼共产党和其他社会主义力量未能进入政府。

因此，在没有工业、资本，经济先被殖民企业主导，随后又由腐败的国有化管理层控制，没有学校系统并背负巨额债务的情况下，印尼独立后的头 15 年主要消耗在国家未来走向的内部斗争上：是成为主权社会主义国家，还是融入帝国主义全球经济。

自上而下的武力解决与未被清理的殖民遗产

经过 1950~1965 年 15 年关于独立印尼的未来的斗争后，新建立的“新秩序”政府决定停止印尼对被纳入前殖民者世界的抵抗——苏加诺总统在 1962 年称之为“旧有势力”。苏加诺曾与印度和中国领导人共同组织 1955 年万隆亚非会议，开启了这两个大陆第三世界国家间寻求更大团结的进程。

苏哈托政府决定将印尼经济融入以前殖民大国为主导的全球经济结构。1967 年 6 月，财政部长弗朗斯·塞达率领印尼代表团在瑞士与许多西方跨国公司的首席执行官会面，讨论经济的未来。随后成立了印尼

政府间集团（IGGI），它由国际货币基金组织和世界银行组成，几乎所有西方政府都参与其中，包括前殖民国家荷兰。IGGI 每年在荷兰开会决定下一年给印尼的债务额度。

尽管主办了倡导前殖民地国家合作的 1955 年亚非会议，并提出“新兴力量”概念，印尼却在 IGGI 的监督下融入全球经济——讽刺的是，IGGI 会议地点就在荷兰。1992 年，在与荷兰发生争执后，IGGI 更名为印尼国际协商集团（CGI），并在巴黎举行会议，但其职能仍是分配债务和监督印尼经济政策。苏哈托倒台后，CGI 再未出现。在亚洲金融危机时期，在 IMF 监督下采取的政策标志着融入帝国主义主导的全球体系已完成，不再需要 CGI。

印尼经济落后的根源在于殖民主义遗留，使其在面对前殖民国家的主导地位时，处于工业和资本贫困状态。在新秩序政府统治的 32 年间，其态度是接受作为被征服经济体的命运，以尝试发展经济。当然，自 20 世纪 70 年代，特别是 1975~1985 年石油繁荣以来，印尼制造业比之前有所发展（记住这是从极低基础上增长）。但印尼经济作为被征服经济的特征仍然占主导。

首先，使用低生产率技术的小企业工人比例仍超过 90%。大多数工人是临时性、季节性或兼职。根据 CELIOS 研究所最新报告，80% 的工人收入低于官方最低工资。这些数据让我想起斯蒂文斯（Stivens）1941 年的数据。确实，虽然印尼经济规模比 1941 年大得多，现在也有组装汽车等大型工厂，但基本特征相同。1932 年，苏加诺本人在其长文《印尼的自力更生与群众行动》中就曾完整数据说明：在荷兰殖民统治下，经济生活完全处于“无物不小”的格局之中——如今的情形依然如此。

印尼绝大多数企业规模之小，正是这种“小”的体现之一。人均 GDP 之低是另

一表现。官方最低工资标准本就微薄，却仍有 80% 的劳动者无法达到。每月 60.9 万印尼盾（约合人民币 280 元）的官方贫困线，或四口之家（平均 4.7 人）290 万印尼盾的标准，更是低得令人难以置信。这些微小的数字大多直接反映了日常生活的贫困状态。人均 GDP 更能说明问题：它不仅揭示生存资源的匮乏，更暴露出可用于发展的财富储备捉襟见肘——毕竟这 4000 美元的年收入既要维系当下生计，又需支撑未来发展。

我认为聚焦一点能更鲜明地揭示整个经济的结构性贫困。这里我再次回到马克思对生产资料制造与商品制造（或许还应加上服务）之间需要适当平衡的强调。马克思写道：“第二部类所需生产资料的总价值必须等于第一部类所生产的可变资本与剩余价值之和。”简言之，若没有对制造商品的机器（当然还需结合劳动力）进行充分投资，就不可能持续扩大社会所需或所求商品的生产规模。

区分总产量与生产资料本身的产量至关重要。明确这一区分也有助于理解所谓“进口替代工业化”的弱点，这是印尼政府更迭后立即实施的基本政策。进口替代工业化（ISI）是通过促进工业产品国内生产来减少对进口依赖的经济政策。在印尼，该政策并未真正用国内生产替代进口，而是用进口工厂设备替代进口成品——即进口生产资料。国家仍依赖进口。

在美国，人均生产资料生产投资为 3800~4200 美元，荷兰为 3200~3600 美元，中国为 1200~1500 美元（但面向 14 亿人口），而印尼仅 250~350 美元。难怪印尼仍极度依赖生产资料进口，国内只能制造最低端的机械设备。中国 90% 的机床（包括高端型号）为国产。印尼的生产基本限于传统车床，且数量有限。这种鲜明对比也反映在研发投入差异上：中国 2025 年的年度研

发投资可能达 6000 亿美元，印尼则可能不足 1 亿美元。

差异的根源

1950 年，中国和印尼都处于极度衰弱的境地。1949 年 2 月，毛泽东指出：“中国连年战争，经济遭到破坏，人民生活痛苦。”巴里·诺顿在《中国经济：转型与增长》（2007 年）中写道：“1950 年的中国是世界上最贫困的国家之一，多年内战与外国入侵使经济支离破碎，这个以农业为主导的社会，工业产能几乎可以忽略不计，人均收入水平与非洲最贫困地区相当。”前文我已详细阐述过印尼面临的殖民遗产问题。

因此，两国发展水平的差异不能用发展起点的截然不同来解释。1950 年时，两国都处于满目疮痍的状态。

在全球南方，最先进的工业能力存在于中华人民共和国。那么，其秘诀是什么？这个问题当然不可能用一两句话回答，但有一点很明确：中华人民共和国直到 20 世纪 70 年代才对外国投资开放，这距离新中国成立已经过了四分之一个世纪。在这 25 年里，中国增强了制定经济发展计划的能力，更重要的是，在执行计划时保持纪律性。当规划或实施中出现错误时，能够识别并研究这些错误。外国投资在严格监督下获准进入，而不是被当作其发展的基础。

与中国相比，印尼（特别是 1965 年后）的思维方式存在根本差异。我从未在任何英文版的中国原始文献中，找到过关于马克思“第一部类”与“第二部类”需要保持比例平衡的明确论述——或许只是我研究不够深入，若中文文献中确实没有相关记载反倒会令我惊讶。但两国在概念表述

上存在显著差异，这突出体现为中文语境对“生产力”一词始终如一的强调。优先发展生产资料制造业（既包括制造机器的机器，也包括生产商品的设备），被明确视为提升本土生产资料生产能力、实现战略自主的核心要义。

国民经济、全球南方与生产社会化的国际化

但如今到了2025年，印尼实施现行经济战略已逾半个世纪。这个经济体有出路吗？这是个重大问题，我不敢妄言有答案。我想提出两个主要问题：

第一，如果印尼被征服经济的基本特征是无法在国内生产所需的大部分生产资料，那么它应选择发展哪些特定生产资料（假设能筹集国内资金）？在一个生产资料供给能力可能已被中国等其他生产者满足的世界里，该如何决策？此外，许多实际生产过程已不再基于单一国家，因为生产和供应链早已跨国分布。像印尼这样缺乏相关能力的国家，该从何处着手破局？

这类问题让我们思考：在仍处于帝国主义框架的全球经济中，第一部类与第二部类的关系如何运作？仅在国家层面制定发展规划还足够吗？理想情况下，这最好通过国家间的全球规模合作（即国际化）完成。但帝国主义世界使掠夺性的全球北方国家与全球南方国家对立。即使要建立最低限度的互利关系也需要斗争。更甚者，整个全球经济的资本主义性质，也可能使全球南方国家在商业合作中彼此对立。

或许，未来需要越来越多的全球南方国家将全球南方本身视为一个关键的经济区域单元，共同规划彼此间的分工，才能削弱全球北方对全球南方的侵略性遏制。

例如，中国能否提议在市场机制之外，援助像印度尼西亚这样的国家发展某些特定生产资料制造能力。我认为中国已经有一些类似的小型项目，比如与埃塞俄比亚的合作。当然，要产生真正的影响，这类规划和项目需要在多个国家大规模展开。

正如全球南方许多国家及观察人士，以及全球北方声援全球南方的人士所主张的那样，全球南方国家间的合作正变得日益重要。切实的集体规划将至关重要。而这正是第二个，也是相当重大的问题所在。国家间的最佳合作——尤其是涉及实际规划时——必然要求国家能完全掌控本国财富，从而有能力认真执行计划。但这引发了一个重大政治问题：首先，谁在掌控国家政权？是通过各类代议制政治机制实现的社会整体，还是少数精英阶层？全球南方国家中仅有少数拥有社会主义或半社会主义政府。从中国、古巴和委内瑞拉仍在面临的处境也可明显看出，任何实质性削弱依赖性的举措都会遭遇帝国主义的敌意。只有当一个国家的社会整体（或接近整体）掌握着经济主权时，才能直面这种敌意。精英主导的国家则无能为力。尽管情况如此，任何可能的合作虽然无疑有其价值，却难以实现最佳效益，最终或许根本不足以以必要方式改变全球经济格局。

全球南方国家的每一次重大进步都值得肯定。但现实是，当今世界亟须打破压迫与被压迫国家间两极分化的格局，建立真正的国际合作。要终结帝国主义这种高度集中的掠夺性体系，变革必须从帝国主义国家内部发生。这就引出了另一个问题：北方国家的人民何时才能认清帝国主义的不公，推动本国进入与全球南方人民民主合作的新纪元？■

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Indonesia's Colonial Legacy and the Challenges for the Global South

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I'm not a citizen of the Global South. This realization hit me when I sat in the conference room of the University of Indonesia on June 11. The room was filled with delegates from the People's Republic of China and almost all of Southeast Asia - certainly including Indonesia itself. As the only Caucasian from the Global North in attendance (genetically mixed Scottish-Viking), my position felt odd.

The Global South and Southeast Asia Forum was initiated by the Global South Network. My invitation as a speaker was co-signed by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences (FISIP) University of Indonesia, Communication University of China, and Beijing Longway Economic and Social Research Foundation. The discussion is centered on the economic cooperation of the Global South countries - not just a discourse, but has been manifested in the form of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) group that Indonesia has now joined. Although the nature of its orientation is not yet clear.

My status as a Senior Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore explains why I was listed as a participant from there. However, the view I conveyed was not the view of my institution but was born from the observation of Indonesian politics and economics since the 1970s. Ironic perhaps: a Caucasian from a Singapore think-tank talks about Indonesia.

The spirit of this conference was clear: to respond to the awakening of the Global South consciousness, both in the former colonies and in the societies of the Western colonial countries themselves. While many hope for some kind of a multi-polar world, the world is actually increasingly bipolar, not multipolar: divided between the oppressed Global South and the US-led Global North which dominates the world through giant corporations and institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and ADB.

Then where is Indonesia's position? Is Indonesia really part of the Global South? The essence of the Global South is structural poverty. In my presentation, I emphasized: both Indonesia and China are essentially poor countries. Without understanding the reality of structural poverty and dependence, it is impossible for us to read global dynamics. This is not just a geographical division, but a division between the exploited and the exploiters.

Let's take a look at the raw numbers. Indonesia's GDP per capita (2022): \$5,000 vs US (\$76,000), Netherlands (\$56,000), Australia (\$65,000). Net worth per adult: Indonesia (\$17,350) vs US (\$551,347), Netherlands (\$352,814). The former colonial country has a median wealth 183 times that of former colonies like Indonesia.

The bitter fact: despite being rich in natural resources, Indonesia remains poor due to a lack of capital and technological capacity to process its natural resources. Among the Global South, only China is relatively advanced in the manufacturing sector of its own means of production (Department A in Marx's *Das Kapital*). Domestic manufacture of the actual means of production (machine tools and so forth) is already around 30~40% and China aims for 70%+ self-sufficiency in high-end machine tools by 2030, although breakthroughs in areas like ultra-precision grinding and 5-axis CNC controllers are still needed. From early in its economic planning, China prioritised increasing its capacity to manufacture its own means of production, accelerating this process in the early 2000s.

The Global North still monopolizes the ability to create new types of productive technologies, even though their systems are fraught with internal contradictions. The US's domestic production of actual means of production is around 60% or more.

Acknowledging the structural poverty and dependence of Indonesia is important. Without honest confession, it will never be possible to ask: why is Indonesia so poor and backward? And this question is the most crucial, because without understanding the causes of poverty and backwardness, the solution will not be found.

Why is Indonesia Poor?

So why is Indonesia poor? The first and most decisive reason was the economic, political and cultural dominance of the colonial powers for almost 300 years in the archipelago. This domination did not always take the form of direct colonization, as happened in the 20th century, but nevertheless European colonial powers, especially the Netherlands, dominated all fields of social development since the 16th century. This is not the place to review the 300-year history, we just need to examine the economic situation in the Dutch East Indies in the 1930s, before the Second World War. Before I talk about that situation, I invite the reader to remember the WW2 and how gigantic and almost "infinite" the industrial capabilities of the colonial colonizers, especially the United States, Britain, Germany and Japan, were. Weapons of war from aircraft carriers, submarines, fighter-bombers to millions of jeeps, trucks, panzers and others and hundreds of billions of rounds of ammunition and global production of bombs and artillery ammunition likely range from 35 to 45 million tons.

And in Indonesia at the same time? Dutch colonialism never built a single modern factory. The largest factories were for grinding sugarcane stalks and tobacco leaves. A report compiled by Peter Sitsen of the Department of Industrial Affairs in Batavia in 1941 entitled *Industrial Development of the Netherlands Indies* shows how only 324,210 people in a population of 69,435,000 were involved in "industry" – basically almost zero. In addition, the average size of this workplace was 58 workers: so, they were workshops, not factories. In another part of this report, which gives data for 1941, it is stated that there was a smaller total of workers, namely 146,771, earning an average annual income of 318 guilders, hardly zero in fact.

In other words, there was no industry: "Industrial Development" was a complete misnomer. Workshop manufacture was dominant. It is worth remembering Marx's distinction between manufacture (and its improvement) on the one hand and industrialisation on the other. Improving manufacture involves increasing tools that makes the individual worker more

productive, industrialisation is the introduction of machinery that actually replaces human labour. Even at the level of manufacture, the Netherlands Indies in 1941 was pathetically undeveloped.

After almost four years of war against the re-invading Dutch colonial army, and in order to bring the armed conflict between Republic and Dutch colonial forces to and as quickly as possible, in 1949 the Republican leadership made a number of concessions. These included adopting a federal structure for Indonesia allowing the Dutch scope to continue influence in some regions; allowing Dutch capital to resume ownership and control of all the enterprises they controlled under colonial rule as well as agree to continuing Dutch control over western Papua pending further negotiations. Further the Republican leadership accepted the Dutch assertion that the colonial government of the Netherlands East Indies was in debt to the government of Netherlands itself and agreed the new government of Indonesia to pay off that debt. So, on day one after the Dutch military and state apparatus left Indonesia, the country owed 4.3 billion guilders (about USD 130 billion today) to the Netherlands as a result of the 1949 Round Table Conference. After paying 3.5 billion guilders, in August 1956, the government of Ali Sastroamidjojo suspended the payment. In 1966, the Suharto government continued and completed the payments.

So, on day one after the war to defeat the colonial return ended, the new Indonesia had no real manufacturing capacity and was already in debt. But that was not all. The Dutch left almost nothing of developmental worth behind because, in fact, that had taken so much wealth out of the country to invest in the development of its own country. Over just the sixty years before the Japanese invasion of Indonesia, between 1880 and 1940, researcher the late Alec Gordon, calculated that 56,900,000,000 guilders was repatriated back to The Netherlands by various means. In today's purchasing power this amounts to over six billion dollars (USD 6,192,502,273). This was more than one year of The Netherlands' Gross National Product at that time.

So, Indonesia had no significant manufacture, no accumulated capital as it was all in The Netherlands and a huge debt on day one.

But not only that. At the most, only 10-12% of children in the Netherlands Indies went to primary school. At the same time, of course, in the Netherlands such schooling was compulsory with almost 100% attendance there. At the time of independence, Indonesia was also primarily a village country with very few towns with a population of over 20000 people.

At the time of full independence, both the government and the Indonesian people, facing the second half of the 20th century in a world dominated by all the former colonial countries, as a country without industry at all, no capital, no real school system, almost no cities, and with a large foreign debt. The lack of any industry meant that it did not have any capacity to create and accumulate capital.

It is clear that the main reason Indonesia is still poor is the legacy of colonialism. This is the fate of the entire Global South and is the basis of unity of consciousness among most of the countries of the Global South.

There is a second cause. The Indonesian national revolution was primarily an anti-colonial revolution. The extent to which it can be said to have experienced a social revolution is

limited as there was no overturning of the ownership of the means of production, including no collectivisation of land ownership. Firstly, as noted above one concession made by the Indonesian leadership to the Dutch was that Dutch capital could keep everything had owned before the revolution. Although there was no substantial industry, the Dutch resumed control over all mines and plantations, and also shipping companies as well as banking and export-import firms. Colonial capital private ownership of major sections of the whole modern economy continued. Major investments were still being determined by Dutch capital's needs for profit not national development priorities.

Almost immediately after independence, the left-wing of Indonesian politics, including the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and the Indonesian National Party (PNI) began campaigning for the cancellation of the debt, the inclusion of West Papua in Indonesia and the nationalisation of all Dutch enterprises. The looming threat of nationalisation meant that investment in the Dutch owned plantations and mines was slow. Then in 1956~1957, after being occupied by unionised workers, the Indonesian parliament nationalised all Dutch enterprises. From that moment, most of the modern economy was in state hands. However, these enterprises were at a low level of production, the new managements were inexperienced or corrupt, industrial conflict continued within many of them and the process was taking place in a period of civil war and political volatility.

The campaign for the nationalisation of the Dutch enterprises was just one aspect of a struggle unfolding within Indonesia to complete the national revolution by carrying out a social revolution. Apart from demanding the nationalisation of imperialist country enterprises (Dutch, British, Belgium), the left-wing also demanded land reform (distribution of land from the rich to the poor) and other socialist reforms. This campaign was led by PKI and a growing left-wing in the PNI and supported by President Sukarno. However, the PKI and other socialist forces were not able to be brought into the government for fear of provoking a coup d'état by anti-Left sections of the military.

Thus, without industry, capital, its economy dominated by colonial business and then under corrupt nationalised management, with no school system and burdened with a large debt, the first 15 years after Independence were much consumed by a struggle within the country over its future: sovereign socialist or integration into the imperialist global economy.

Contradiction Resolved by Force from Above: Colonial Legacy Not Addressed

After 15 years of fighting, 1950~1965, over the future of an independent Indonesia, a new government, the New Order government, was established, which decided to stop Indonesia's resistance to being integrated into the world of former colonizers, which President Sukarno called The Old Established Forces (Oldefos) in 1962. Sukarno has played a key role, along with the leaders of India and China, in organising the 1955 Bandung Asia Africa Conference, which initiated a process of seeking greater solidarity among Third World countries in these two continents.

The Suharto government decided to integrate the Indonesian economy into a global economic structure dominated by the former colonial powers. In June, 1967, an Indonesian delegation led by Finance Minister Frans Seda met in Switzerland with CEOs of many Multinational Corporations from Western countries to discuss the future of the economy.

This was followed by the establishment of the Intergovernmental Group of Indonesia. This group comprised the IMF and the World Bank, and was attended by almost all Western governments, including the old colonial power, The Netherlands. The IGGI meets annually in the Netherlands to determine how much debt will be given to Indonesia for the following year.

From hosting the 1955 Asian-African Conference advocating cooperation between former colonial countries and the originator of the concept of New Emerging Forces, Indonesia became integrated in the global economy under the supervision of IGGI, which ironically met in the Netherlands. Indeed, in 1992, after a dispute with the Netherlands, IGGI changed its name to the Consultative Group on Indonesia and met in Paris, but its function was to allocate debt and oversee Indonesia's economic policies. After Suharto fell, the CGI was never seen again. With the policies taken by the government at the time of the Asian Financial crisis, under the supervision of the IMF, the process of integrated into the imperialist dominated global system had been completed enough so that a CGI is no longer needed.

The source of Indonesia's economic backwardness is the legacy of colonialism that left it in a state of industrial and capital poverty in the face of the dominance of former colonial countries. Then during the New Order government, over 32 years, the attitude was to try to grow an economy by accepting its fate as a conquered economy. Of course, since the 1970s, especially since the oil boom of 1975~1985, Indonesia's manufacturing sector has grown larger than before, remembering that it was growing from a dismally low base. But the character of Indonesia's economy as a conquered economy is still dominant.

First, the number of workers working in small businesses using low-productivity technology is still above 90%. Most of the workers are casual, seasonal or part-time. According to a recent report released by the CELIOS Institute, 80% of these workers have an income below the official minimum wage. This data reminds me of the Stivens' data in 1941. Indeed, although Indonesia's economy is much larger than in 1941 and now there are large factories that assemble cars and others, the fundamental characteristics are the same. In 1932, Sukarno himself in his long article *Swadeshi and Mass Action in Indonesia* provided complete data to illustrate that under Dutch colonialism economic life was dominated by a situation where nothing was small. The situation is the same now.

The small size of the vast majority Indonesian enterprises is one manifestation is this smallness. The low GDP per capita is another. The official minimum wage, which 80% of workers don't receive, is also small. The official poverty line of Rp 609,000 per month or Rp 2.9 million per household of 4.7 people is also unbelievably tiny. Most of these small figures, however, directly show the poverty in daily life. GDP per capita does more than that: it also exhibits the poverty of wealth that is available for development, as that USD 4,000 per year has to provide immediate sustenance for life as well as fund development.

I think one focus can also more starkly reveal the structural poverty of an economy as a whole. Here, I return again to Marx's emphasis on the need for a proper balance between the manufacture of the means of production and the manufacture of goods (and we might add services.) Marx wrote, for example: "The aggregate value of the means of production needed in Department II must equal the sum of variable capital and surplus-value produced in Department I." Put simply, you cannot keep expanding the production of goods that

society needs or wants, without the adequate investment in creating and manufacturing the machines that make goods, in conjunction with labour, of course.

Distinguishing between overall production output and output in the means of production itself is crucial. Being clear on this distinction, also helps understand the weakness of what is sometimes called “import substitution industrialisation”, a fundamental policy implemented by Indonesia immediately after the change of government. Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) is an economic policy aimed at reducing a country’s reliance on imported goods by promoting domestic production of industrialized products. In Indonesia this policy did not really substitute importing with domestic production but substituted importing finished goods with improving factories, i.e. importing means of production. The country remained dependent in importing.

In America, the investment per capita in producing the means of production figure is \$3,800~\$4,200; in the Netherlands \$3,200~\$3,600; in China \$1,200~\$1,500 (but for 1 billion and 400 million people) and in Indonesia only \$250~\$350 per capita. It is not surprising that Indonesia remains extremely dependent in importing means of production, being able to manufacture within Indonesia only the lowest level of machinery. China produces 90% of its machine tools domestically, including high-end models. Indonesia’s production is limited basically to conventional lathes, and also is limited in numbers. The stark comparison is also reflected in differences in investment in research and development. China invests \$2 billion a year, where Indonesia invests probably less than \$100 million.

Origins of the Differences

In 1950, both China and Indonesia were in a drastically weakened state. In February, 1949, Mao Zedong stated: “China has been in war for years, its economy has been devastated, and the people are living in misery.” In his book *The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth* by Barry Naughton (2007) “In 1950, China was one of the poorest countries in the world, its economy shattered by years of civil war and foreign invasion, with an overwhelmingly agrarian society where industrial capacity was negligible and per capita income languished at levels comparable to the poorest parts of Africa.” I have already elaborated above the colonial legacy that Indonesia faced.

So, the difference in the levels of development between the two countries cannot be explained by significantly differing developmental starting points. In 1950, both countries were in a devastated state.

In the Global South the most advanced industrial capability is in the PRC. So, what is its secret? Of course, answering that question is impossible in just one or two sentences. But one thing is clear. The PRC only opened its doors to foreign investment in the 1970s, a quarter of a century after its national and social revolution. In those 25 years, the country had strengthened its ability to draw up an economic development plan and, more importantly, and be disciplined in carrying out the plan. When mistakes in planning or implementation were made, they could be identified and studied. Foreign investment is allowed to enter under strict monitoring, not called in as the foundation for its development.

There is, also, a fundamental difference in the kind of thinking that emerged in China as

compared to Indonesia, especially after 1965. I have never been able to find in any English language Chinese originating material explicitly referencing the need for a proportional balance between Marx's Department A and Department B. I suspect I just haven't looked hard enough and I would be surprised if it is not there in Chinese language material. However, there is a very clear difference in conceptual language manifested in the consistent and persistent use of the term "productive forces". The decision to prioritise the manufacture of means of production – the machines that you will use to make machines as well as the machines that you will use to produce goods – is clearly understood as the core of developing the capacity to produce domestically as much as possible and as strategically as possible of the means of production as you can.

National Economies, the Global South and the Internationalisation of the Socialisation of Production

But now in 2025, Indonesia already has been implementing its current economic strategy for over half a century. Is there a way out from being a conquered economy? This is a big question, and I don't pretend to have the answer or answers. There are two major issues that I do wish to raise.

First, if a basic part of Indonesia's conquered economy is its inability to produce domestically any significant amount of the means of production it needs, then what particular means of production should it choose to develop (assuming it could generate the finances domestically to do so)? How does it make such a decision in a world where the capacity to supply the needs for means of production may already be being met by other producers, including




In China, the decision to prioritise the manufacture of means of production is understood as the core of developing the capacity to produce domestically.

China? Furthermore, many actual production processes are no longer based in one country, as the production and supply chain has become multi-country for many products. Where does a country such as Indonesia without such a capacity start?

These kinds of issues make us ask the question: how does the relationship between departments A and B work in a global economy still operating in an imperialist framework? Is it enough anymore to try to make plan development purely on a national basis? Ideally, of course, this would be best done through global scale cooperation between nations, i.e. internationally. But the imperialist world pits the predatory Global North countries against the countries of the Global South. It is struggle to even achieve minimal mutually beneficial relationships. On top of that, the capitalist nature of the global economy as a whole can also pit one Global South country against another in commercial cooperation.

Perhaps, as part of the process of weakening the aggressive containment of the Global South by the Global North, will require more and more Global South countries to see the Global South itself as a key economic regional unit which can collectively plan a division of labour among themselves. Can China, for example, propose to aid, outside market mechanisms, a country like Indonesia develop some specific means of production manufacturing capacities. I think China already has some small projects like this, for example, with Ethiopia. Of course, to have a real impact such designs and projects would need to be on a large scale across many countries.

As many countries and observers in the Global South and those in solidarity with the Global South in the Global North argue, cooperation between the Global South is increasingly important. Actual collective planning would be crucial. And this is where the second, and quite huge issue, arises. Optimal cooperation among countries, especially involving actual planning, definitely requires the state to have full control over the country's wealth so that it is able to seriously implement a plan. But this raises a major political question? First, who is in power over the country itself: is it society itself through whatever representative political mechanisms or just a handful of elites? Only a minority of Global South countries have socialist or semi-socialist governments. It is also clear, from what China, as well as Cuba and Venezuela are still facing, serious moves towards lessening dependence will be met with hostility from imperialism. Only a country where society as a whole, or more-or-less as whole, wields sovereignty over its economy can face up to such hostility. Elite dominated states cannot. While this is the case, whatever cooperation is possible, although now doubt useful, will not be of optimal benefit and may, in the end, not at all be adequate to change the global economy in the necessary way.

Every substantial advance among the Global South will be an advance. But truly, the world is in need of international cooperation, dissolving the current bipolar divided world, between oppressor and oppressed nations. To end a system of such concentrated predatory power – this imperialism – transformational change must take place in the imperialist countries themselves. So here is another question: when will the people of the countries of the Global North realize the injustice of imperialism and bring their country to a different era of democratic cooperation with the peoples of the Global South? 

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[摘要]

泰国战后经济的发展路径深受美国及世界银行、国际货币基金组织主导的战后世界秩序的塑造与制约。本文追溯了泰国从进口替代转向出口导向工业化和金融自由化的演进过程。由外部力量主导的发展模式虽带来短期繁荣，却因低工资竞争和跨国资本依赖而累积了结构性矛盾。金融自由化诱发的资本流动失控和房地产泡沫最终触发了1997年亚洲金融危机。其后IMF附带严苛条件的“援助”加剧了社会代价，并为外部资本廉价收购泰国资产提供了便利。本文提出构建以“三个平衡”（内外市场、家庭与企业、竞争与共享）和“三种共享”（权力、机会、市场）为基石的新型经济体系，旨在提升内需，降低外部依赖，促进区域合作，探索一条超越霸权秩序的替代路径。

泰国现代经济的发展路径

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关键词：泰国战后经济 亚洲金融危机 共享型经济

一、引言

第二次世界大战后，美国崛起为全球首要超级大国。这一霸权地位的确立，主要源于英国、法国等传统殖民强国因战争遭受重创。在此背景下，美国及其主导的世界银行、国际货币基金组织等机构开始深度干预泰国政治经济格局。简言之，战后泰国政治经济的发展轨迹，基本遵循下列路径：

- 1949年，加入世界银行（成为成员国）
- 1950年，获得世界银行贷款
- 1950年，中情局支持泰国政府
- 1957年，接受美国政府与世界银行的监督
- 1958年，沙立·他那叻军事独裁政权
- 1961年，经济发展计划（首个五年计

划）实施

- 1961~1971年，进口替代工业化阶段
- 1972年至今，出口导向型工业化阶段
- 20世纪90年代，华盛顿共识框架下的金融自由化（受国际货币基金组织监督）
- 1997年，金融危机（“冬阴功危机”）
- 2000~2024年，经济增长放缓（年均增长率3.18%）

二、遏制苏联影响：国际货币基金组织与世界银行成立的深层逻辑

1941年6月，德国发动对苏联的入侵。然而至冬季，纳粹军队深陷冰雪困境无法推进。苏联军队展开反击致德军溃败。趁此良机，苏联持续施压，通过进一步军事

行动将保加利亚、捷克斯洛伐克、匈牙利、波兰、罗马尼亚、南斯拉夫及东德的政治体制改造为苏式社会主义国家。这些国家全面推行计划经济体制，废除资本主义并消灭市场机制。

需特别指出的是，在苏德战争期间，美国为消灭纳粹势力，通过《租借法案》（《促进美国国防法案》）向苏联提供支持。苏联借此强化军备，最终战胜纳粹军队。

1941年12月美国参战后，成立于1921年的外交关系协会（CFR）判定苏联已成为资本主义制度的重大威胁。鉴于苏联势力已主导东欧，CFR警告若不能遏制其扩张，西欧与美国资本主义体系将面临存亡危机。因此CFR提出构建“大区域”

（Grand Area）战略——旨在维护美国资本主义繁荣的扩张性势力范围，其版图设计涵盖欧洲及其殖民地，甚至延伸至中国与日本。^[1]

经济层面，CFR主张建立跨国官方机

构作为“大区域”的经济引擎。该方案经罗斯福总统批准后，由财政部长亨利·摩根索负责落实。1942年3月，摩根索起草成立国际货币基金组织与国际复兴开发银行（即世界银行）的计划。1944年，44国代表在美国新罕布什尔州布雷顿森林召开会议，最终决议设立这两个机构：国际货币基金组织于1945年成立，世界银行于1946年投入运作。^[2]这些机构的根本使命是保障“大区域”经济体系的稳定运转，由此形成了美国主导下国际货币基金组织与世界银行共同维系的新世界秩序。

为巩固欧洲“大区域”，北约组织应运而生。在东南亚地区，美国除将其划入势力范围外，更注意到该地区的战略资源（包括稀土、锡、铅、钨及橡胶）及越南、老挝、柬埔寨方兴未艾的社会主义革命运动。为保护“大区域”并遏制中南半岛的革命浪潮，美国策划成立东南亚条约组织（SEATO），泰国亦成为其成员国。



为保护“大区域”并遏制中南半岛的革命浪潮，美国策划成立东南亚条约组织

三、世界银行影响下的泰国

世界银行于1946年成立后，泰国于1949年成为其第47个成员国。1950年，泰国获得首笔300万美元的世界银行贷款，用于铁路基础设施建设。随后自1955年起，世界银行和美国主要通过美国援外使团逐步扩大在泰国的政治经济影响力，并通过美国新闻处开展反共宣传。

1956年的美国国务院历史学家办公室第504号外交经济往来文件（包含美国驻泰大使馆与美国国务院之间的电报往来）揭示了美国在泰国扮演的多重政治经济角色。例如，一份电报详细记录了美国试图为泰国灌溉大坝项目促成4600万美元世界银行贷款的努力，同时讨论了美国修建一条连接曼谷和老挝公路的计划。这些干预措施凸显了美国对塑造泰国发展轨迹的战略兴趣。在此背景下，有学者认为泰国已成为美国的“半殖民地”。^[3]

美国中央情报局（CIA）第7503号情报报告显示，世界银行于1957年对泰国经济发展进行了题为“泰国可能的发展”的研究。这份在銮披汶·颂堪元帅政府末期发布的报告主张限制政府职能，主要集中于促进私营企业发展。然而，銮披汶政府以国有企业为主导，导致其拒绝完全采纳这些建议。

笔者认为这一政策分歧很可能是美国撤回对銮披汶政府支持的原因之一。此前，双方曾因共同的反共目标而关系密切。例如，美联社记者斯坦利·斯温顿（Stanley Swington）的报道指出，在1947年銮披汶发动政变后，美国提供了300万美元援助，条件是泰国政府允许美国使用其军事基地。此外，在20世纪50年代，CIA通过海洋供应公司向炮·是耶农警察上将提供资金支持以加强警察力量，并建立警察伞兵部队用

于在各省开展反共行动。然而，由于銮披汶不愿完全接受私营资本发展模式，美国转而支持一直与銮披汶关系密切的陆军司令沙立·他那叻元帅。这一转变生动展现了经济政策、地缘政治利益与政治联盟演变之间复杂的互动关系。

四、美国与世界银行影响下的现代资本主义发展

1957年9月16日，沙立·他那叻元帅发动政变，从銮披汶·颂堪元帅手中夺取政权。随后在1957年12月15日举行新选举，沙立元帅的亲信他依·吉滴卡宗将军出任总理。沙立元帅旋即访美，与艾森豪威尔总统等美国政府高层会晤，重点商讨反共政策及符合美国资本主义模式的发展路径。^[4]1958年10月20日，沙立元帅再次发动政变，建立完全威权体制。

革命委员会第4号公告明确宣示政府反共立场，第11号公告第4条则下令成立国家经济发展委员会。^[5]与此同时，工会组织被全面取缔，理由是其涉嫌庇护共产主义分子。^[6]经济发展计划启动时，政府清晰阐明了经济理念与发展方向：国家将大力扶持私营企业，避免直接参与经济活动，转而将资源投入各类基建项目。^[7]本质上，沙立·他那叻元帅全盘接受了美国在反共政策与发展美式资本主义经济体系方面的建议。

第一（1961~1966）与第二（1967~1971）个国家经济发展计划均重点推行进口替代工业化（ISI）战略。该策略通过税收优惠与关税壁垒（即“促进与保护政策”）来扶持本土制造业。然而进口替代工业严重依赖国内市场，由于农民与工人收入极低（如劳工日薪仅8泰铢）导致的内部购买力不足，最终制约了进口替代工业的发展

空间。

进口替代工业增长潜力的内在局限性，促使美国与世界银行的顾问们向泰国政府建议实施战略转型——从第三个国家经济发展计划（1972~1976）开始转向出口导向型工业化（EOI）发展模式。

泰国推动出口导向型产业发展的战略，主要依靠全球市场的低价竞争优势——通过压制工资水平来降低成本，而非着力于技术研发或产品质量提升。这一发展模式导致EOI增长存在固有局限性：在技术和质量升级方面过度依赖跨国公司，但跨国公司始终不愿转让核心技术；随着全球进入数字时代，泰国面临高科技出口产品短缺的困境；加之缺乏自主航运线路导致的高运输成本，进一步制约了EOI发展。

值得注意的是，EOI战略并未改善泰国贸易逆差：1976年（“三五”计划末期）逆差达95.31亿泰铢，1981年（“四五”计划末期）扩大至658.43亿泰铢，1986年（“五五”计划末期）攀升至891.28亿泰铢^[8]，至2023年贸易逆差更激增至3029.25亿泰铢。

五、国际货币基金组织建议下的金融自由化进程

20世纪90年代，国际货币基金组织向泰国提出通过金融体系实现经济增长的建议，要求泰国遵循《国际货币基金组织协定》第八条款实行金融自由化。其核心理念是：若泰国允许资本自由流动，泰铢将成为东盟区域贸易结算货币，使泰国转型为区域金融中心，从而推动经济增长与繁荣。在此愿景下，泰国政府一度梦想成为“亚洲第五小龙”。

1990年5月，泰国政府采纳了国际货币基金组织的建议。随后在1993年，曼谷

国际银行设施成立，旨在促进国际资金转移。该举措专门设计用于激励国内金融机构快速便捷地从海外借入资金（资金流入）。

泰国私营部门主要通过三种方式使用这些资金：以3%~4%的年利率借款后，以7%~8%的利率在泰国国内转存套利；将短期贷款（约占外债总额的65%）投入投机盛行、利润畸高的新兴房地产市场；以及投资同样快速增长的股票市场。值得注意的是，这些流入资金中约80%来自私营部门，而非政府借贷。

与泰国金融业繁荣相伴而生的，是汇率稳定机制的严重缺失和防范资本大规模快速外流保障措施的不足，这直接导致了汇率剧烈波动。同时，由于未能充分评估外债借入的必要性，造成私营部门债务过度累积。更严重的是，企业普遍采取“短债长投”的冒险操作，致使项目收益无法及时覆盖短期偿债义务。

简言之，泰国政府被国际货币基金组织的建议所左右，只关注表面收益而未能建立有效的风险对冲机制。在制度准备方面严重不足——既缺乏完善的政策法规体系，也未能建立有效的监管机构来管控和防范风险损失。经济学基本原理表明，任何决策都存在机会成本，有所得必有所失。因此经济决策的关键在于确保收益大于代价。然而由于缺乏风险意识和事前防范，最终导致损失远超收益，1997年“冬阴功”金融风暴就是明证。

六、冬阴功危机始末

根据国际货币基金组织第八条款的规定，泰国商业银行和金融公司获得了资本自由流动的特权——无须泰国央行事先审批即可进行跨境资金往来。更关键的是，外国投资者可直接将外汇存入泰国商业银行

账户，而无须兑换为泰铢。这一政策导致外资大量涌入：由于泰国银行提供 7%~8% 的年利率，远高于外国银行 2%~3% 的利率水平，巨额外汇存款如潮水般涌入泰国金融体系。

1992 年，泰国证券交易委员会（SEC）成立。该机构允许证券交易所上市大企业直接从境外融资，由于境外利率远低于泰国国内水平，这些企业开始大规模举借外债，导致私营部门债务激增至外债总额的 80%。这些借款多为短期贷款（期限不足一年），却被大量投入房地产等长期投资领域。

房地产行业的快速扩张最终导致供应过剩，房产销售滞缓、资金回笼困难，企业难以履行短期偿债义务。债权人信心崩塌，房地产公司股价应声暴跌，进而拖累向其放贷的金融机构。当 SEC 认定无法继续放任这些金融公司股价下跌时，宣布暂停其股票交易，随即引发挤兑风潮——储户争

相从金融机构提取存款。最终，规模较小的银行和众多金融公司在巨额挤兑压力下相继破产。

1996 年末，泰国政府勒令 3 家小型银行和 18 家金融公司停业。1997 年 3 月，又有 10 家金融机构被关闭；6 月增至 16 家；至 8 月更出现惊人的 42 家机构倒闭。累计 86 家金融公司被清盘，使泰国陷入真正的金融机构系统性危机。这场金融危机引发三大连锁反应：

外汇存款抽离：外国储户从银行和金融公司提取资金，兑换成美元后汇出境外；

国内资本外逃：泰国本土富豪也纷纷提款，将泰铢兑换成美元存入海外账户；

外资证券撤资：股市外资抛售股票，将泰铢兑换为美元撤离泰国。

上述三重冲击导致泰国外汇储备急剧缩水，1997 年骤降至仅 28.5 亿美元。市场对泰铢信心迅速崩塌：官方汇率虽维持 25 泰铢兑 1 美元，黑市汇率却飙升



1997 年，泰国陷入国际媒体所称的“冬阴功危机”，曾经的“亚洲第五小龙”就此沦为病弱的暹罗猫

至 40~50 泰铢兑 1 美元，最终迫使泰国于 1997 年 7 月 2 日宣布泰铢贬值。外债以泰铢计价时规模实际翻倍，致使大量负有外债的企业因无法偿债而破产。^[9] 泰国由此陷入国际媒体所称的“冬阴功危机”，曾经的“亚洲第五小龙”就此沦为病弱的暹罗猫。

七、向国际货币基金组织求援

泰国外汇储备的急剧萎缩严重削弱了其货币发行能力——由于美元储备不足以支撑本币，政府无法印制足够的泰铢满足国内支出需求。迫于形势，泰国政府不得不向国际货币基金组织及其他国家求援：其中直接向国际货币基金组织借款 40 亿美元，另从中国香港和日本、马来西亚、世界银行、亚洲开发银行、澳大利亚、新加坡、印尼及韩国等渠道通过国际货币基金组织统借 132 亿美元，贷款总额达 172 亿美元。^[10] 这笔援助附带四项严苛条件^[11]：

（一）实现 1997~1998 年 3% 的 GDP 增长率；

（二）首年将通胀控制在 7%~8%，次年降至 4%~5%；

（三）1997 年将经常账户赤字压缩至 GDP 的 5%；

（四）外汇储备不得低于 1997 年 230 亿美元、1998 年 250 亿美元。

为抑制通胀，国际货币基金组织要求泰国实施财政盈余政策并提高增值税（VAT）。这些措施导致政府支出缩减与民生成本上升，在经济衰退中形成双重打击：私营部门投资骤降、失业率攀升、购买力萎缩。这一做法完全背离凯恩斯理论——该理论主张经济下行期应通过增加政府支出或投资（赤字财政政策）来刺激经济，而非国际货币基金组织推崇的财政

盈余。

从政治经济学视角看，危机根源在于金融自由化与过度外债引发货币供给激增，催生房地产等领域的投机泡沫。资产市场交换价值虚高，实际使用价值却未同步提升。更严重的是，外部金融资本仅追逐短期套利而不投入实体经济，制造虚假繁荣后抽离资金，直接导致泰国经济崩盘。虽然这些是私人资本市场的固有缺陷，但国际货币基金组织的救助条件无疑雪上加霜——通过四项严苛条款将危机代价转嫁给泰国政府。

这些条件最终演变为普通民众的生存重负：生活成本高涨、失业潮蔓延、企业大规模倒闭。与此同时，外资却得以抄底收购泰国折价资产：以美国高盛为代表的金融公司大举进场，通过低价收购资产再转售给国内外企业获取暴利。在此过程中，国际货币基金组织实质上充当了新经济殖民主义的制度推手，为跨国资本掠夺泰国资产提供了合法性外衣。

八、超越新世界秩序霸权的经济替代路径

自二战结束以来，新世界秩序长期由国际货币基金组织、世界银行及美国主导。这三方势力将影响力渗透至包括泰国在内的整个资本主义世界，最终导致泰国陷入国际货币基金组织的债务陷阱。1999 年国际雇员与技术人员联合会在马来西亚吉隆坡举办经济危机研讨会时，我曾主张亚洲国家应逐步摆脱对美国、国际货币基金组织及世界银行的依赖，并提出具体建议^[12]：

（一）扩大亚洲内部贸易：加强亚洲大陆各国之间的贸易往来，促进区域经济一体化发展。通过建立更紧密的供应链网络和区

域贸易协定，减少对西方市场的依赖。

(二) 推行本币贸易结算：逐步减少对美元的依赖，在双边贸易中使用本地货币进行结算。例如，泰国可用泰铢从马来西亚进口商品，马来西亚则用林吉特通过货币互换协议购买泰国产品，从而增强双边贸易流动性。尽管该提议曾遭部分泰国学者批评，认为其阻碍全球化进程且反资本主义，但事实证明中国目前已与数十个国家成功实践这一模式，建立了成熟的本币结算体系。

(三) 创设亚洲货币基金组织（AMF）：建立区域性金融互助机制，为成员国提供流动性支持。该构想与现已成立的亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB）理念相通，旨在构建更平等的国际金融架构。此类机制不仅能增强亚洲国家应对金融危机的能力，更能打破传统国际金融机构的垄断地位，推动国际货币体系多元化发展。

危机前泰国经济年均增长率维持在7%左右，而危机后这一数字已降至约3%。为此，我主张推动经济结构转型以降低出口依赖度——这一调整具有双重紧迫性：一方面泰国工业出口品竞争力薄弱且过度依赖跨国公司；另一方面当前十年间，泰国不仅面临贸易战与经济两极化的挑战，更遭受美国政府关税威胁（如部分泰国商品被课以36%关税，美方认定其供应链源自中国而意图削弱中国贸易优势）。

基于此，本文提出以“三个平衡”与“三种共享”为基石的新型经济体系。三个平衡指：

(一) 内外市场再平衡：泰国必须降低对出口的依赖。在中美贸易战导致国际贸易受限的背景下，我们应转向更倚重国内市场，力求实现外部市场与内部市场对经济贡

献度的50:50均衡。

(二) 家户经济与企业经济协调：提升内需市场依赖度必然要求重视家户经济——因为国内购买力根本来源于普通民众收入。必须重新调整发展重心，使家户经济获得与企业经济同等的战略地位。家户经济是创造购买力的核心引擎：2023年泰国家户消费占GDP比重高达58%，而私营企业投资仅占17%，政府支出与投资占23%，净国际贸易顺差（出口减进口）贡献仅2%。

(三) 竞争与共享融合：在强化家户经济过程中，鉴于家户天然的竞争劣势，政府不能放任其单独与企业抗衡。必须为家户构建“共享型经济”机制，确保生产要素公平分配，并保障家户产出获得合理的市场份额。因此，经济体系需要妥善平衡竞争原则与共享机制。

三种共享，即为实现共享型经济，需建立以下三位一体的制度体系：

(一) 权力共享：特指参与制定国家经济政策及立法过程的话语权，确保家户经济权益能通过制度性安排获得保障。

(二) 机会共享：涵盖教育、信息资源、技术转移等发展要素的公平获取，以及体面就业与创收机会的平等分配。

(三) 市场共享：从事生产活动的家户必须享有实质性的市场准入权，并能在目标市场中获得有意义的份额占比。

这一“三个平衡、三种共享”的新型经济架构，将助力泰国提升自主发展能力，降低对外部势力的依附性。该体系旨在使泰国审慎疏离美国、国际货币基金组织及世界银行的过度影响，在承认现有合作关系的同时，着力削弱过度依赖，防止泰国重蹈覆辙，再次被这三大势力过度支配本国的经济与政治体系。

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The Route of Modern Economic Development of Thailand

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Keywords: Post-war Thai Economy; Asian Financial Crisis; Shared Economy

1. Introduction

Following World War II, the United States emerged as the world's preeminent superpower. This ascendancy was largely due to the debilitated state of traditional colonial powers like Great Britain and France, both severely weakened by the war. Consequently, the United States, along with institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), began to exert significant influence over Thailand's political economy. In brief, the trajectory of Thailand's post-World War II political economic development has largely followed the path below:

- 1949 Member of World Bank
- 1950 Loan of World Bank
- 1950 CIA support Thai government
- 1957 Supervision of USA government and World Bank
- 1958 Dictator General Sarit Thanarat
- 1961 Economic development plan (5 years plan)
- 1961~1971 Import substitution Industries
- 1972~present Export oriented Industries
- 1990s Financial liberalization under IMF supervision Washington Consensus
- 1997 Financial crisis (Tom Yum Kung)
- 2000~2024 Slow growth (3.18% by coverage)

2. Containing Soviet Influence: The Rationale Behind the IMF and IBRD

During World War II, in June 1941, Germany launched its invasion of the Soviet Union. However, by winter, the Nazi forces became bogged down in the snow, unable to advance. The Soviet army counterattacked, leading to German defeat. Seizing this opportunity, the Soviets pressed on, engaging in further military action and subsequently transforming the political systems of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and East Germany into Soviet-style socialist states. These nations adopted centrally planned economies, abolished capitalism, and eliminated market mechanisms.

It should be noted that, during the war between German and Soviet, USA wanted to eliminate the Nazi, then, supported Soviet by means of Lend and Lease program. (An Act to Promote the Defense of the United State). Soviet gained the support from USA to strengthen

its arm force and was able to conquer NAZI Troop finally.

In December 1941, the United States entered the war on the Allied side. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR, established in 1921), recognized the Soviet Union as a growing threat to capitalism. With Soviet influence already dominating Eastern Europe, the CFR concluded that failure to contain this influence would jeopardize capitalism in Western Europe and the United States. Consequently, the CFR proposed that the U.S. establish a “Grand Area”—an expansive capitalist sphere aimed at securing the prosperity of American capitalism. This Grand Area was envisioned to encompass Europe, its various colonies, and even China and Japan ^[1].

Economically, the CFR advocated for the creation of multinational official agencies to serve as economic drivers within this Grand Area. This plan was presented to President F.D. Roosevelt, who approved it and tasked Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White with its implementation. In March 1942, White drafted plans for the establishment of the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also known as the World Bank (WB). Subsequently, in 1944, an international conference of 44 nations was convened at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA, to propose the formation of these two organizations. The conference agreed to the proposals, leading to the establishment of the IMF in 1945 and the IBRD in 1946. ^[2] These institutions were created to ensure the stability and smooth functioning of the Grand Area’s operations. Hence, New World Order under the domination of USA, IMF, and WB has emerged.

To safeguard the Grand Area within Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established. In Southeast Asia, beyond its designation as part of the Grand Area, the United States identified the region’s strategic raw materials, including rare earth minerals, tin, lead, wolfram, and rubber. Crucially, it also recognized the burgeoning socialist revolutionary movements in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. To protect the Grand Area and counter these socialist revolutions in Indochina, the United States orchestrated the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), of which Thailand became a member.

3. Thailand Under the Influence of the World Bank

Upon its establishment in 1946, the World Bank soon welcomed Thailand as its 47th member in 1949. Thailand secured its inaugural World Bank loan of \$3 million in 1950, allocated for railway infrastructure development. Subsequently, from 1955 onwards, the World Bank and the United States, primarily through the United States Operation Mission (USOM), incrementally expanded their political and economic footprint within Thailand, and campaigned for anti-communism by USIS (United State Information Service).

The U.S. Diplomatic and Economic Engagement Document No. 504 from the Office of the Historian in 1956, comprising telegraphic communications between the U.S. Embassy in Thailand and the U.S. Department of State, illuminates the multifaceted political and economic roles the United States played in Thailand. For instance, a telegram details U.S. attempts to facilitate a \$46 million World Bank loan for Thai irrigation dam development, alongside discussions about the U.S. constructing a road linking Bangkok to Laos. These interventions underscore a strategic interest in shaping Thailand’s development trajectory. In this context someone perceived Thailand as the semi – colony of USA. ^[3]

An Intelligence Report No. 7503 from the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) reveals that the World Bank undertook a study on Thailand's economic development in 1957, titled "Probable Development in Thailand." This report, issued in the twilight of Prime Minister Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram's administration, advocated for a limited governmental role, primarily confined to fostering private enterprise. However, Field Marshal Plaek's government was characterized by a prevalence of state-owned enterprises, which led him to resist fully adopting these recommendations.

The author posits that this policy divergence likely contributed to the United States' withdrawal of support for Field Marshal Plaek's government, despite earlier fervent backing driven by their shared objective of countering communism. For instance, an AP news report by Stanley Swington indicated that following the 1947 coup led by Field Marshal Plaek, the U.S. provided \$3 million in aid, contingent on the Thai government granting the U.S. access to its military bases. Moreover, during the 1950s, the CIA, operating through Sea Supply Company, funneled financial support to Police General Phao Sriyanon to strengthen police forces and established police parachute units for anti-communist operations in provincial areas. Nevertheless, Field Marshal Plaek's reluctance to fully embrace private capital development prompted the United States to pivot its support to Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the Army Commander, who had consistently been a close associate of Field Marshal Plaek. This shift illustrates the intricate interplay between economic policy, geopolitical interests, and the evolution of political alliances.

4. The Development of Modern Capitalism Under US and World Bank Influence

On September 16, 1957, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat staged a coup d'état, seizing power from Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram. Subsequently, new elections were held on December 15, 1957, with General Thanom Kittikachorn, a close associate of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, becoming Prime Minister. Field Marshal Sarit then traveled to the United



Field Marshal Plaek resisted fully adopting the World Bank's recommendations of limiting governmental role.

States, where he met with President Eisenhower and other high-ranking US government officials. These negotiations focused on anti-communism and economic development aligned with American capitalism ^[4]. On October 20, 1958, Field Marshal Sarit executed another coup, establishing a full-fledged authoritarian state.

Revolutionary Council Announcement No. 4, consequently, declared the government's stance on anti-communism. Furthermore, Revolutionary Council Announcement No. 11, Article 4, mandated the establishment of the National Economic Development Board ^[5]. Concurrently, labor unions were banned, based on the perception that they harbored communist elements ^[6]. The philosophy and direction of economic development were clearly articulated upon the launch of the economic development plan: the government would promote private enterprise and refrain from direct economic involvement, instead channeling state resources into various projects ^[7]. In essence, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat adhered to the recommendations of the United States regarding both anti-communism and the development of an American-style capitalist economic system.

The First (1961~1966) and Second (1967~1971) National Economic Development Plans heavily emphasized Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). This strategy involved granting tax privileges and protecting domestically produced goods through tariff barriers, known as Promotion and Protection Policies. However, ISI-based industries primarily relied on the domestic market, and insufficient internal purchasing power, due to extremely low incomes for farmers and workers (e.g., laborers earning only 8 baht per day), ultimately limited the growth potential of import substitution industries.

The inherent limitations in the growth rate of import substitution industries prompted advisors from the United States and the World Bank to recommend a strategic shift for the Thai government towards Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI), beginning with the Third National Economic Development Plan (1972~1976) onwards.

Thailand's strategy for fostering the growth of its export-oriented industries relied on low-price competitiveness in the global market, primarily achieved by suppressing wages to reduce costs, rather than focusing on technological development or enhancing product quality. This approach led to inherent limitations in EOI growth. Thailand became overly reliant on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) for technological and quality advancements, yet TNCs were reluctant to transfer technology. As the world transitioned into the digital age, Thailand faced a shortage of high-tech export goods. Furthermore, high transportation costs, due to the absence of its own shipping lines, further constrained EOI.

Notably, EOI did not improve Thailand's trade balance. For instance, in 1976 (end of the Third Plan), the trade deficit was 9,531 million baht; in 1981 (end of the Fourth Plan), it widened to 65,843 million baht; in 1986 (end of the Fifth Plan), it reached 89,128 million baht ^[8], and the last, in 2023, the trade deficit was increased to 302,925 million baht.

5. Financial Liberalization Under IMF Recommendations

In the 1990s, the IMF advised Thailand that it could achieve economic growth through its financial system. They recommended that Thailand adhere to Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, which mandates financial liberalization. The rationale was that if Thailand

allowed for free capital flow, the Thai baht would become a regional trading currency in ASEAN, transforming Thailand into a regional financial powerhouse, thereby fostering economic growth and prosperity. Hence, Thai government dreamed of being the fifth economic tiger in Asia.

In May 1990, the Thai government followed the IMF's advice. Subsequently, in 1993, the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) was established to facilitate international money transfers. This initiative was designed to incentivize domestic financial institutions to rapidly and easily borrow funds from abroad (flow in).

Thai private sector entities borrowed these funds primarily for three main purposes: borrowing at annual interest rates of 3~4% and depositing them at 7~8% interest in Thailand; investing short-term loans (approximately 65% of foreign loans) into the burgeoning real estate market, which was rife with speculation and excessive profit-taking; and investing in the equally booming stock market. Notably, approximately 80% of these inbound loans were from the private sector, not the government.

Accompanying the boom in Thailand's financial sector was a critical lack of adequate exchange rate stabilization measures and insufficient safeguards against large and rapid capital outflows, which led to exchange rate volatility. There was also a failure to adequately assess the necessity of foreign borrowing, resulting in excessive private sector debt. Furthermore, the imprudent practice of taking short-term loans for long-term investments meant that revenues could not be generated quickly enough to meet short-term debt obligations.

In summary, the government was swayed by the IMF's recommendations, focusing solely on the perceived benefits without implementing adequate measures to mitigate potential downsides. There was insufficient preparation of institutional infrastructure, such as appropriate policies, laws, and effective regulatory bodies, to manage and prevent risks and losses. In economics, every action has trade-offs; gaining something often entails losing something else. Therefore, the economic imperative is to prevent losses from outweighing gains. However, without awareness and proactive preparation, the negative consequences can indeed exceed the benefits, as evidenced by the 1997 "Tom Yum Kung" financial crisis in Thailand.

6. The Tom Yum Kung Crisis

Under the IMF's Article VIII obligations, commercial banks and finance companies were granted the freedom to engage in unrestricted capital inflows and outflows, bypassing the prior approval process from the Bank of Thailand. Foreigners could also directly deposit foreign currency into Thai commercial banks without converting it into Thai baht. This led to a significant influx of foreign deposits, attracted by high Thai interest rates of 7~8% annually, compared to only 2~3% in foreign banks.

In 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was established. The SEC permitted large companies listed on the stock exchange to borrow directly from abroad, leading to substantial foreign borrowing by these firms due to significantly lower interest rates compared to those in Thailand. As a result, private sector debt rapidly escalated to 80% of total foreign

debt. The majority of these borrowed funds were short-term loans (under one year), with a substantial portion being channeled into long-term investments in the booming real estate sector.

The rapid expansion of the real estate business led to an oversupply, causing a slowdown in property sales and diminishing revenue collection. This made it difficult for businesses to meet their short-term debt obligations. Creditors consequently lost confidence, leading to a sharp decline in the stock prices of these real estate companies. This, in turn, dragged down the financial institutions that had lent to these real estate firms. When the SEC determined that it could no longer allow the stock prices of these financial companies to continue plummeting, it announced a suspension of trading in their shares on the stock exchange. This triggered a bank run, as depositors rushed to withdraw their money from financial institutions. Ultimately, smaller banks and numerous finance companies, facing massive withdrawals, were forced into bankruptcy.

By late 1996, three small banks and 18 finance companies were ordered to close. In March 1997, another 10 were shut down, followed by 16 in June 1997, and a staggering 42 in August 1997. In total, 86 finance companies were closed, plunging Thailand into a genuine financial institutional crisis. The consequences of this financial crisis included:

(1) Withdrawal of foreign currency deposits: Foreign depositors withdrew their funds from banks and finance companies, converting them into US dollars and repatriating them.

(2) Domestic capital flight: Wealthy Thais also withdrew their funds, converting them into US dollars and depositing them in overseas accounts.

(3) Foreign portfolio divestment: Foreign capital invested in the stock market sold off their shares, converted Thai baht into US dollars, and exited the country.

These three factors led to a rapid depletion of Thailand's international reserves, which dwindled to only \$2,850 million in 1997^[9]. Confidence in the Thai baht rapidly eroded. While the official exchange rate was 25 baht to 1 US dollar, the black market rate soared to 40~50 baht per dollar leading to devaluation of baht on 2 July 1997. The value of foreign debt, when converted into baht, effectively doubled, leading to the bankruptcy of major companies with foreign debt obligations that they could no longer meet. Thailand thus entered a severe economic crisis, which international media dubbed the "Tom Yum Kung Crisis." Then, fifth economic tiger became disable Siamese cat, finally.

7. Borrowing from the IMF

The drastic reduction in Thailand's international reserves severely curtailed its ability to print sufficient baht for domestic expenditure, as the dollar reserves backing the currency became inadequate. Consequently, the Thai government was compelled to borrow from the IMF and other nations. This involved \$4 billion directly from the IMF and an additional \$13.2 billion collectively from Japan, China, Malaysia, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Korea. This collective loan had to be lent through IMF and the total loan was \$17.2 billion^[10]. This assistance came with four stringent IMF conditions^[11]:

- (1) Achieve 3% GDP growth in 1997~1998
- (2) Maintain inflation at 7~8% in the first year, reducing it to 4~5% in subsequent years
- (3) Reduce the current account deficit to 5% of GDP in 1997
- (4) Maintain international reserves no lower than \$23 billion in 1997 and \$25 billion in 1998.

To control inflation, the IMF proposed implementing a surplus budget and increasing the Value Added Tax (VAT). These measures led to reduced government spending and increased living costs, even as the economy was in decline. Private sector investment plummeted, unemployment rose, and purchasing power diminished. This approach directly contradicted J.M. Keynes's theory, which advocates for increased government spending or investment (a deficit budget policy) to stimulate the economy during a downturn, rather than the IMF's recommended surplus budget.

From a political economy perspective, the crisis stemmed from financial liberalization and excessive foreign borrowing, which fueled a rapid increase in the money supply and led to speculative bubbles, particularly in the real estate market. The market exchange value surged, but the actual use value of assets did not. This was exacerbated by external financial capital seeking short-term profits without investing in the real sector, creating a temporary economic boom. When this financial capital withdrew, the Thai economy collapsed. While these were inherent flaws of the private capitalist market system, the IMF's measures arguably exacerbated the situation by imposing conditions that burdened the Thai government.

These conditions shifted the burden onto the general populace through higher living costs, increased unemployment, and widespread business failures. This also created opportunities for foreign capital to acquire distressed assets in Thailand at significantly reduced prices. Notably, financial firms like Goldman Sachs from the USA entered the market, purchasing assets and reselling them to both Thai and international companies for enormous profits. In this light, the IMF effectively acted as a mechanism facilitating a form of neo-economic colonialism in Thailand.

8. Alternative Paths for Economic Development Beyond New World Order Hegemony

Since the end of World War II, the New World Order has largely been governed by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States. The pervasive influence of these three entities has extended across the capitalist world, including Thailand, ultimately leading to Thailand's indebtedness to the IMF. During the 1999 Federation of International Employees and Technicians (FIET) organized the conference on the economic crisis in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, I proposed that Asian nations should increasingly distance themselves from the USA, IMF, and WB. Specifically, I suggested ^[12]:

(1) Expanding intra-Asian trade: Foster greater trade among countries within the Asian continent.

(2) Utilizing local currencies for trade: Reduce reliance on the US dollar by conducting trade in local currencies. For example, Thailand could use the baht to purchase goods from Malaysia, and Malaysia could use the ringgit to buy goods from Thailand through currency

swaps. This would enhance liquidity in bilateral trade. While this proposal faced criticism from some Thai academics who viewed it as obstructing globalization and being anti-capitalist, China has, in fact, adopted this strategy with dozens of countries in the present day.

(3) Establishing an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF): Create a regional monetary fund to provide mutual financial assistance among Asian nations. This concept is similar to the currently established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Prior to the economic crisis, Thailand's economic growth averaged approximately 7% annually. However, since the crisis, this average has fallen to roughly 3% per year. Therefore, I propose restructuring the economy to reduce reliance on exports. This is critical because Thailand's industrial exports possess low competitive potential and are overly dependent on multinational corporations (TNCs). Furthermore, in the current decade, Thailand faces challenges from trade wars and economic bipolarity, alongside threats from the US government regarding tariff imposition. Thai goods, for instance, are subjected to a 36% tariff because the United States perceives many of them as having supply chains originating in China, and the US aims to eliminate China's trade advantages.

Therefore, I propose an economic system predicated on "three balances" and "three forms of sharing" :

Three Balances

(1) Rebalancing External and Internal Markets: Thailand must lessen its dependence on exports. Given the constraints in international trade due to the US-China trade war, we should pivot towards greater reliance on the domestic market, aiming for a 50:50 split between external and internal market contributions.

(2) Harmonizing Household and Business Economies: Increased reliance on the domestic market necessitates a greater emphasis on the household economy, as domestic purchasing



Since the economic crisis, Thailand's economic growth has fallen from roughly 7% to 3% per year.

power originates from general public income. Therefore, we must recalibrate our focus, giving the household economy parity with the business economy. The household economy serves as the primary engine for generating purchasing power, with Thai household consumption contributing a substantial 58% of total GDP in 2023. In contrast, private business investment accounts for only 17% of GDP, while government spending and investment contribute 23%, and the net international trade balance (exports minus imports) adds a mere 2%.

(3) Integrating Competition and Sharing: As we bolster the household economy, the government cannot simply allow households to compete unaided against businesses, given households' inherent competitive disadvantage. The government must foster an economy of sharing for households, ensuring the equitable distribution of factors of production and guaranteeing household output a fair market share. The economic system must, therefore, appropriately balance competition with sharing.


Three Forms of Sharing

To achieve an economy of sharing, we must establish a three-pronged system:

(1) Sharing of Power: This specifically refers to the power to shape state economic policy and to enact legislation that benefits the household economy.

(2) Sharing of Opportunities: This encompasses equitable access to education, information, technology transfer, and opportunities for dignified employment and income generation.

(3) Sharing of Markets: Households that produce goods must have effective access to markets and be able to secure a meaningful market share within those markets.

This proposed economic structure, dubbed the “Three Balances, Three Forms of Sharing” system, would enable Thailand to enhance its self-reliance and reduce its dependency on foreign powers. It aims to prudently distance Thailand from the disproportionate influence of the USA, IMF, and WB. While acknowledging existing relationships and networks, this approach seeks to diminish undue reliance and prevent these three entities from excessively dominating Thailand's economic and political systems, a pattern observed in the past. 

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[摘要]

印尼的减贫困境揭示了“共享贫困”文化传统与现代发展之间的深层矛盾。这一文化机制源于殖民历史与本土适应，通过风险共担抑制了创新与资本积累，形成“低水平均衡陷阱”。破解困境需转向“文化-制度协同演化”路径，将传统互助网络转化为发展动力。实践表明，伊斯兰金融与村社互助的融合、数字技术赋能的文化适应等创新模式，能够激活传统文化中的发展潜能。印尼的探索为全球南方国家提供了重要启示：减贫政策必须尊重文化内生性，通过制度重构实现“共享发展”转型。中印尼合作案例进一步证明，基于文化尊重的南南合作能有效促进技术-文化融合，为全球减贫治理提供新范式。

从“共享贫困”到“共享发展”： 印尼减贫的新范式*

[中国] 潘 玥

关键词：文化-制度协同演化 共享发展 低水平均衡陷阱

印尼作为东南亚最大的经济体，在近十年来几乎保持年均 5% 经济增长的同时，贫困率始终徘徊在 9% 左右，农村 11.79% 的贫困率显著高于城市的 7.09%，^[1] 形成独特的“增长-贫困”二元困境。这一现象背后，蕴含着克利福德·格尔茨揭示的“共享贫困”文化传统：爪哇农村通过劳动细分与收入均等维持社会均衡，却导致生产内卷化与创新抑制。^[2] 印尼减贫政策的系统性失效，根源在于将文化视为发展的外生变量，忽视了“共享贫困”文化中蕴含的发展潜能。这种理论盲点不仅存在于印尼，更是全球南方国家面临的共同挑战：如何在破坏文化根基的前提下，激活传统文化中的发展动力，实现从“共享贫困”向“共享发展”的转型。

一、“共享贫困”的文化逻辑与发展困境

从历史来看，印尼“共享贫困”文化的形成与发展困境，并非简单的传统文化遗留问题，而是殖民历史、国家建设与全球化进程交互作用的复杂结果。

（一）历史根源：殖民遗产与文化适应

印尼“共享贫困”文化的形成与荷兰殖民统治密切相关。殖民者实施的“强制种植制度”要求爪哇农民将 20% 的土地用于种植出口作物，^[3] 这一制度重组了当地生产关系，迫使农村社区发展出集体应对压力的互助机制。在资源被剥夺的背景下，爪哇农民通过细化农业生产流程，创造更多劳动参与机会，形成了格尔茨所描述的“农

业内卷化”现象。^[4]

这种适应性文化机制在历史进程中不断强化。独立后的苏加诺时期，“共享贫困”文化与国家建设的民族主义叙事相结合，将爪哇传统互助精神（gotong royong）上升为国家意识形态。苏哈托新秩序时期，国家通过威权庇护体系将这一机制纳入政治控制框架，形成了“从上而下的共享”模式。这种历史演进使“共享贫困”文化与现代官僚体系形成共生关系，一方面缓解了社会不满，另一方面却强化了资源均等化分配的惯性。

（二）文化机制：风险共担与发展内卷

“共享贫困”并非简单的平均主义，而是包含风险共担、互惠义务与声望经济的复杂价值系统。这一文化机制运作的核心在于将个体理性行为嵌入集体利益框架，通过社会压力和道德约束实现资源的再分配。

在爪哇农村，当个人收入超过社区平

均水平时，往往面临更高的互助期待和社会压力。这种“成功惩罚”机制使理性个体倾向于将盈余转化为社会资本而非生产性投资，通过大型婚礼、宗教仪式等炫耀型消费来满足社会期待。从经济学角度看，这是一种基于不确定性环境的风险分散策略，但其代价是抑制了个体的创新激励和资本积累。

这种文化机制在当代表现为三个层面的发展困境：一是土地持续细碎化，平均农户耕地面积从1983年的0.5公顷降至2019年的0.2公顷，^[5]规模经济效应难以实现；二是非正规就业高度普遍化，近60%的劳动力集中在非正规部门，劳动生产率仅为正规部门的三分之一；^[6]三是传统互助网络承担社会保障功能，但其局限性日益凸显，互助范围有限、资源动员能力不足、风险分散不充分。

更深层的问题在于“共享贫困”文化形成了一种“低水平均衡陷阱”：个体理性行为导致集体次优结果，而集体行为模



印尼“共享贫困”的文化机制在当代带来了土地细碎化等发展困境

式又强化了个体的保守策略。这种文化 - 经济互锁机制，使得外部政策干预往往收效甚微，甚至产生意外的负面效应。

二、文化 - 制度协同演化的理论突破

要理解印尼减贫困境的深层机制，必须跳出传统发展理论的分析框架，构建文化与制度互动的动态分析模型。现有减贫理论往往陷入文化决定论与文化工具论的二元对立：前者将文化视为发展的固定约束，认为传统文化必然阻碍现代化进程；后者将文化简化为政策工具，忽视其内在逻辑和自主性。这种二元思维忽视了文化的动态性和内生性，无法解释为何相同的减贫政策在不同文化背景下产生迥异效果。

事实上，文化既非纯粹的约束变量，也非简单的工具变量，而是发展过程中的内生变量。文化塑造着人们的偏好结构、行为模式和制度预期，同时也在实践中不断调适和重构。关键问题不是文化是否阻碍发展，而是如何在尊重文化逻辑的基础上，引导其向有利于发展的方向演化。基于在印尼田野调查的实证研究，我提出“文化 - 制度协同演化模型”：文化与制度并非对立关系，而是动态互构的共生系统。文化为制度提供合法性基础和运行逻辑，制度为文化提供表达载体和实践平台。在此框架下，“共享贫困”文化中的互助精神、风险共担意识与社区认同等元素，恰可转化为包容性增长的文化资本。关键在于通过制度设计，将传统互助网络从“均等化分散”转向“互助式积累”，使“共享”从生存策略升华为发展动力。

三、制度重构的实践路径

基于文化 - 制度协同演化的理论，印尼

减贫政策必须建立在尊重文化逻辑的基础上，创造性地融合传统资源与现代要素，形成具有本土特色的发展模式。

（一）伊斯兰金融与村社互助的创新融合

印尼作为全球最大的伊斯兰国家，伊斯兰金融体系具有独特的发展潜能。截至2024年，印尼伊斯兰银行资产达980.30兆印尼盾，年增长率保持在20%以上，^[7]但其在农村地区的渗透率仍然有限，大量小农户仍被排斥在正规金融体系之外。

这种金融排斥的根源不仅在于地理距离和交易成本，更在于现有金融产品与农村文化逻辑的不匹配。传统银行的个人信贷模式与村社集体决策传统存在张力，抵押担保要求与土地集体所有制产生冲突，标准化产品设计忽视了农业生产的季节性特征。通过将传统村社互助组织（*arisan*）转型为合作社组织，并与伊斯兰金融机构建立伙伴关系，可以构建符合文化逻辑的普惠金融体系。这种模式的核心在于将现代金融科技嵌入传统社会网络，既保持了村社互助的文化内核，又提升了资源配置效率。在中爪哇实施的“村社资源互助银行”试点项目中，通过将传统的“轮流储蓄互助组”改造为正规合作金融机构，不仅提高了农户获取金融服务的便利性，更激活了社区成员的共同发展意识。项目实施两年来，参与农户的储蓄率显著提高，生产性投资明显增长，社区内部的经济合作网络也得到显著强化。

（二）数字技术赋能的文化适应

数字普惠金融正成为缩小农村资源获取鸿沟的关键工具。根据印尼中央统计局2023年数据，印尼手机普及率为67.29%，智能手机用户达1.7亿人，^[8]为数字金融服务下沉农村创造了基础条件。

然而，传统金融排斥与数字鸿沟的双重障碍，要求数字普惠金融的发展必须充分考虑文化适应性。

单纯的技术移植往往面临文化排斥和使用障碍。农村用户对数字支付的信任度偏低，操作复杂的金融 APP 难以被中老年群体接受，标准化的数字产品无法满足多样化的农村需求。这些问题的根源在于忽视了技术应用的文化环境，将技术视为价值中性的工具。

“宗教领袖 + 数字平台”的减贫干预模式代表了文化 - 技术融合的创新方向。在印尼伊斯兰社区中，宗教领袖（ulama）和伊斯兰寄宿学校（pesantren）拥有极高的社会信任度和动员能力，是连接传统与现代的重要桥梁。将这一传统权威结构与现代数字平台相结合，可以形成文化认同与技术赋能的协同效应。

实地调研发现，由伊斯兰寄宿学校主导的数字创业培训项目，比政府直接干预更能激发社区参与热情。这些项目通过将伊斯兰商业伦理与现代商业技能相结合，不仅提升了参与者的技术能力，更重要的是增强了他们的文化自信。项目对女性和青年群体的覆盖也更为有效，因为宗教网络为他们提供了参与经济活动的文化正当性。

四、南南合作的实践意义与全球启示

印尼减贫的文化转型实践，不仅具有本土价值，更在全球南方国家的发展合作中展现出重要的示范意义。

（一）中印尼减贫合作的范式价值

中印尼减贫合作代表了全球南方国家互学互鉴的典范，其成功经验超越了传统的技术转移模式，体现了基于文化理解的

发展合作新范式。

2005 年起，印尼政府采取“政府全额埋单、农民报名领取”的杂交水稻推广政策，90% 以上的杂交水稻种子采购自中国。^[9]然而，纯粹的技术推广效果有限，真正的突破来自技术与文化网络的有机结合。当杂交水稻技术通过村社互助网络传播，并结合伊斯兰小额信贷支持种子购买时，农户采纳率显著提高。

2019 ~ 2021 年间，在中爪哇实施的“伊斯兰农业合作社 + 杂交水稻”综合项目，使参与农户产量得到了提高，每公顷净收入也有所增加。^[10]更重要的是，这一项目改变了传统“共享贫困”中的劳动密集型耕作模式，通过引入现代农业技术和管理方法，实现了从“共享贫困”向“共享发展”的转型。

该项目的成功在于将技术创新与文化网络相结合，使村社互助从简单的收入平均化转向生产资源的优化配置。合作社不仅是技术推广的载体，更是文化转型的平台，通过集体学习和共同实践，逐步改变了农民的生产观念和行为习惯。这种变化的深层意义在于，传统互助文化向现代合作经济的功能转化，为印尼农村发展注入了新的活力。

（二）构建文化尊重型发展援助模式

传统的发展援助往往基于西方中心主义的现代化假设，忽视受援国的文化特殊性，导致援助效果不佳甚至产生负面后果。中印尼合作的成功在于构建了文化尊重型发展援助模式：不是简单的技术移植，而是基于对印尼文化逻辑的深入理解，设计符合本土需求的合作方案。

这种模式体现在三个层面：首先，教育合作建立中印尼减贫学院，培养熟悉两国文化和减贫经验的专业人才，为长期合

作奠定人才基础；其次，农业合作不仅引入中国的杂交水稻技术，更重要的是借鉴中国小农户与现代农业有机衔接的制度创新经验；最后，文化产业合作共同开发将传统文化转化为经济资产的创新模式，如伊斯兰金融产品设计、文化旅游开发等。

这种基于文化尊重和发展互惠的南南合作，超越了传统的援助 - 依赖范式，建立了平等互利的伙伴关系。它不仅促进了技术和经验的双向流动，更重要的是为全球南方国家探索自主发展道路提供了有益借鉴。

五、全球南方的发展范式创新

印尼的实践表明，文化与发展之间并非零和关系，而是可以实现互利共赢的。关键在于找到文化遗产与现代发展的平衡点，通过制度创新实现两者的有机结合。这种发展模式的理论价值在于打破了传统发展理论中的文化 - 经济二元对立，提出了文化变量内生化的分析框架。

在此框架下，文化不仅是发展的背景条件，更是发展的内在变量和潜在动力。如何在破坏文化根基的前提下，激活传统文化中的发展潜能，将看似阻滞发展的文化要素转化为包容性增长的社会资本，这是全球南方国家面临的共同挑战。

从“共享贫困”到“共享发展”的转型实践，为全球南方国家提供了在保持文化自主性的同时推动包容性发展的重要启示。这种发展模式的推广，需要南南合作提供有力支撑。南南合作的优势在于合作伙伴具有相似的历史经验和文化背景，更容易理解和尊重彼此的发展需求。与传统的南北合作相比，南南合作更加注重平等互利，

避免了文化霸权和发展依赖问题。

中印尼减贫合作的成功经验表明，基于文化尊重和发展互惠的南南合作，能够有效促进技术和经验的双向流动，建立平等互利的发展伙伴关系。这种合作模式不仅有利于参与国的发展，更重要的是为构建更加公平、包容的全球发展秩序提供了重要借鉴。

结语：文化转型的辩证路径

印尼减贫政策的文化张力与制度重构，揭示了全球南方国家面临的根本性挑战：如何在现代化进程中保持文化自主性，如何将传统文化资源转化为发展动力。这一探索超越了传统发展理论的局限性，提出了文化 - 制度协同演化的新范式。

文化转型的关键在于“嫁接”而非“替代”。这不是简单的技术移植，而是在保留文化根系的基础上，通过制度创新引导其生长方向。它要求我们既要尊重文化的历史传承，又要适应时代发展的要求；既要保持文化的独特性，又要增强其包容性和开放性。

在共建人类命运共同体的全球视野下，立足本土文化、面向全球发展的减贫路径探索，正是构建更加公平、包容世界的关键所在。印尼的转型实践，不仅具有重要的理论价值，更为全球减贫治理提供了崭新的思路和方案。文化多样性不是发展的障碍，而是人类文明进步的重要动力。只有在尊重文化差异的基础上，才能实现真正的包容性发展，构建更加美好的世界。在这个意义上，印尼的减贫探索不仅是一个国家的发展实践，更是全人类共同追求美好生活的重要组成部分。

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From “Shared Poverty” to “Shared Development”: Indonesia’s New Paradigm of Poverty Alleviation*

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Keywords: culture–institution co-evolution, shared development, low-level equilibrium trap

As the largest economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has maintained an average annual GDP growth rate of nearly 5% over the past decade. Yet its poverty rate has remained stagnant at around 9%, with rural poverty (11.79%) significantly higher than in urban areas (7.09%),^[1] revealing a unique “growth–poverty” dual dilemma. Underpinning this phenomenon is the cultural tradition of “shared poverty,” as revealed by Clifford Geertz: Javanese rural communities maintain social equilibrium through labor segmentation and income equalization, which, however, leads to production involution and innovation suppression.^[2] The systemic failure of Indonesia’s poverty alleviation policies stems from the prevailing theoretical framework, which treats culture as an exogenous variable to development. This approach neglects the latent developmental potential embedded in the “shared poverty” cultural tradition. Such a theoretical blind spot is not unique to Indonesia but represents a broader challenge shared across the Global South: how to activate the developmental dynamics within traditional cultures without undermining their foundational values, thereby transforming “shared poverty” into “shared development.”

1. The Cultural Logic of “Shared Poverty” and the Developmental Dilemma

Historically, the formation of Indonesia’s “shared poverty” culture and its associated developmental challenges are not simply the residual effects of tradition. Instead, they are complex outcomes of colonial legacy, nation-building processes, and globalization.

(1) Historical Origins: Colonial Legacy and Cultural Adaptation

The emergence of Indonesia’s “shared poverty” culture is closely tied to Dutch colonial rule. The implementation of the Cultivation System (*cultuurstelsel*) required Javanese farmers to allocate 20% of their land for cash crops intended for export.^[3] This system reshaped local production relations and forced rural communities to develop mutual aid mechanisms in response to collective pressure. Deprived of resources, Javanese farmers responded by refining agricultural processes and creating more opportunities for labor participation—thus producing the phenomenon of “agricultural involution” described by Geertz.^[4]

This adaptive cultural mechanism was further reinforced over time. During the post-independence Sukarno era, the culture of “shared poverty” became intertwined with nationalist narratives of nation-building. The Javanese spirit of mutual aid (*gotong royong*) was elevated to the level of state ideology. Under Suharto’s New Order regime, the state incorporated this mechanism into an authoritarian patronage system, resulting in a top-down

model of sharing. Over time, this historical evolution forged a symbiotic relationship between the “shared poverty” culture and the modern bureaucratic system—on one hand mitigating social discontent, but on the other reinforcing the inertia of resource equalization.

(2) Cultural Mechanisms: Shared Risk and Developmental Involution

“Shared poverty” is not a simple form of egalitarianism; rather, it embodies a complex value system that includes risk-sharing, reciprocal obligations, and a reputation economy. At its core, this cultural mechanism embeds individual rational behavior within a framework of collective interest, achieving redistribution of resources through social pressure and moral norms.

In rural Java, individuals whose income exceeds the community average often face heightened expectations for mutual aid and stronger social pressure. This mechanism of “penalizing success” encourages rational actors to convert surplus income into social capital rather than productive investment. Conspicuous consumption—such as lavish weddings and religious ceremonies—becomes a way to meet social expectations. From an economic perspective, this can be understood as a risk diversification strategy in an environment of uncertainty, but its cost lies in suppressing incentives for innovation and capital accumulation.

In contemporary contexts, this cultural mechanism manifests as a threefold development dilemma: First, land continues to fragment, with the average farm size shrinking from 0.5 hectares in 1983 to just 0.2 hectares in 2019, making economies of scale difficult to achieve.^[5] Second, informal employment is widespread, with nearly 60% of the workforce engaged in the informal sector, where labor productivity is only one-third of that in the formal sector.^[6] Third, traditional mutual aid networks continue to function as social safety nets, but their limitations are increasingly evident: they cover only narrow scopes of support, lack sufficient capacity for resource mobilization, and are inadequate for effective risk diversification.

The deeper issue lies in how the culture of “shared poverty” creates a “low-level equilibrium trap”: rational individual behavior leads to collectively suboptimal outcomes, while the prevailing collective behavior patterns reinforce individual conservatism. This cultural–economic lock-in effect renders external policy interventions largely ineffective and, in some cases, produces unintended negative consequences.

2. Theoretical Breakthrough: Co-Evolution of Culture and Institutions

To understand the deep-rooted mechanisms behind Indonesia’s poverty alleviation challenges, it is essential to move beyond traditional development theories and construct a dynamic model of culture–institution interaction. Existing poverty alleviation theories tend to fall into a binary opposition between cultural determinism and cultural instrumentalism. The former sees culture as a fixed constraint that inevitably hinders modernization, while the latter treats culture as a mere policy tool, overlooking its internal logic and autonomy. This dichotomy neglects the dynamic and endogenous nature of culture and fails to explain why similar poverty alleviation policies produce divergent outcomes in different cultural

settings.

In reality, culture is neither purely a constraint variable nor merely an instrumental one—it is an endogenous variable within the development process. Culture shapes preference structures, behavioral patterns, and institutional expectations, while simultaneously being continuously adjusted and reconstructed through practice. The key issue is not whether culture obstructs development, but how to guide its evolution in a development-oriented direction while respecting its internal logic. Drawing on empirical research from fieldwork in Indonesia, I propose a “culture–institution co-evolution model”: culture and institutions are not antagonistic but form a dynamically co-constructed, symbiotic system. Culture provides the legitimacy and operating logic for institutions, while institutions offer platforms for cultural expression and practical implementation. Within this framework, elements of the “shared poverty” culture—such as mutual aid, risk-sharing consciousness, and community identity—can be transformed into cultural capital for inclusive growth. The key lies in institutional design that shifts traditional mutual aid networks from “equalizing dispersion” toward “accumulative mutualism,” thereby elevating “sharing” from a survival strategy to a driver of development.

3. Practical Pathways for Institutional Reconstruction

Guided by the theory of culture–institution co-evolution, Indonesia’s poverty alleviation policies must be grounded in cultural logic, creatively integrating traditional resources with modern elements to develop a locally rooted model of development.

(1) Innovative Integration of Islamic Finance and Community-Based Mutual Aid

As the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia holds unique potential in developing Islamic finance. By the end of 2024, total assets of Indonesian Islamic banks reached IDR 980.30 trillion, with an annual growth rate exceeding 20%.^[7] However, its penetration in rural areas remains limited, and many smallholder farmers continue to be excluded from the formal financial system.

The root cause of financial exclusion lies not only in geographical distance and transaction costs but also in the mismatch between existing financial products and rural cultural logic. The individual credit model of traditional banks often clashes with the collective decision-making traditions of village communities. Collateral requirements conflict with the collective ownership of land, and standardized product designs overlook the seasonal nature of agricultural production. By transforming traditional village mutual aid organizations (arisan) into cooperative entities and establishing partnerships with Islamic financial institutions, a culturally coherent inclusive financial system can be built. At the core of this model is the embedding of modern financial technology into traditional social networks, preserving the cultural essence of mutual aid while enhancing resource allocation efficiency. In a pilot project of the “Village Mutual Resource Bank” in Central Java, traditional rotating savings and credit associations were formalized into cooperative financial institutions, significantly improving farmers’ access to financial services and fostering a shared sense of development among community members. After two years of implementation, participating farmers have shown a marked increase in savings rates, a notable rise in productive investments, and a

strengthened internal network of economic cooperation.

(2) Culturally Adaptive Digital Technology Empowerment

Digital inclusive finance is emerging as a key tool for narrowing the resource gap in rural areas. According to Indonesia's Central Statistics Agency (BPS), as of 2023, the national mobile phone penetration rate reached 67.29%, with 170 million smartphone users,^[8] laying the groundwork for digital financial services to reach rural areas. However, the dual barriers of traditional financial exclusion and the digital divide mean that the development of digital inclusive finance must fully account for cultural adaptability.

The mere transplantation of technology often encounters cultural rejection and user resistance. Rural users tend to distrust digital payments, complex financial apps are difficult for older adults to use, and standardized digital products fail to meet the diverse needs of rural communities. The root of these problems lies in the disregard for the cultural context of technological application and the mistaken assumption that technology is a value-neutral tool.

The poverty alleviation model of "religious leaders + digital platforms" represents an innovative approach to cultural-technological integration. In Indonesian Islamic communities, religious leaders (ulama) and Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) hold high levels of social trust and mobilization capacity, serving as crucial bridges between tradition and modernity. Integrating these traditional authority structures with modern digital platforms can generate synergies between cultural identity and technological empowerment.

Field research indicates that digital entrepreneurship training programs led by pesantren are more effective than direct government interventions in encouraging community participation. These programs integrate Islamic business ethics with modern commercial skills, not only improving participants' technical capabilities but also strengthening their cultural confidence. The programs are particularly effective in reaching women and youth, as religious networks provide them with culturally legitimate spaces to engage in economic activities.

4. The Practical Significance of South-South Cooperation and Its Global Implications

Indonesia's cultural transformation in poverty alleviation holds not only local relevance but also critical demonstrative value for development cooperation among countries in the Global South.

(1) The Paradigmatic Value of China–Indonesia Poverty Alleviation Cooperation

China–Indonesia cooperation in poverty alleviation exemplifies mutual learning and experience-sharing among Global South nations. Its success transcends traditional technology transfer models, embodying a new paradigm of development cooperation grounded in cultural understanding.

Since 2005, the Indonesian government has implemented a hybrid rice promotion policy under which the government fully subsidizes the seeds and farmers voluntarily enroll to receive them. Over 90% of the hybrid rice seeds have been sourced from China.^[9] However, the mere dissemination of technology yielded limited outcomes. The real breakthrough

occurred when technology was organically integrated into cultural networks. When hybrid rice technology was disseminated through village mutual aid networks and coupled with Islamic microcredit to support seed purchases, adoption rates among farmers increased significantly.

Between 2019 and 2021, the integrated project “Islamic Agricultural Cooperatives + Hybrid Rice,” implemented in Central Java, led to increased yields and higher net income per hectare for participating farmers.^[10] More importantly, the project transformed the traditional labor-intensive model of “shared poverty” by introducing modern agricultural technologies and management methods, thereby shifting toward a model of “shared development.”

The project's success lay in its integration of technological innovation with cultural networks, transitioning village-level mutual aid from mere income equalization to optimized allocation of productive resources. The cooperative served not only as a vehicle for technology dissemination but also as a platform for cultural transformation. Through collective learning and joint practice, it gradually reshaped farmers’ perceptions and behaviors. The deeper significance of this change lies in the functional transformation of traditional mutual aid culture into a modern cooperative economy, injecting new vitality into rural development in Indonesia.

(2) Constructing a Culturally Respectful Model of Development Assistance

Traditional development aid often rests on Western-centric modernization assumptions that neglect the cultural particularities of recipient countries, leading to ineffective or even harmful outcomes. The success of China-Indonesia cooperation lies in constructing a culturally respectful model of development assistance—not a simple transplantation of



Since 2005, the Indonesian government has implemented a hybrid rice promotion policy.

technology, but a collaboration designed through a deep understanding of Indonesian cultural logic and tailored to local needs.

This model manifests on three levels. First, in educational cooperation, the establishment of the China-Indonesia Poverty Alleviation Institute aims to cultivate professionals familiar with both countries' cultures and poverty alleviation experiences, laying a talent foundation for long-term cooperation. Second, in agricultural cooperation, it is not only the introduction of China's hybrid rice technology that matters, but also the institutional innovation linking smallholder farmers with modern agriculture. Third, in cultural and creative industries, the two sides jointly develop innovative models that transform traditional culture into economic assets, such as Islamic financial product design and cultural tourism development.

This model of South-South cooperation—based on cultural respect and reciprocal development—goes beyond the traditional aid-dependency paradigm to establish an equal and mutually beneficial partnership. It promotes not only the bidirectional flow of technology and experience, but more importantly, offers valuable insights for Global South countries seeking autonomous development paths.

5. Paradigm Innovation for Development in the Global South

Indonesia's experience shows that culture and development are not a zero-sum game, but can instead be mutually reinforcing. The key lies in finding a balance between cultural heritage and modern development, and integrating the two through institutional innovation. The theoretical value of this development model is its break with the culture-economy dichotomy of traditional development theories, proposing instead an analytical framework that internalizes culture as a variable in development.

Within this framework, culture is not merely a contextual backdrop but an intrinsic factor and latent driver of development. The challenge facing Global South countries is how to activate the developmental potential within traditional cultures—without undermining cultural foundations—and transform elements that appear to hinder development into forms of social capital that support inclusive growth.


Indonesia's transformation from "shared poverty" to "shared development" provides important lessons for Global South countries seeking to maintain cultural autonomy while advancing inclusive development. The promotion of such a development model requires strong support from South-South cooperation. The advantage of South-South cooperation lies in the partners' shared historical experiences and cultural backgrounds, making it easier to understand and respect each other's development needs. Compared with traditional North-South cooperation, South-South cooperation emphasizes equality and mutual benefit, avoiding issues of cultural hegemony and dependency.

The successful experience of China-Indonesia poverty alleviation cooperation demonstrates that South-South cooperation, grounded in cultural respect and reciprocal development, can effectively facilitate the two-way flow of technologies and experiences and establish equal, mutually beneficial development partnerships. This model not only benefits the development of participating countries but also provides valuable references for constructing a fairer and more inclusive global development order.

6. Conclusion: The Dialectics of Cultural Transformation

The cultural tensions and institutional restructuring in Indonesia's poverty alleviation policies reveal a fundamental challenge facing Global South countries: how to preserve cultural autonomy during modernization, and how to transform traditional cultural resources into drivers of development. This exploration transcends the limitations of conventional development theories by proposing a new paradigm of culture-institution co-evolution.

The key to cultural transformation lies in "grafting" rather than "replacing." It is not about simply transplanting technologies, but guiding the growth of traditional culture through institutional innovation while retaining its cultural roots. This requires both respect for historical cultural continuity and adaptation to the demands of contemporary development; it calls for maintaining cultural uniqueness while enhancing inclusiveness and openness.

Against the backdrop of building a community with a shared future for humanity, the exploration of poverty alleviation paths rooted in local cultures yet oriented toward global development is essential for constructing a fairer and more inclusive world. Indonesia's transformation is not only of theoretical significance, but also offers novel ideas and approaches for global poverty governance. Cultural diversity should not be seen as an obstacle to development, but as a vital driver of human progress. Only by respecting cultural differences can inclusive development be realized and a better world built. In this sense, Indonesia's poverty alleviation journey is not just a national development effort, but an important part of humanity's collective pursuit of a better life. 

注释 References:

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[摘要]

在全球南方崛起的背景下，以伊斯兰文明为核心的马来世界为探索多元现代性提供了独特范例。该区域立足于自身文明传统，通过在各领域的持续自我更新，对现代性进行着调适与超越。其路径具体表现为：在法律和教育上，使伊斯兰教法和宗教教育适应现代化议程；在政治上，伊斯兰政党日益成为重要力量；在经济上，天课义务、穆斯林企业家和新中产的崛起、创新的伊斯兰金融体系共同构成其现代化动力；在社会层面，民间伊斯兰团体发挥着维护稳定的关键作用。然而，马来世界的探索亦面临西方对伊斯兰世界的持续污名化、本土极端主义威胁及国际冲突外溢等严峻挑战。展望未来，其成败关键在于能否在保持文化主体性的同时，实现社会公平与技术进步的平衡。

马来世界对多元现代性的探索*

[中国] 许利平

关键词：马来世界 伊斯兰文明 多元现代性

随着百年未有之大变局加速演变，全球南方群体性崛起逐渐成为 21 世纪国际政治经济秩序重塑的显著特征之一。而全球南方群体崛起离不开对多元现代性探索。这种探索基于全球南方各国战略自主性，从各自具体国情出发，以本土文化为内核，进行现代化变革与推进，是对现代全球文明的积极贡献。

习近平指出，“多样文明是世界的本色”^[1]。作为世界多样文明的重要组成部分，马来世界以伊斯兰文明为核心，在文化、教育、政治、经济、社会等领域不断推动现代化进程，构成了非西方社会对现代性探索的一个重要部分。

马来世界来自马来语 *Dunia Melayu* 或 *Alam Melayu*，指以马来-印尼语为媒介、共享相似的传统习俗与伊斯兰信仰的东南亚海岛区域。马来世界不仅是一个地理概念，而且是一个历史和文化概念，更

是一个系统的文明体系。从这个意义上讲，马来世界对多元现代性探索，则是一个传统文明体系对现代性的调适与超越过程。

法律的调适

作为马来世界的主体，马来穆斯林的行为方式受到伊斯兰教法及其相关法律的约束。伊斯兰教法 (*shariah*) 即《古兰经》所启示的，由圣训构筑的天命总和。“它的内容从礼拜仪式、宗教义务到道德准则、法律规范，几乎包含了人类的全部行为。它相当于一种宗教伦理的行为规范，实质上是一种包罗万象的应尽义务体系。”^[2]

按照伊斯兰教法，人的行为规范包括五个方面：义务性的行为，值得赞许的、有价值的善行，许可的行为，受指责的不良行为，被禁止的行为。上述行为的规范在不同的时期、不同的地区有不同的变化，

其本质在于伊斯兰法律不断适应马来世界现代化诉求。比如“购买和售卖人寿保险是被禁止的行为，这是马来西亚的丁加奴州伊斯兰教法庭的判决。但是埃及的宗教顾问把它列为是许可的行为。利用避孕药进行计划生育计划是被允许的，但是马来西亚的各地有不同的规定。在吉打州被允许；吉兰丹州是被指责的行为；雪兰莪则是被禁止的行为。肾脏移植在紧急时刻（救命的时候）是被允许的。在霹雳州和雪兰莪州也允许心脏和眼角膜移植手术，但是在森美兰州完全禁止这些手术”^[3]。

伊斯兰教法律由伊斯兰教法官卡迪（Qadi）来执行。根据法律，卡迪必须是一名对圣典和现代各个国家的伊斯兰教法律有研究的伊斯兰教学者。当他有任何问题时，可以请教宗教顾问穆夫提（Mufti），这位顾问通常是伊斯兰教理事会的主席或会员。于是宗教顾问会根据伊斯兰教法律（Fikh）发出一道法特瓦（Fatwa，教令），

他甚至可以从著名法官的案例中找出“现成”的解决方法。

作为教令，法特瓦并没有约束力，它必须获得伊斯兰教法庭或宗教界理事会的支持，同时还必须获得中央政府的批准和同意。在马来西亚的一些州，禁止人寿保险和计划生育的两条伊斯兰教判决无法获得执行，便是因为得不到中央政府的支持，主要是考虑非马来穆斯林群体的感受。

教育的更新

人们一般认为，宗教教育会束缚人们的头脑，抹杀个人的创造性，对现代化所要求的关键因素——技术进步是一个巨大的障碍。但是根据笔者在马来世界的调研，宗教教育在国家现代化中所起的作用和扮演的角色是十分复杂的，不能一言以否之。

伊斯兰教育首先从清真寺和小礼拜寺开始。根据《古兰经》的解释，清真寺不



清真寺不仅作为礼拜，讨论和藏书的场所，而且是小孩学习伊斯兰教基础知识的场所

仅作为礼拜，讨论和藏书的场所，而且是小孩学习伊斯兰教基础知识的场所。它的教育功能体现在以下几个方面：教育孩子坚持每天向真主祈祷；培养孩子对科学知识的热爱和与社会的凝聚力以及作为社会和国家的一员对其应尽的义务和责任；通过在耐心、勇气、意识、沉思、乐观和研究等思想和心理素质方面的训练，培养孩子内心潜在的成稳感、力量感和繁荣感。

清真寺的教育设施包括图书室、讨论室和教室。根据1989年的统计，全印尼有清真寺196612座，小礼拜寺369342座。^[4]这些大大小小的清真寺遍布印尼的乡村和城市，对印尼的教育有着不可磨灭的作用。马来西亚全国目前有清真寺2000座左右。根据笔者的调查，现在吉隆坡的一些清真寺，在周六和周日，一些空余的教室也被利用起来，作为小学生补习功课之用。可见，清真寺正在快速融入现代社会之中。

在印尼、马来西亚等马来世界核心国家，伊斯兰宗教学校分布较广。它有具体的教学计划和课程表，有完整的学校行政管理机构，采用古典的教学制度，学生有年龄的限制，学生必须交纳学费，分班学习。与伊斯兰私塾学校最大的不同，伊斯兰宗教学校不仅教授《古兰经》和阿拉伯文，而且还讲授普通学校的一般的文化课程。不同的历史时期，规定不同的授课时间比例。近年来，它的世俗的文化课的授课时间远远超过了宗教课程。在教育制度方面，伊斯兰宗教学校与现代教育制度接轨，不仅设置了小学、初中和高中基础教育体制，而且还设置了高等教育体制，这体现了伊斯兰教育在面对现代化挑战的一种自我更新。

全面的政治参与

政治参与的扩大、政治威权的理性化

和政治结构与功能的分化，常被看作是政治现代化的三个重要指标。马来穆斯林精英和伊斯兰政党在其合法性、制度性的政治参与中，不断推进马来世界的政治现代化。

在马来世界的核心国家，政府的决策层主要为马来穆斯林的精英，非马来穆斯林则被排挤在权力中心之外。这些马来穆斯林的精英都自称是虔诚的伊斯兰教信徒，作为乌玛代行真主权力。这样，威权的政府就在政治上取得了无可辩驳的合法性。这种合法性基础为马来世界大力推动追赶型的现代化提供了强大的动力。

在马来世界的核心国家众多大选中，伊斯兰党势力历来是任何世俗政党都不可小视的。1955年，在印尼大选中，伊斯兰政党势力十分强大。伊斯兰党派的得票率就超过了半数。^[5]后来由于历届政府对伊斯兰政党采取了一定的限制措施，伊斯兰政党在历届的大选中，获得支持率在27%~29%之间。

在马来西亚，伊斯兰党日渐壮大，党员大多是不满巫统世俗主义倾向的前巫统党员。该党主张用伊斯兰建国，骨干多是伊斯兰青年教师，主要的势力在马来西亚的农村地区。从1959年赢得议会中的13个席位，到1999年赢得27个席位。2022年议会选举中，一举获得43个议席，成为国会第一大政党，这说明伊斯兰党通过大选，其政治参与度在不断增强。

强化经济的内驱力

马来世界的经济现代化在一定程度上来源于其内在的三大动力，即伊斯兰教义中的天课义务、马来穆斯林企业家和中产阶级积极进取以及伊斯兰金融的助推。

首先，天课制度的天然设计。

在伊斯兰教的教义中，五功是每个穆斯林应尽的义务。其中，天课则是五功之一。

《古兰经》规定：“在他们的财产中，有乞丐和贫民的权利。”就是说，政府应当从政府的财产中提取一部分的份额给穷人。为了使穷人得到自己应有的权利，让政府和富人履行自己的义务，伊斯兰教确立了天课和施舍的制度。“在印尼，40年代，马斯友美党主张用天课的税款来补贴农民和小商人。在60年代，苏加诺政府时期，天课被用于孤儿院和穆斯林教育。”^[6]马来西亚政府有时把天课用在人民信托公会，促进职业培训、咨询服务、贷款和运输等服务。

在马来世界的现代化进程中，经济建设通常会面临资金短缺、失业率高和社会分配不公等问题，因此，如何扩充私人 and 公共积累、充分开发和合理配置国家资源、改善社会福利等成为国家经济现代化要解决的难题。而制定符合国情的天课制度将有利于扩大私人 and 公共积累，有利于扩大社会储蓄从而刺激扩大再生产，对经济现代化起积极推动作用。

其次，马来穆斯林企业家和中产阶级的积极进取。

在马来世界的工业化过程中，华人扮演着十分重要的角色，同时也不能忽略马来穆斯林的容忍、耐心、勇敢的企业家精神。这些品质摒弃了一些传统的性格弱点，并融合了一些现代的企业家精神。20世纪60年代，在马来西亚诞生了一批马来穆斯林企业家。这些企业家都是来自马来西亚的城市郊区，大部分由农民、小贸易商和乡镇企业家组成。他们的成就得益于拉扎克政府在城市郊区的大规模建设项目。同时，马来西亚政府实施“新经济政策”之后，诞生了一批新兴的中产阶级，被称为“新马来人”。他们受过良好教育，前卫，

诚实，守纪律、守信誉，有的成为大型公司的董事长，从事高端的跨国企业并购和管理。

再次，伊斯兰金融的助推。

20世纪70~80年代，在马来西亚兴起了一场声势浩大的伊斯兰复兴运动，政府开始在经济领域大力推进伊斯兰化，包括创立伊斯兰金融机构。在马来西亚，政府根据相关法律设立一套与世俗金融系统完全齐备的伊斯兰金融系统，包括银行、金融公司、非金融公司和金融市场。马来西亚这套独树一帜的金融系统，在国际上被称为双系统。在其他伊斯兰国家，要么是完全的伊斯兰金融系统，要么是世俗的金融系统加上零星的伊斯兰金融机构。马来西亚伊斯兰的金融系统具有完整性、系统性，分工细致，所提供的金融品种和服务也比较完备，具有一定的竞争力，近年来也在引进新技术进行升级。

印尼的金融系统仍然是常规金融系统占主导地位，还没有建立起像马来西亚的双系统，但伊斯兰金融发展速度很快。2024年，印尼伊斯兰金融资产达到9927万亿印尼盾，是国内生产总值的45%。其中，伊斯兰银行的资产占整个伊斯兰金融资产的10%，其增长率为7.6%，稍高于常规银行增长率7%。^[7]这表明伊斯兰银行与常规银行的竞争日益激烈，伊斯兰金融力量逐渐强大起来，正在成为经济增长的新动力。

总之，马来世界的伊斯兰金融机构为普通客户提供了另外一种金融品种。在新的规则下，银行和客户的关系转变成契约式商业合伙关系，从而提高了中小商人、中小企业主的地位，在一定程度上解决了中小企业的融资难的问题，为缩小贫富差距打下了良好的基础，以利于社会的稳定和平衡发展，为经济的现代化创造良好的环境。



穆罕默迪亚开办了许多学校、医院和慈善机构，为市民社会打下牢固的基础

维护社会稳定和谐

社会民间团体是实现社会自律秩序、维护社会稳定的中坚力量。在印尼，存在着三大民间伊斯兰团体：伊斯兰教师联合会、穆罕默迪亚协会和印尼穆斯林知识分子联合会。伊斯兰教师联合会，主要创办伊斯兰教育，为市民社会输送了不少人才。穆罕默迪亚开办了许多学校、医院和慈善机构，为市民社会打下牢固的基础。印尼穆斯林知识分子联合会，主要是穆斯林官僚，代表的是中产阶级的利益，是市民社会一支稳定的建设力量。以上三个组织在不同的历史时期，推动在教育、文化、福利、行政等领域的工作，为建设一个稳定、和谐社会做出了积极贡献。

在马来西亚的现代化进程中，伊斯兰姐妹组织在维护妇女权益方面发挥了重要作用。该组织致力于根据《古兰经》规定的平等、正义和自由的原则，维护伊斯兰社会中妇女的权益。如今的马来西亚伊斯

兰姐妹组织已经发展成为拥有几十万名会员的全国性组织，影响越来越大。其活动充分利用各种形式的媒体，以宣传《古兰经》为基本使命，维护妇女权益，弘扬伊斯兰正统法制思想，除旧立新，提高伊斯兰法制公正和民主的形象。

总之，稳定和开放是打开马来世界未来的钥匙。处于世界交通枢纽和多元文化交汇点的马来世界，在面临全球化时代，正在不断进行自我调节与更新。同时，马来世界对多元现代性的探索，本质上是试图构建一种既植根于伊斯兰文化和马来传统，又能包容全球化、科技进步和多元族群的一种现代化范式。这一过程充满矛盾与创新，为全球南方国家的现代化提供了重要参考，即现代性不必是单色的、西方的，而且可以是多彩的、本土化的。未来，马来世界能否在保持文化主体性的同时实现社会公平、公正与技术进步，将是其多元现代性探索成败的关键。

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The Malay World's Exploration of Multiple Modernities

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As the once-in-a-century transformation accelerates its evolution, the collective rise of the Global South has gradually become one of the defining characteristics reshaping the international political and economic order in the 21st century. The emergence of the Global South is inextricably linked to its exploration of multiple modernities. This exploration, grounded in the strategic autonomy of Global South nations, proceeds from their specific national conditions with local culture at its core to drive modernization reforms and advancement. It brings non-Western experiences into sharper focus, representing a positive contribution to contemporary global civilization.

As President Xi Jinping emphasized, “Civilizational diversity is the defining feature of our world.”^[1] As a vital component of this diverse civilizational landscape, the Malay World—with Islamic civilization as its nucleus—has continuously advanced modernization across cultural, educational, political, economic, and social spheres. These efforts constitute a significant component of non-Western societies’ exploration of modernity.

The Malay World, derived from the Malay terms “Dunia Melayu” or “Alam Melayu”, refers to the maritime regions of Southeast Asia where Malay-Indonesian languages serve as the medium, and where people share similar traditional cultural practices and Islamic faith. The Malay World is not only a geographical concept but also a historical and cultural one, and, more importantly, a systematic civilizational entity. In this sense, the Malay World’s exploration of multiple modernities is a process of adaptation and transcendence by a traditional civilization in the face of modernity.

Legal Adaptation

As the main body of the Malay World, Malay Muslims are bound by Islamic law (Shariah) and related legal systems. Shariah is the sum of divine commandments revealed in the Quran and elaborated in the Hadith. “Its content ranges from worship rituals and religious obligations to moral principles and legal norms, encompassing almost all human behavior. It functions as a religious-ethical code of conduct, essentially a comprehensive system of duties.”^[2]

According to Islamic law, human behavior is categorized into five types: obligatory acts; commendable and virtuous acts; permissible acts; blameworthy acts; and forbidden acts. The norms for these behaviors vary across periods and regions, reflecting the adaptation of Islamic law to the modernization demands of the Malay World. For example, “buying and selling life insurance is a forbidden act, as ruled by the Islamic court of Terengganu, Malaysia.

However, Egypt's religious authorities classify it as permissible. The use of contraceptives for family planning is permitted, but regulations differ across Malaysian states: allowed in Kedah, discouraged in Kelantan, and prohibited in Selangor. Kidney transplants are permitted in emergencies (to save lives). Heart and cornea transplants are allowed in Perak and Selangor but completely banned in Negeri Sembilan.^[3]

Islamic law is enforced by judges (Qadi), who must be scholars well-versed in Islamic scriptures and modern Islamic legal systems across countries. When in doubt, a Qadi may consult a religious advisor (Mufti), typically the chair or member of an Islamic council. The Mufti issues a fatwa (religious edict) based on Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh), sometimes drawing on precedents from renowned judges.

As religious edicts, fatwas are not binding unless supported by Islamic courts or councils and approved by central governments. In some Malaysian states, prohibitions on life insurance and family planning have not been enforced due to lack of central government support, primarily to accommodate non-Malay Muslim sentiments.

Educational Renewal

It is commonly believed that religious education stifles creativity and hinders technological progress—a key factor in modernization. However, based on fieldwork in the Malay World, the role of religious education in national modernization is complex and cannot be dismissed outright.

Islamic education begins in mosques and prayer halls. According to the Quran, mosques serve not only as places of worship, discussion, and book storage, but also as venues for teaching children the fundamentals of Islam. The educational functions of mosques include: instilling daily prayer habits; fostering a love for knowledge, social cohesion, and civic responsibility; and cultivating traits like patience, courage, mindfulness, optimism, and critical thinking.

Mosques are equipped with libraries, discussion rooms, and classrooms. In 1989, Indonesia had 196,612 mosques and 369,342 prayer halls^[4], spread across urban and rural areas, playing an indelible role in education. Malaysia has around 2000 mosques nationwide. I also found that some mosques in Kuala Lumpur now use spare classrooms for weekend tutoring, which demonstrates their rapid integration into modern society.

In core Malay World countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, Islamic religious schools (madrasahs) are widespread. These schools have structured curricula, administrative systems, and age-based classes, charging tuition fees. Unlike traditional Islamic schools (pondok), madrasahs teach both the Quran/Arabic and secular subjects, with secular courses increasingly dominating in recent years. Madrasahs have also modernized their education systems, offering primary, secondary, and higher education—a testament to Islamic education's self-renewal in response to modernization.

Comprehensive Political Participation

The expansion of political participation, the rationalization of political authority, and the

differentiation of political structures and functions are often regarded as three important indicators of political modernization. Malay Muslim elites and Islamic political parties, in their legitimate and institutionalized political participation, have been continuously advancing the political modernization of the Malay world.

In core Malay World countries, political decision-making is dominated by Malay Muslim elites, with non-Malay Muslims often excluded from power centers. These elites, self-identified as devout Muslims, derive political legitimacy from their role as stewards (ummah) of divine authority. Such legitimacy foundation has provided powerful impetus for the Malay World to vigorously promote its catch-up modernization.

In the core countries of the Malay World, Islamic political parties have consistently been a force that no secular party can afford to underestimate in numerous general elections. In Indonesia's 1955 general election, Islamic political parties demonstrated remarkable strength, with their combined vote share exceeding 50%.^[5] Subsequently, due to certain restrictive measures implemented by successive governments against Islamic parties, their electoral support has stabilized between 27% to 29% in subsequent elections.

In Malaysia, the Islamic Party (PAS) has experienced gradual growth, with its membership primarily consisting of former UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) members dissatisfied with UMNO's secularist tendencies. PAS advocates for establishing an Islamic state, with its core leadership largely comprising young Islamic religious teachers. The party draws its main support from Malaysia's rural areas. From winning 13 parliamentary seats in 1959, PAS expanded its representation to 27 seats by 1999. In a significant breakthrough during the 2022 parliamentary elections, the party secured 43 seats, emerging as the largest party in parliament. This electoral trajectory clearly demonstrates the steadily increasing



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political participation and influence of PAS through electoral processes.

Endogenous Drivers for Economy

The economic modernization of the Malay World is driven by three internal forces: the Islamic obligation of zakat (almsgiving), the dynamism of Malay Muslim entrepreneurs/middle class, and the rise of Islamic finance.

First, the natural design of the zakat system.

In Islamic teachings, the Five Pillars are obligatory duties for every Muslim. Among them, zakat is one of the Five Pillars. The Quran stipulates: "And in their wealth is a recognized right for the beggar and the poor." This means governments should allocate a portion of public funds to the poor. To ensure the poor receive their due rights and to compel governments and the wealthy to fulfill their obligations, Islam established the systems of zakat and charity. "In the 1940s the reformist Masjumi party in Indonesia reportedly used zakat collected by party organizations to benefit farmers and small traders, and in the 1960s President Sukarno urged his people to give zakat, promising it would not be used to pay off the national debt, but rather would be expended on Islamic orphanages and educational institutions." ¹⁶¹ The Malaysian government sometimes channels zakat funds to MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat) to support services like vocational training, consulting, loans, and transportation.

In the modernization process of the Malay World, economic development often faces problems such as capital shortages, high unemployment rates, and unequal social distribution. Therefore, how to expand private and public accumulation, fully develop and rationally allocate national resources, and improve social welfare have become challenges in national economic modernization. The establishment of a zakat system suited to national conditions will help expand private and public accumulation, increase social savings to stimulate expanded reproduction, and play a positive role in promoting economic modernization.

Second, the proactive spirit of Malay Muslim entrepreneurs and the middle class.

In the process of industrialization in the Malay World, the local Chinese community has played a very important role, while the entrepreneurial spirit of the Malay Muslims should not be overlooked. The entrepreneurial spirit of Malay Muslims is characterized by qualities such as tolerance, patience, and courage. These qualities discard some traditional weaknesses while incorporating elements of modern entrepreneurship.

In the 1960s, a group of Malay Muslim entrepreneurs emerged in Malaysia. These entrepreneurs mainly came from the suburban areas of Malaysia, most of whom were farmers, small traders, and rural entrepreneurs. Their achievements benefited from the Razak government's large-scale construction projects in suburban areas. At the same time, after the implementation of the "New Economic Policy" by the Malaysian government, a new middle class emerged, also known as the "New Malays." They are well-educated, knowledgeable, progressive, honest, disciplined and trustworthy. Some of them have become chairmen of major corporations, engaging in international mergers and acquisitions and corporate management.

Third, the boost from Islamic finance.

In the 1970s and 1980s, a large-scale Islamic revival movement emerged in Malaysia. One of the outcomes of this movement was that the government began to vigorously promote Islamization in the economic field, including the establishment of Islamic financial institutions. In Malaysia, the government established a fully equipped Islamic financial system alongside the conventional financial system under relevant laws, including banks, financial companies, non-financial companies, and financial markets.

Internationally, Malaysia's unique financial system is known as a dual system. In other Muslim countries, there is either a completely Islamic financial system or a conventional financial system with scattered Islamic financial institutions. Malaysia's Islamic financial system demonstrates remarkable integrity and systematic structure, featuring meticulous division of labor and relatively comprehensive financial products and services, which have endowed it with considerable competitiveness. In recent years, it has been actively incorporating new technologies for system upgrading.

The completeness and systematic nature of Malaysia's Islamic financial institutions are its key features. The establishment of these Islamic financial institutions provides Malay Muslims with more options, and these institutions have detailed divisions of labor, offering relatively comprehensive financial products and services with certain competitiveness. Facing the information age, the Islamic financial system continues to update and transform itself by introducing new technological solutions.

Indonesia's financial system is still dominated by conventional finance and has not yet established a dual system like Malaysia's, but Islamic finance is developing rapidly. In 2024, Indonesia's Islamic financial assets reached 9,927 trillion Indonesian rupiah, accounting for 45% of GDP. Among them, Islamic bank assets accounted for 10% of total Islamic financial assets, with a growth rate of 7.6%, slightly higher than the conventional bank growth rate of 7%.^[7] This shows that competition between Islamic and conventional banks is intensifying, Islamic financial power is gradually strengthening, and it is becoming a new driver of economic growth.


In summary, Islamic financial institutions in the Malay World provide ordinary customers with alternative financial products. Under the new rules, the relationship between banks and customers transforms into a contractual commercial partnership, thereby elevating the status of small and medium-sized merchants and business owners, to some extent solving the financing difficulties faced by SMEs, laying a good foundation for narrowing the wealth gap, and contributing to social stability and balanced development, thus creating a favorable environment for economic modernization.

Maintaining Social Stability and Harmony

Non-governmental social organizations are the backbone for achieving a self-regulating social order and maintaining social stability. In Indonesia, there are three major civil Islamic organizations: Nahdlatul Ulama (the Federation of Islamic Scholars), Muhammadiyah (the Muhammadiyah Association), and the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). Nahdlatul Ulama primarily focuses on establishing Islamic educational institutions,

cultivating numerous talented individuals for civil society. Muhammadiyah has established many schools, hospitals, and charitable institutions, laying a solid foundation for civil society. The Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, mainly composed of Muslim bureaucrats, represents the interests of the middle class and serves as a stable, constructive force in the development of civil society. Throughout different historical periods, these three organizations have advanced efforts in education, culture, social welfare, and administration, making significant contributions to the building of a stable and harmonious society.

In the modernization process of Malaysia, Sisters in Islam (SIS) has played a vital role in upholding women's rights. SIS is dedicated to protecting the rights of women based on the principles of equality, justice, and freedom as prescribed in the Quran. Today, SIS has grown into a national organization with hundreds of thousands of members. Its activities leverage various forms of media to promote the teachings of the Quran, protect women's rights, champion the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, reform outdated practices, and enhance the image of Islamic law as both just and democratic.

In conclusion, stability and openness are the keys to unlocking the future of the Malay world. Positioned at a crossroads of global transportation and a meeting point of diverse cultures, the Malay world is continuously undergoing self-adjustment and renewal in the face of globalization. Meanwhile, the Malay world's exploration of multiple modernities is, in essence, an attempt to construct a paradigm of modernization that is both rooted in Islamic culture and Malay tradition, yet also accommodates globalization, technological progress, and multi-ethnic diversity. This process is filled with contradictions and innovations, and provides an important reference for the modernization of Global South nations—namely, that modernity does not have to be monochrome and Western, but can be multi-colored and localized. The future of the Malay world's pursuit of multiple modernities will hinge on its ability to maintain cultural subjectivity while achieving social equity, justice, and technological progress. 

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Global South and Southeast Asia



为什么发起GSN?

在世界格局重塑之际，全球南方不仅在政治、经济层面崛起，更迫切需要知识的自我觉醒。GSN（Global South Network）正是由此发起的独立、非营利的知识网络与交流平台，旨在系统探讨南方各项议题，推动南方世界的知识去殖民化与主体性重建，培育以南方为主体的概念框架、研究方法与叙事坐标。通过论坛、出版、会议与沙龙等形式，GSN希望搭建持续对话的公共空间。我们的愿景是构筑开放、平等、互信的南方知识共同体，联结多元经验，生成可被实践检验的知识成果，将思想化为改变现实的力量。

Why We Initiate GSN?

Amid the reshaping of the global order, the Global South is rising not only in political and economic terms but, more urgently, in its need for intellectual self-awakening. GSN (Global South Network) was initiated in this context as an independent, non-profit knowledge network and communication platform. It seeks to systematically examine key issues of the Global South, advance the decolonization of knowledge and the reclaiming of intellectual subjectivity in the Southern world, cultivate conceptual frameworks, research methods, and narrative coordinates that highlights the subjectivity of the South. Through forums, publications, conferences, and salons, GSN hopes to create a public space for ongoing dialogue. Our vision is to build an open, equitable, and trust-based knowledge community in the South, connect diverse experiences, produce knowledge outcomes that can be tested in practice, and turn ideas into forces for real-world change.